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Abstract
Every organisation needs to exchange and disseminate data constantly amongst its employees, members, cus-
tomers and partners. Disseminated data is often sensitive or confidential and access to it should be restricted to
authorised recipients. Several enterprise rights management (ERM) systems and data protection solutions have
been proposed by both academia and industry to enable usage control on disseminated data, i.e. to allow data
originators to retain control over whom accesses their information, under which circumstances, and how it is
used. This is often obtained by means of cryptographic techniques and thus by disseminating encrypted data
that only trustworthy recipients can decrypt. Most of these solutions assume data recipients are connected to
the network and able to contact remote policy evaluation authorities that can evaluate usage control policies and
issue decryption keys. This assumption oversimplifies the problem by neglecting situations where connectivity
is not available, as often happens in crisis management scenarios. In such situations, recipients may not be
able to access the information they have received. Also, while using data, recipients and their applications can
create new derived information, either by aggregating data from several sources or transforming the original
data’s content or format. Existing solutions mostly neglect this problem and do not allow originators to retain
control over this derived data despite the fact that it may be more sensitive or valuable than the data originally
disseminated.
In this thesis we propose an ERM architecture that caters for both derived data control and usage control in
partially disconnected networks. We propose the use of a novel policy lattice model based on information flow
and mandatory access control. Sets of policies controlling the usage of data can be specified and ordered in a
lattice according to the level of protection they provide. At the same time, their association with specific data
objects is mandated by rules (content verification procedures) defined in a data sharing agreement (DSA) stip-
ulated amongst the organisations sharing information. When data is transformed, the new policies associated
with it are automatically determined depending on the transformation used and the policies currently associated
with the input data. The solution we propose takes into account transformations that can both increase or reduce
the sensitivity of information, thus giving originators a flexible means to control their data and its derivations.
When data must be disseminated in disconnected environments, the movement of users and the ad hoc con-
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nections they establish can be exploited to distribute information. To allow users to decrypt disseminated data
without contacting remote evaluation authorities, we integrate our architecture with a mechanism for authority
devolution, so that users moving in the disconnected area can be granted the right to evaluate policies and issue
decryption keys. This allows recipients to contact any nearby user that is also a policy evaluation authority to
obtain decryption keys. The mechanism has been shown to be efficient so that timely access to data is possible
despite the lack of connectivity. Prototypes of the proposed solutions that protect XML documents have been
developed. A realistic crisis management scenario has been used to show both the flexibility of the presented
approach for derived data control and the efficiency of the authority devolution solution when handling data
dissemination in simulated partially disconnected networks.
While existing systems do not offer any means to control derived data and only offer partial solutions to
the problem of lack of connectivity (e.g. by caching decryption keys), we have defined a set of solutions
that help data originators faced with the shortcomings of current proposals to control their data in innovative,
problem-oriented ways.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Information management is one of the most important aspects of an organisation’s life that can often make the
difference between success and failure. While conducting their business, organisations and individuals produce,
share and process vast amounts of information. Information on customers, partners, competitors, products, ser-
vices, business and research activities is gathered, created anew or obtained from third parties. Gathering or
creating new information is a very expensive activity that requires organisations to invest substantial resources.
Information is thus considered an important asset that must be leveraged by widely disseminating it both inter-
nally within the originating organisation and externally with clients and collaborators. In large multinational
organisations, data frequently crosses administrative borders and is even subject to different legislative con-
straints. Inter-organisation partnerships and joint projects are based on the assumption that the cooperating
partners are willing to share their data. However, shared and disseminated information must be protected from
unauthorised access or use because of its intrinsic commercial or personal value. Unintended disclosures may
not only undermine marketing and commercial plans or reveal confidential information about products and
research activities, but might also have a cost in terms of public credibility. The need to control data after its
acquisition or transmission does not solely arise from the confidentiality of data but also from an increasing
amount of legislation regarding the handling of private and medical data (such as HIPAA in the USA [JD96],
and the data protection act in the UK [act98]), the freedom of information availability [foi00, foi66], data reten-
tion requirements for auditing [sox02]. For example, the latest european directives on data protection [eud12]
will force companies to pay a great deal of attention to data protection practices with threats of severe penalties
in the form of fines or bans to operate in the abiding countries. Privacy thus represents a large and increasing en-
terprise risk for companies to take into consideration as data subjects and their personal identifiable information
are protected by law. Third-party controllers, usually parts of government bodies, monitor the organisations and
companies to discover, stop and potentially punish misconducts in personal data handling. Such rules must thus
be regarded as important as any marketing, commercial or research strategy in any organisation’s operations.
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Moreover, the foremost purpose of many inter-organisational cooperations is the creation of new intellectual
property (IP) or simply of new and more useful information through the sharing and processing of existing data.
The newly produced information is often more valuable or sensitive than the data that was originally shared
and its protection is thus a major concern. This is why copyright laws such as the copyright and patent laws
in the USA [pat10] and the copyright, designs and patents act in the UK [pat88], exist in most jurisdictions.
Sometimes, the newly produced information may be less valuable, or its ownership may shift from one entity
to another one (for example, aggregated private information is owned by the aggregating company, not by the
data subjects). Motivations for data protection also come from:
• the military environment, where people and national security often depend on data confidentiality;
• crisis situations (e.g. police, firefighters and first-aid services), where unprotected data dissemination
could cause public chaos, slow down rescuers and affect efficacy of the rescue operations;
• public research environments, where data is public but its usage must be audited or limited in time;
• digital markets, where resources are sold and licensed and cannot be freely redistributed.
Data loss prevention is necessary and organisations cannot simply rely on post-breach procedures (such as
insurances and legal actions) to make up for the damages caused by data leaks. While the former reduces
the risk of unauthorised data disclosures, the benefits of the latter alone may be surpassed by their negative
side effects: bad publicity, expensive, long and uncertain legal actions, jeopardised relationships with third
parties. The two approaches to data security are not mutually exclusive, but rather make up for each other’s
lacks. Similarly, permissive approaches based on risk mitigation strategies such as user training and strict data
handling practices (e.g. based on data classification and users’ clearance, possibly specified in a legal contract)
can be coupled with automatic preventions strategies and post-breach procedures to built a safe operational
envelope and achieve the desired result. Moreover, building a safe but limited operational environment is
not alone sufficient, especially when data must travel beyond the organisational boundaries. The operational
environment to be consider must thus include all organisations sharing data and solutions to audit each other’s
policies and behaviours and verify their correctness must be put in place.
Note that although we have referred to data, the issue of protecting exchanged items is generic and applies
to any digital object including multimedia resources and software. We will therefore refer to it generically as
disseminated data or information and will occasionally use digital resource and object interchangeably where
no ambiguity arises. We will also use the term data originators (or simply originators) to indicate all entities
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Figure 1.1: Sharing data between organisations
that create or first disseminate data and the term data recipients (or simply recipients) to indicate all entities
that receive or consume disseminated data.
1.2 The Challenges
Data protection is a challenging task because it must be applied regardless of the data’s physical location, even
after information has crossed the organisational boundaries and has been received by both known parties part of
a supply chain and unknown parties. Normally, once data has been sent to a recipient, no automated controls can
be imposed on the usage of that data and further dissemination cannot be prevented. This is a significant obstacle
that may hinder the sharing of data perceived as confidential, private or commercially sensitive. Data exchange
and usage should be governed in fact by many parameters including: the nature of the data and its sensitivity, the
data recipients (and their trustworthiness), the “purpose” for which the data is to be used, the context in which
the data is used and the potential benefits to be obtained from exchanging the data. However, information either
flows freely without restrictions or is not shared at all. Partners mutually rely on each other not to disclose
the shared data with external and malicious parties and at the same time attempt to gain confidence about their
mutual trustworthiness, e.g. by auditing their operations. Service level agreements may be put in place to
guarantee the amount, type and quality of the data exchanged, but these usually do not include details on the
handling of sensitive and protected information. Data governance in large companies is often based on internal
procedures that employees are expected to comply with and on a range of risk-mitigating measures such as
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employee training, while external data dissemination is governed by mutually agreed arrangements regarding
the handling of shared information (Figure 1.1). The latter are known as data sharing agreements (DSAs) and
define at a high level of abstraction the procedures for handling data including access rights, disclosure and
notification obligations and constraints on usage that must be respected by the participants to the agreement.
The term “data usage”’ here encompasses a broad set of situations and controls including data lifetime, data
retention or destruction, creation of derived data and onward dissemination that data originators need to control
based on changing circumstances and conditions. While DSAs are in use today, they are mostly specified in
natural language and thus not linked to an automated policy enforcement system. They are in essence legal
documents whose enforcement is currently only possible through the courts. The definition of the agreement
itself is per se a very problematic phase in the relationship between the organisations that have to come to terms
with their different and, more often than not, conflicting requirements. For example, when public research
institutions work with national security and military agencies, they must find a tradeoff between the aim to
publicly disseminate their knowledge and the need to preserve secrecy. Whenever economic interests are at
stake or mismanagement of data could cause a great deal of damage (economical, physical or psychological) to
communities or individuals, relying on human interpretation of the law or on informal agreements may prove
hazardous. Rather then venturing on expensive and long legal disputes that often cast shadows on the corporate
image or risking dangerous data leakages, preventative and automatic controls on data usage would be an ideal
solution.
The problem of controlling data usage by unknown recipients was formulated as early as 1989 in the form
of the originator control ORCON/ORGCON family of models [Gra89] and later studied by Abrams [AHK+91,
Abr93] and others. A taxonomy of models was presented under the name of dissemination control (DCON)
[TS04], and more recently a family of models for usage control (UCON) has been presented in [PS04]. UCON
is more general in that it is not only concerned with the retention of control by the data originator but also
attempts to cater for permissions that change during the usage of the data or digital resource. In this work we
will use the term UCON to refer in a generic way to usage control models, DCON to refer to the sub-category
of UCON models where the dissemination of the resource is the only usage that needs to be controlled (e.g. to
block the distribution of copyrighted material or to encourage the distribution of publicly available information)
and UCONABC to refer to the models proposed by Park and Sandhu [PS04].
Scenarios where usage control is an issue are often based on orthogonal assumptions and address antithetical
requirements. For example, key factors are:
• the amount of mutual knowledge entities share (what do originators know about recipients?);
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• the control over recipients’ devices and communication channels (can recipients modify the software/hardware
configurations of their devices?);
• the number of different organisational domains among which data is exchanged (is data disseminated in
just one organisation or are there several partners involved?);
• the nature of the connections between entities (are devices connected through ad hoc networks, is there
an infrastructure or are they completely or partially disconnected?);
• the architecture that can be deployed (centralised or decentralised);
• the “purpose” for which the data is shared. Note that despite its relevance, the usage “purpose” is often
not considered by data protection systems because it is practically impossible to determine the reason for
which data is used. Simply knowing who is using data (as in access control and policy systems, Section
2.4) and how (as in usage control systems [PS04]) provides no indication on their real intentions. This is
why “purpose-based” usage control is outside the scope of this thesis.
As a consequence of such variety the problem has been confronted, either directly or indirectly, by research
studies in different areas of computer science from which this work draws inspiration, ideas and techniques:
• Access control, including mandatory access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC),
focuses on the verification of the access rights users have when requesting access to digital resources
[SdV00]. Resources are usually protected by making decisions over their dissemination (and thus before
they are sent to recipients) on the basis of the requesting users’ clearance (MAC) or permissions (DAC).
By Sandhu’s definition [SP03] UCON can be considered a “a generalization of access control to cover
obligations, conditions, continuity (ongoing controls) and mutability”.
• Digital rights management (DRM) focuses on the distribution of copyrighted material where access to
and usage of resources is usually subject to some form of payment [fai07, win11]. Protected resources
are intended to be used by a restricted set of applications that can be controlled through software gener-
ally referred to as virtual machines (VM) or reference monitors (RM). DRM technologies focus on the
enforcement of a small subset of the controls UCON aims to allow such as payment obligations, temporal
limits on usage and bounded re-dissemination of resources.
• Enterprise rights management (ERM) focuses on the distribution of commercially sensitive informa-
tion within and between cooperating organisations. Protected resources include, among others, marketing
plans, research data and results, market research and statistics, technical know-how, financial analysis,
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reporting and so on. Access to and usage of such resources can be subject to a wide range of different
conditions depending on the particular scenario and data type. Typically, protected resources are intended
to be used in a controlled environment that includes not only software and hardware but also physical
location. For example, recipients may be limited to accessing the data only on the devices provided and
managed by their employer, while physically being located in the organisation’s premises. ERM differs
from DRM in different ways. First, DRM restricts data access to its paying owner and forbids modifica-
tions and re-dissemination, while ERM protects data throughout its entire life cycle, which may include
collaborative changes to its content. Second, DRM protection is usually integrated within a specific data
format (e.g. DRM protection for blu-ray discs) or device (e.g. Apple’s FairPlay on iPods), while ERM
protection is tied to the user application accessing the data (e.g. Microsoft Office or Adobe’s Acrobat).
ERM systems can be seen as commercial implementations [liq06, mar09, Mic05] of UCON aimed at
corporate environments.
• Privacy focuses on the handling of information related to individuals. In this thesis we will refer to the
term “privacy” as synonymous of “confidentiality” or “secrecy” of information belonging to individuals
and their capacity of retaining control over it [ML00, ZJMW05, MPB03]. In this sense, privacy protection
overlaps with UCON in many respects. Specific issues addressed within this category include identifying
and restricting access to personally identifiable information based on the consent of the data subject and
data protection legislation. In particular, usage consent is problematic as legislations [act98, JD96, eud12]
usually protect the right of data subjects to revoke it. When such right is exerted, it is hard to determine
to which extent the ownership of the data subject over its data affects the ownership of the results that
have been obtained so far by using the data. An example is the creation of aggregated data that collects
information from different subjects. The owner of such aggregate is usually the company that invested
money to create it, and the original data subjects should have no rights over it. Even so, organisations
are forced to treat such matters carefully, as legislations such as the latest european directives on data
protection [eud12] threat them with severe penalties in case of misconduct. However, because of these
reasons, we emphasise that the main motivations behind this research are drawn from environments
where personal data privacy is something to deal with to protect an organisation in face of the existing
legislation, but is not a driving factor for its operations.
• Document protection frameworks focus on the distribution of documents whose disclosure is restricted
by means of cryptographic algorithms and protocols [BCF01, MS03, Cra04]. Documents are processed
and encrypted under a number of keys which can be distributed amongst recipients. The usage con-
19
trol problem in this case is reduced to a key management problem where keys are distributed to users
according to varying criteria.
• Policy-based management focuses on the declarative definition of rules constraining system behaviour.
By Sloman’s definition, policies are rules governing the choices in behaviour of a system [Slo94]. In this
sense, policies are the primary means by which UCON rules can be expressed over disseminated data
[xac05, Gua01, Ian02, JSSS01].
• Distributed trust management focuses on the declarative definition of rules driving the creation of trust
relationships between entities (users, processes acting on behalf of users, automated processes etc.) that
have no prior knowledge of each other. The term trust indicates the belief that an entity will behave as
expected in the context of a specific interaction and, in our case, of a specific usage request. Some trust
management solutions [BFG10, BFL96] have been explicitly designed to express and evaluate authori-
sation policies. Similarly, trust management could also be used as a means to establish trust relationships
amongst data recipients and originators in UCON.
Drawing from the research areas described above, we investigated the main limitations of existing solutions
for data protection. In fact, while current data protection and DRM/ERM architectures vary in aspects such as
policy/rights deployment and data protection mechanisms, common design principles, functionality and flaws
can be identified. First, data is associated with access rights (or usage control policies) and cryptographically
protected before distribution (i.e. the data is “published”). Then a central trusted authority (TA), often the
originator himself, responds to access requests, evaluates recipients’ credentials and rights and issues the de-
cryption keys. A trusted component running on the recipient devices, which we will refer to as the virtual
machine/monitor (VM) or simply client, ensures that rights are locally enforced. Specific architectures differ
in their management of user authentication, policy and rights retrieval, audit of user actions and other tasks
[Aut05, Mic05, MPB03, PSS00, Sec07, PHB06]. Although existing solutions cater for different requirements
and scenarios, they all suffer from a few major hurdles that limit their usability:
• Issue 1: derived data protection. First, the existing solutions’ common perspective considers only
passive recipients that access information and never transform it. Recipients instead often transform
the received data by adding or removing content. When data is transformed its protection requirements
change accordingly and the previously applied policies can become either too restrictive or too loose for
the new content. Also, information that is directly derived from protected data should inherit part of the
original data’s protection requirements, so as not to infringe the original owner’s rights, should they have
any. Existing ERM systems either ignore the problem or offer only partial solutions. Most of the time
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users are forced to republish the data with new policies, which has several limitations. First, it assumes
that data is modified only by its owner or by a user who is trusted to republish the data correctly. Second,
the effort required from users to keep policies up-to-date with the data content may exceed the effort
required to modify the data itself. Finally, modifying policies is an error-prone activity that may lead to
data leakages. We call this problem the “derived data problem” and it is one of the main focuses of this
thesis, together with the problem of policy evaluation in disconnected scenarios.
• Issue 2: trusted authority selection. Second, the set of trusted authorities (TA) is statically and ex-
plicitly defined. Changes, such as adding a new TA or removing an existing one, require defining new
agreements, establishing new trust relationships and implementing them in terms of key exchanges, trust
records etc. Moreover, the assumption that recipients are willing to present their credentials to the author-
ity designated by the data originator, even when credentials may be private or confidential, is not always
realistic. Untrusted TAs may misuse the credentials by disclosing them publicly or may not perform
fair policy evaluations. Finally, in organisational environments where partners do not know the internal
structure of the organisation with whom they interact it is difficult for the originator to specify access
rules based on internal roles of the recipient or to specify which entities in the partner organisation are
entitled to issue or verify specific credentials. Instead, recipients are typically better placed to choose
which authority could better evaluate their credentials amongst a scope of acceptable authorities defined
by the originator. Note that the problems classified under this issue group do not directly affect data pro-
tection but are weaknesses of the trust assumptions made by existing protection systems. The technology
solution we propose here is complementary to other controls that can be used to increase confidence in
the behaviour of the entities involved in the data exchange (e.g. post-usage evaluations based on audit
trails, user complaints and reports etc).
• Issue 3: data protection in disconnected networks. The last issue concerns the availability of the TA:
if recipients cannot contact the specified TA, they cannot access the data. This problem is particularly
relevant when data must be accessed in (partially) disconnected environments, as it is often the case
for military or rescue missions. Encryption systems such as attribute-based encryption (ABE) [BF01,
SW05, Cha07, BSW07, OSW07] and access hierarchies [AFB05] that allow policies or access rights
to be evaluated offline are not a viable solution as they require all recipients to receive credentials and
encryption/decryption keys from the same authority before data is disseminated, even if they belong to
different organisations. Moreover, these solutions prevent context dependent conditions to be evaluated,
as they provide decryption keys only on the basis of statically defined credentials.
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In this thesis we aim to propose solutions to the above problems. We thus aim to enable derived data control
and usage control in partially disconnected networks.
1.3 Application Scenario
The main problem civil protection agencies and organisations have to face while conducting their daily activity
is to predict when either disastrous events or small scale accidents will happen. Even after a crisis has exploded
and rescuers have already intervened on the scene, it still is difficult to predict how the events will unfold and
how human settlements, facilities, natural resources or even people’s lives will be threatened or affected. The
unpredictability of the events at hand and the potential damage they can cause, also in terms of human lives,
make crisis management an extremely delicate task. When facing an emergency, decision times must be ex-
tremely quick so that the proper actions can be taken to alleviate the current threat. Being able to read the actual
situation and its development in all its detail is thus of the upmost importance to guarantee the success of rescue
missions. This is no easy feat, especially since most of the time it requires the organisations and companies
involved to share all the information that they are aware of. Data availability is thus extremely important. The
main obstacles in this sense are the reluctance of the parties to share data, motivated by its sensitive, confidential
nature, and the hectic development of events which often hinders or plainly prevents communications between
rescuers. Moreover, third parties are often unaware of the crisis management procedures and data management
practices followed by civil protection agencies and join the operations with no prior notice.
The need for timely access to disseminated data and the possibility of disrupted communications push to the
extreme the traditional requirements for data protection and usage control. Traditional ERM systems assume
“friendly” scenarios where no delay incurs in the data exchange or data protection processes, where all possible
recipients and originators are known in advance and where all machines are under the administrative control
of a specific organisation. These assumptions are not realistic in crisis management, and this is why we chose
it as the main application scenario to be used throughout this thesis. In particular, the specific scenario we
present here, and further develop in the following chapters, is based on the actual practices regulating data
sharing and protection during crisis management operations carried out by public safety organisations in the
United Kingdom and studied by BAE systems plc [GBLD]. The scenario will provide a context for examples
and simulations throughout the rest of this thesis and will be used to illustrate the details and aspects of our
approaches.
Consider a traffic accident that rapidly escalates into a threat to the larger surrounding area. Figure 1.2
depicts the scene. A car has been crushed between a petrol tanker and a chemical tanker in the middle of
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a tunnel. An explosion at the time of the impact caused thick black smoke to fill the tunnel, while escaped
witnesses state that one of the tankers is leaking a “suspicious” liquid. From the street it is possible to see a
chemical spilling out of the tunnel and seeping into a nearby sewer, while several injured persons have come
out of the tunnel with breathing problems. Nearby vegetation, close to a small residential district, also catches
fire. Police, fire brigades and ambulance services immediately arrive on the scene with both vehicles and
mobile stations and deploy in the area so-called bronze or mobile command centres (BCCs). The “threat area”
they consider is a perimeter of 100m radius centred on the tunnel. Despite this being only an hypothetical
scenario, similar situations have happened in the past. For example in 1999 the tragedy of the Mont Blanc
Tunnel caused the death of 39 people when a truck caught fire in the tunnel. The rescue operations lasted for 53
hours during which cooperation amongst different agencies belonging to different countries was fundamental.
Similarly, the rescue operations for the London underground bombings of 2005, where 52 people people died in
explosions in underground tunnels, were significantly hindered by the communication difficulties encountered
by the rescuers.
Figure 1.2: Data sharing in an example mobile environment
Examples of information the rescuers need to exchange and that must be protected are:
• personal and medical information of victims;
• the tunnel and sewer plans and information on nearby gas pipelines, gas storages and electrical facilities;
• information on the tankers’ content; 4) the map of the surrounding area with information on the houses
to be evacuated;
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• information on the state of the accident and of the rescue operations.
Also, gathered information may be combined or transformed by BCCs to produce new data that should be
protected depending on its new content (e.g. a list of residents in the area combined with their clinical history).
In addition to first responders, many other organisations are called to share data on the accident: the service
providers, the local council, an environmental agency and the tankers’ transport companies. Subsequent respon-
ders are heterogeneous: while some may have agreements with first responders and be aware of the procedures
to follow (e.g. they may have stipulated a DSA with the rescue organisations) others may be unaware of the
regulations involving data sharing and protection. Examples are private companies whose facilities or vehicles
have been involved in the accident and that have no predefined agreement with the rescue organisations, despite
the confidentiality of the data they can and must provide. In other words, while some organisations may have
pre-agreed DSAs, others may not.
In this context, rescuers’ timely access to data represents the basis for a prompt and effective rescue plan,
while a failure to share information is a source of later embarrassment and can have a high cost even in terms
of human lives. Data confidentiality must nevertheless be protected for several reasons. First, victims’ privacy
is governed by legislation such as HIPAA in the USA. Second, information on the accident may cause panic
while burglars may target houses that have been evacuated and criminals may use information on the local
facilities and utilities for future crimes. Third, leaked information revealing a possible mismanagement of the
operations may be used to embarrass the involved agencies and individuals. Finally, organisations may merge
information coming from different sources to gain a broader insight into the development of the situation. If
for example, information from the fire brigade, the company owning the chemical tanker and the ambulance
services were used by one of the rescuing organisations to deduce that there is a toxic contamination in the
accident area, the new information should be restricted to avoid panic but rescuers should be able to access it so
that they can react to possible threats. In other words, derived data control is also an important aspect in crisis
management. On the other hand, data must still be accessible to all authorised rescuers not only for reading but
for editing as well. Note that the term “authorised user” includes a wide range of usage controls, such as but not
limited to identity, role, location and time verification, credentials checks (e.g. to verify users’ qualifications to
handle highly technical data), limitations on the duration of the access or interruption of the access in case of
contextual changes (e.g. data becomes more sensitive as a consequence of the evolving situation), obligatory
actions to be performed by the accessing user etc.
In this scenario, the lack of long-range connectivity is a very likely circumstance. The communication
infrastructure could have been disrupted by the incident itself (e.g. if the explosion damaged a local antenna)
or could have never been present in the tunnel. In this sense, incidents in particular environments such as
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Requirements
1: Sharing of protected data with rescuers and participating organisations on the base of existing DSAs
2: Dissemination of protected derived data (i.e. that cannot be accessed by unauthorised recipients) with no
additional delays
3: Timely access to data with no connectivity
Table 1.1: Main requirements for crisis management scenario
underground tunnels or caves are generally very difficult to deal with. Also, the communication network may
have been shut down for security reasons, or public panic may overload the existing infrastructure making it
unusable for emergency services.
Table 1.1 summarises the main security requirements of the presented crisis management scenario. First, re-
sponders must be able to exchange and access data with any involved organisation, according to the regulations
specified in existing DSAs. Second, transformed data should be re-disseminated in the emergency area with no
further delay caused by decisions over the protection to be applied over it. Derived data should be automatically
protected upon creation. Finally, data must be accessible even when connectivity is not available.
1.4 Contribution
The principal contribution of this thesis is to present a data protection architecture that can be deployed in
partially disconnected environments (such as the one described in the above scenario) and that caters for the
derivation of usage/access control policies for derived data. In making this contribution, a number of significant
results have been achieved, which can be summarised as follows:
• Contribution 1 - An Information Flow System for derived data protection: from our perspective,
protecting derived data means determining the usage control policies applicable to the new information
depending on the original information used and the derivation process itself. To achieve this, we have
developed a novel policy model that uses information flow labels [BL73, Den76] and partially orders
policies depending on the level of protection they provide. We thus generate a lattice of usage control
policies that can be used to label and classify data and enables us to reason about the protection level to
be associated with derived information. This is presented in Chapter 4 and addresses the first issue we
identified in Section 1.2 and the second requirement of Table 1.1. Derived data is protected automatically
(i.e. policies are created automatically and associated with the data) upon creation and with no further
delays, so that it can be re-disseminated immediately in the emergency area.
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• Contribution 2 - PAES: a Policy-Based Authority Evaluation Scheme for data protection: In order
to allow recipients to decide which authorities they actually trust with their credentials, we designed a
policy evaluation scheme based on the idea that authority to evaluate policies can be granted by other
policies. In addition to specifying the criteria recipients must meet to access the data, PAES also permits
data originators to specify the criteria that authorities must meet to be trusted to evaluate policies. In
contrast to existing models, the set of authorities is therefore dynamic and defined by characterisation.
This provides increased flexibility in finding authorities mutually trusted by both data originators and
recipients. This is presented in Chapter 5, in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.2 and addresses the second issue we
identified in Section 1.2. In fact, not only recipients can select their most trusted (to both access their
credentials and correctly evaluate policies) evaluation authority amongst a set of acceptable ones, but if
an authority is unreachable for any reason, a different one can be chosen easily from those within reach.
• Contribution 3 - An adaptation of the PAES scheme (Mobile-PAES) for partially disconnected en-
vironments: When network connectivity is absent, the movements of users can be leveraged to carry
the information to whomever needs it. Networks that leverage node mobility and ad hoc connections to
disseminate messages are known as opportunistic networks (Oppnets) or delay tolerant networks (DTNs)
[RHB+07, VB00, CG07]. However, data protection schemes for such networks [LKB+06, SK05] are
predominantly intended for protecting communications between a specific sender-recipient pair, i.e. to
protect data packets while they are stored and forwarded by intermediate nodes. This conflicts with the
very definition of data dissemination. We propose a solution to integrate traditional protection mech-
anisms for disseminated data in oppnets. In particular we adapt the original PAES design for use in
oppnets. The aim is to increase the probability that rescuers can meet and contact a trusted authority by
means of an ad hoc connection, and thus receive the needed authorisations. This third contribution is
presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 and addresses the third issue we identified in Section 1.2 and the
third requirement of Table 1.1. Rescuers acting in an emergency area with no connectivity will be able
to share and access protected data in a timely fashion.
Throughout the thesis, we will also show how the architecture we propose allows organisations in an emer-
gency area to share data according to the regulations specified in different DSAs, thus satisfying the first require-
ment of Table 1.1. Whilst the contributions of this thesis facilitate secure data sharing, they are complementary
to the traditional controls put in place in such circumstances such as data classification activities and users’
clearance management, user training on security awareness and risks, activity auditing, insurances, contractual
obligations and so on, which aim to mitigate the risk of users misusing the disseminated data, either intention-
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ally or unintentionally. The operational context within which policy-based data protection can be successful
must thus include a set of controls that mitigates the risk of human error, discourages malicious behaviour and
reduces the damages caused by policy breaches.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 - Background and Related Work: In this chapter we introduce the existing technologies for
data protection, thus setting the scene for the contributions presented in this thesis. We first present access
control models and policy systems. We then present the software architectures proposed for the enforcement
of usage control and data protection. The last part of the chapter gives an overview of the software/hardware
mechanisms that have been proposed as part of the Trusted Platform Initiative [Gro, ELM+03, Sch03] and
gives an idea of how they could fit into the solutions we propose.
Chapter 3 - Architecture: This chapter sets the ground for the subsequent description of our proposed
solution. First, it introduces the threat model which is the basis of this thesis. It then proceeds describing the
high-level components that constitute the architecture of our solution and their interactions. Finally, it details
how we integrated our proposed architecture with trusted computing technologies. This integration in particular
has been made possible by the work of Dr. Anandha Gopalan [GGSL11].
Chapter 4 - A Data Labelling System for Derived Data Control: This chapter is devoted to the presenta-
tion of the data labelling mechanism we deploy to derive usage control policies for derived data. An extensive
example based on the crisis management scenario is provided to evaluate the efficacy and flexibility of the
proposed solution.
Chapter 5 - Policy-Based Authority Evaluation Scheme (PAES): This chapter describes the PAES policy
model and the two possible uses we devised. We first show how PAES can be used in fully connected scenarios
to address some of the problems of traditional ERM systems (the second issue described in Section 1.2). We
then describe how PAES can be used to enable usage control in partially disconnected environments and crisis
management scenarios in particular. The chapter also provides a description of the simulations we performed
to evaluate the proposed protocol.
Chapter 6 - Conclusions: In the last chapter we summarise the work done, underlying the contributions and
limitations of our solutions and discussing possible future directions for research.
27
1.6 Publications
While a journal paper is still in the writing and will be submitted for the ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security (TISSEC), some of the ideas described in this thesis have already been published in several
venues:
- A. Gopalan, V. Gowadia, E. Scalavino, E. C. Lupu. “Policy driven Remote Attestation.” In Proceedings
of the 3th ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems,
Aalborg, Denmark, ICST, May 2011.
- V. Gowadia, E. Scalavino, E. C. Lupu, D. Starostin, and A. Orlov. “Secure Cross-domain Data Sharing Ar-
chitecture for Crisis Management.” In Proceedings of the 10th ACM workshop on Digital rights management,
Chicago, IL, US, ACM, October 2010.
- E. Scalavino, V. Gowadia, R. Ball, E. C. Lupu, G. Russello. “Mobile PAES: Demonstrating Authority
Devolution for Policy Evaluation in Crisis Management Scenarios.” In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Int.
Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, George Mason University, VA, US, IEEE, July
2010.
- G. Russello, E. Scalavino, N. Dulay, E. C. Lupu. “Coordinating Data Usage Control in Loosely-Connected
Network.” In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Int. Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks,
George Mason University, VA, US, IEEE, July 2010.
- E. Scalavino, G. Russello, R. Ball, V. Gowadia, E. C. Lupu. “An opportunistic authority evaluation scheme
for data security in crisis management scenarios.” In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communication Security, Beijing, China, ACM, April 2010.
- E. Scalavino, V. Gowadia, E. C. Lupu. “A Labelling System for Derived Data Control.” In Proceedings
of the 24th IFIP Working Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy, Rome, Italy, IFIP, June
2010.
- G. Russello, E. Scalavino. “Exploiting Node Mobility for Coordinating Data Usage in Crisis Scenarios.”
In Proceedings of the 4th IFIP Workshop in Information Security Theory and Practices, Passau, Germany, IFIP,
April 2010.
- E. Scalavino, V. Gowadia, E. C. Lupu. “PAES: Policy-Based Authority Evaluation Scheme.” In Proceedings
of the 23rd IFIP Working Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy, Montreal, Canada, IFIP,
July 2009.
28
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Chapter Overview
Protecting data and controlling its usage when it is disseminated amongst unknown recipients has been gaining
increasing attention in recent years. Military environments have traditionally been the main contributors (either
directly or indirectly) to the research in the data protection field, but with the widespread diffusion of personal
and mobile devices among the public the problem of data protection has attracted commercial and public
interest and efforts [CW87]. The data available and exchanged both online and offline now includes private and
commercial data. The number of ways users create, protect and access data has also increased accordingly. In
this chapter we present background material on data protection solutions, their limitations and the requirements
and challenges that must still be addressed.
DataControl Policies/Rules
Enforcement Packaging
Distribution/Dissemination modalities
Recipients
Originators
Specify under a Create
Access-time Enforcement Software/Hardware
Distribution-time Enforcement Software 
Control Specification Model
Figure 2.1: Control specification models and enforcement architectures
When dealing with information security (as opposed to system security), we must first distinguish between
the two main components that constitute a data protection solution (Figure 2.1): control specification models,
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i.e. what usage and data controls are specified, and enforcement architectures, i.e. the mechanisms deployed
to ensure controls are enforced. Such mechanisms usually adopt different combinations of the same high-level
components. Data control can in fact be enforced by modifying the disseminated data and enclosing it into a
secured packaging [PMK99, cry97], by controlling whether recipients are authorised to receive the data before
it is sent to them, or by controlling the recipients’ devices so that they may receive the data but not be able to
access it [fai07, Mic05].
In the first part of this chapter we briefly introduce the mandatory access control and multi-level security
(MAC and MLS, Section 2.3) models, from which part of this thesis draws. We then present the more recent
solutions based on policy specifications (PBAC, Section 2.4) that extend the basic discretionary access control
(DAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) models. While this thesis draws from all of these works, our aim
is to abstract from existing paradigms and build on top of them a solution to address the problems of derived data
control and usage control in disconnected environments. The second part of this chapter is devoted to describe
the existing enforcement architectures, distinguishing between interactive data sharing architectures (IDSA,
Section 2.5.2) for connected environments and non-interactive data sharing architectures (NIDSA, Section
2.5.1) for disconnected environments. Particular attention is drawn to the limitations of the proposed solutions,
so that we can frame the description of our unified data sharing architecture (UDSA). Finally, we discuss the
trusted platform initiative (Section 2.6), i.e. the combination of hardware and software mechanisms that aim to
allow users to verify whether a (possibly remote) application can be trusted or not.
2.2 Security Requirements
Traditionally, information security requirements have been classified under three categories: confidentiality,
integrity and availability [Dra06, SdV00].
Confidentiality is defined by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) as “ensuring that in-
formation is accessible only to those authorised to have access” [IOfS] and is required whenever improper
disclosures of data may result in losses not only in terms of money but also in terms of public credibility and
public safety. Examples are the disclosure of industrial or military secrets and private documents. The usage
control paradigm [PS04] expands upon this concept and aims to allow originators to control not only who can
access data and under what conditions, but also how long the access can last, what conditions must be verified
throughout the whole duration of access (continuous control) and what provisional actions must be performed
before, during and after the access.
Integrity is defined as “protecting the accuracy and completeness of information and the methods that are
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used to process and manage it” [IOfS]. Integrity is required whenever accessible but incorrect data may be
detrimental to the organisation’s operations. Examples are incorrect medical histories in healthcare scenarios
or false activity logs in military environments. The usage control paradigm aims to allow originators to control
data modifications, and thus data integrity, in the same way that data accesses are controlled.
Finally, availability is defined as “ensuring that data is accessible and usable when needed by an authorised
entity” [IOfS]. Examples where data availability is pivotal include crisis management scenarios where the effi-
ciency of the rescuers’ coordinated action greatly depends on the information they share. ERM systems assume
the existence of an open dissemination environment across which protected data can be freely disseminated
with no restrictions. While in fact everyone can receive the data, encryption mechanisms prevent unauthorised
recipients from accessing it. Availability could also be improved by forcing recipients to re-disseminate data
upon reception [LY06, PS02]. However, example cases where availability is at risk exist such as the crisis
management scenario presented in Section 1.3. Whenever communication amongst the potential participants to
the data sharing is not guaranteed, data may not be available to authorised users when they need it most, either
because it has not been received or because it cannot be decrypted. In this thesis we explicitly consider this
problem and propose a solution for data dissemination and protection in partially disconnected networks.
2.3 Mandatory Access Control, Information Flow and Multi-Level Security
In mandatory access control (MAC) [SdV00] access to information is predefined by administrative policies
that are mandated by general rules that are valid throughout the system and that are related to the sensitivity
of the protected information. As a consequence MAC policies do not consider the concept of user ownership
over data and users have no control over the data they disseminate. Adopted for a long time mostly in military
environments, MAC policies have been largely developed as multi-level security or lattice-based information
flow policies for both confidentiality and integrity protection [BL73, San93, Bib77].
Denning et al. [DD77] first defined information flow control as “methods of regulating the dissemination of
information among objects throughout the system”. While this broad definition encompasses several problems
and their solutions, information flow has been most often associated with multilevel security systems (MLS)
[BL73]. A multilevel security policy consists of the classification of information and subjects (i.e. processes
that can access information on behalf of users) into security (or sensitivity) classes, of a flow relation defining
permissible flows amongst these classes and of a method of binding data objects to some class. Any operation,
or series of operations, that uses the information contained in some object A to derive the content of another
object B, is said to cause an information flow from A to B. This flow, and thus the operations that caused it, is
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permissible only on the basis of the defined multilevel security policy that organises classes into a lattice (i.e. a
partial order in which any two elements have a unique least upper bound and a unique greatest lower bound).
Top-Secret, {}
Secret, {Nuclear, Army}Top-Secret, {Nuclear} Top-Secret, {Army}
Top-Secret, {Nuclear, Army}
Secret, {Army}Secret, {Nuclear}
Secret, {}
Figure 2.2: An example of security lattice with two security domains. Both dashed and solid lines represent
dominance relationships
All MLS systems aim to achieve some variant of the simple security property and *-property of the Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) model [Den76, BL73]. The lattice of sensitivity classes is generated by the Cartesian product
of two other lattices: a total order of sensitivity levels such as unclassified, classified, secret and top-secret and
a partial order over the subset relationship⊆, where the ordered elements are sets of data categories (or security
domains), such as nuclear, army etc. Sensitivity classes are thus (sensitivity level, category set) pairs that can
be associated either with data as security labels (or data classification labels, indicating the sensitivity level of
the data for the corresponding domains, i.e. the potential damage an unauthorised data leak may cause) or with
subjects as clearance labels (indicating the classes of data subjects are authorised to access). Given the set of
all labels LS and the set of all domains DS, a partial order is defined via the label dominance relation v:
∀La,Lb ∈ LS : La v Lb⇐⇒ s(La)≤ s(Lb)∧ c(La)⊆ c(Lb) (2.1)
where La v Lb indicates that label Lb dominates label La and s(La) and c(La) are the sensitivity level and the
set of domains of label La, respectively. Figure 2.2 depicts an example security lattice. Non-secure informa-
tion flows are prevented by forbidding subjects with a given clearance Ls from accessing data with an higher
classification Ld . The simple security property and *-property can then be stated as:
• simple security property: For every subject s and data object d, s can access d if and only if Ld v Ls.
• *-property For every subject s and data object d, s can modify d if and only if Ls v Ld .
that actually realise a no-read-up, no-write-down access control policy for confidentiality protection. Other
MLS systems aim instead to achieve some variant of the properties of the Biba model [Bib77] that proposes
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a dual no-write-up, no-read-down access control policy for integrity protection. In the original paper, Biba
further extended his model with the low-water mark model that included two alternative policies:
• Low-water mark for subjects: No restrictions are imposed on read operations. A subject s accessing
object o has her classification downgraded to the greatest lower bound of her and o’s classifications.
• Low-water mark for objects: No restrictions are imposed on write operations. An object o written by a
subject s has its classification downgraded to the greatest lower bound of its and s’s classifications.
Despite trying to enforce a more dynamic behaviour where classifications can change, the low-water mark
models have two main drawbacks. The low-water mark policy for subjects constrains the privileges that sub-
jects have to perform certain actions on the order the actions themselves are performed. The low-water mark
policy for objects instead does not protect integrity, since subjects are allowed to write at levels beyond their
own possibly causing highly sensitive information to be tainted by lowly sensitive information. The high-water
mark model instead relates subjects’ privileges with the lowest upper bound of the classifications of objects ob-
served so far. Lipner [Lip82] also proposed to merge the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models adopting independent
confidentiality and integrity classes into a single lattice.
The Bell-LaPadula and Denning’s information flow models have been widely criticised for two main rea-
sons. The first problem is that they failed to capture the effects that changing the classification of data objects
while accessing them have on data protection [McL90]. The problem was addressed informally by enunciating
the tranquillity principle [BL73], stating that the classification of objects should not be changed during nor-
mal operations. Several studies have been conducted to allow modifications of objects’ classifications (i.e. to
upgrade or downgrade an object’s sensitivity levels). Floating labels models are a sub-category of informa-
tion flow models including the decentralised label model [ML00] and Asbestos [EKV+05, VEK+07] where
labels are copied from subjects to data (and viceversa) and from one data item to another, thus actually modi-
fying its classification. Data declassification poses the greatest challenges as it can easily result into informa-
tion leaks if misdirected. Proposals have been made to allow declassification either by explicitly authorising
trusted subjects to downgrade all data objects [SS05], enabling data owners to downgrade their own data only
[ML00] or including declassification annotations at programming language level [LM09]. The second problem
of the Bell-LaPadula model is that mandatory access controls dictated by a security lattice are not expressive
enough for real-world policies. Models have thus been proposed to merge the mandatory access control poli-
cies specified by clearance and data classification labels with discretionary access control policies. Intuitively,
the discretionary policy (e.g. an access matrix or access control list) would operate within the boundaries of
the mandatory policy, restricting only the accesses that would be permitted by the mandatory controls. Exam-
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ples are the work proposed by Walter et al. [WOR+74] and compartmented mode workstations (CMW). The
Bell-LaPadula model also included this feature in its first formulation [BL73, Bel73].
2.3.1 The Decentralised Label Model
With the decentralised label model Myers and Liskov [ML00] provided a language for describing authorised
information flows that could be more flexible and expressive than earlier models. The essentials of their model
are principals, i.e. users and authorities such as groups and roles on behalf of whom processes operate on
data. For example, users and groups in Unix would be represented by principals. Principals are organised in
a partial order defined over the act for relationship. We say that a principal pi acts for a user p j (pi  p j)
when pi possesses all the privileges of p j. A data classification label in the decentralised label model is a set
of (owner : readers) pairs called policies, where an owner is a principal maintaining privileges on the policies
she owns and readers is the list of principals that the policy allows to read the data. In other words data is
labelled with a number of access control lists (i.e. lists of the principals authorised to access) controlled by
different principals and can be accessed only by principals appearing in all lists (or that can act for at least a
principal in all lists). Declassification can be performed by principals only on their owned policies and consists
in adding principals to the list of readers. The model is considered “decentralised” as there is no need for a
central authority managing policies, but all principals in the system are responsible for the policies they own.
Note that the declassification performed by principals is not the only possible one. Access to an object can in
fact be extended to other principals by assigning them to a group or role that is already authorised to access,
while the policy for the object would remain unchanged.
Information flows are controlled by annotating program variables with labels and ensuring that as data flows,
labels only become more restrictive (i.e. there are more owners or some owners allow fewer readers). Input
and output channels from which data enters and exits the program are also labelled to avoid information leaks.
Labels are controlled at compile-time and thus cannot be modified at run-time. Therefore, in order to guarantee
confidentiality, writing a value to a variable is only permitted if the variable’s label is at least as restrictive as
the value’s one. Similarly, if the content of a variable affects the content of another variable, the label of the
second one must be at least as restrictive as the content of the first one. Given two labels Li and L j, we say that
L j is at least as restrictive as Li (Li v L j) if every policy in Li is covered (i.e. is enforced) by at least a policy in
L j. A policy I is covered by a policy J (I v J) if two conditions hold. First, the owner of policy J, o(J), must be
either the same as the owner of policy I or must be able to act for him. Second, the list of readers of policy J,
r(J), must be a subset of the list of readers of policy I, taking into consideration the act for relationship. These
two conditions define the complete relabelling rule that indicates when relabelling from a label Li to a label
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L j is safe, i.e. when an information flow from a value labelled as Li (either read from a variable or an input
channel) to a variable or output channel labelled as L j is permitted. More formally:
Li v L j ≡ ∀I∈Li ∃J∈L j I v J
I v J ≡ o(J) o(I)∧R(J)⊆ R(I)
≡ o(J) o(I)∧∀p′∈r(J)∃p∈r(I)p′  p
(2.2)
where R(I) is the set of all principals that act for at least one principal in r(I):
R(I) = {p | ∃p′ ∈ r(I)∧ p p′} (2.3)
The model provides for two types of data reclassification. The first is an increment-only reclassification.
When a program combines two or more values, for examples multiplying the content of two variables, the
result’s label must be at least as restrictive as the labels of all the input values. This derived label is obtained
as the least upper bound Li unionsq L j of the inputs’ labels, containing the union of all the policies in Li and L j.
Still, the new derived value can only be stored in a variable (or written to a channel) whose label is at least
as restrictive as the derived one. The second type of reclassification is a selective declassification that allows
principals to retain control over the policies they own and thus to relax overly restrictive labels. Processes acting
on behalf of a given set of principals can thus relax the corresponding policies by either adding new readers or
completely removing the policy (that corresponds to adding all principals as readers). Beside the label model
for confidentiality protection, the authors also proposed a dual decentralised label model that protects integrity.
2.3.2 The Asbestos Operating System
Stemming from a refined version of the Bell-LaPadula model [Bel73], the Jif programming language [Mye99]
and the decentralised label model [ML00], Vandebogart et al. [EKV+05, VEK+07] proposed Asbestos, an
operating system to enforce application-defined information-flow security policies. Sensitivity classes in the
Asbestos model are represented by sets of (security domain, security level) pairs. As in the original BLP model,
sensitivity classes are associated with data as data classification labels and with subjects as clearance labels.
Given the set of all labels LS and the set of all domains DS, a partial order is defined over the label dominance
relation:
∀La,Lb ∈ LS : La v Lb⇐⇒∀t ∈ DS : La(t)≤ Lb(t) (2.4)
In other words label La is less than or equal to label Lb if for each domain the level in La is less than or equal
to the level for the same domain in Lb. If one domain’s level is strictly less in La than in Lb and another
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(Nuclear, 0) (Army, 0)
(Nuclear, 1) (Army 0) (Nuclear, 0) (Army 1)
(Nuclear, 1) (Army 1)
(Nuclear, 2) (Army 1) (Nuclear, 1) (Army 2)
(Nuclear, 2) (Army 2)
(Nuclear, 0) (Army 2)(Nuclear, 2) (Army 0)
Figure 2.3: An example Asbestos security lattice with two security domains
Level Usage
* Privilege for the tag
0 High integrity for the tag
1 Default tracking level - no restriction for the tag
2 Default clearance level, used in taint tracking
3 High secrecy for the tag
Table 2.1: Asbestos label sensitivity levels and common usage
domain’s level is strictly less in Lb than in La, then La and Lb are said to be incomparable. Figure 2.3 depicts
an example security lattice in Asbestos, where for example the label (Nuclear 1, Army 1) dominates three
lower-classification labels, is dominated by three higher-classification labels and is incomparable with other
two. Besides its clearance label Cp, each process p is also associated with a tracking label Tp that records the
sensitivity of the most sensitive data received or observed so far (similarly to a high-water mark model). The
process’ clearance label is thus used to bind the maximum tracking label the process can be associated with.
Sensitivity levels for data classification labels range from 0 to 3. Information can flow freely from 0 to 3 (i.e.
data can be received by processes, stored into files or sent through channels with higher classification) but the
reverse direction, i.e. declassification, can only be obtained by processes holding a privilege for the declassified
domain, where the term “privilege” refers to the possibility of a process to declassify data for a specific domain
or override the restrictions imposed by the domain itself (as we will see later).
Table 2.1 summarises the available sensitivity levels and their common usage. In the rest of this thesis we
will adopt Asbestos’ terminology and use the terms “domain” and “tag” interchangeably. While the ∗ level in
a tracking label indicates privilege for the domain, level 0 is used for integrity tracking (i.e. tracking whether
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an object was modified only by high-integrity processes), level 1 is used as the default tracking level for data
and processes (i.e., it represents the initial amount of sensitive information contained in data or known by
processes), level 2 is used as the default clearance level for processes and level 3 is used for high-secrecy
information. One of the main innovations of the Asbestos’ model is that its labels combine the functions of
confidentiality tracking and integrity tracking. While confidentiality is tracked by increasing a process’ tracking
label from 1 to the level of the most sensitive object observed and is protected by enforcing rule (2.8) (see later),
integrity tracking can be achieved by assigning level 0 to the tracking label of high-integrity processes for a
specific integrity tag. In this way, whenever high-integrity processes receive a message from a low-integrity
process, their integrity level is increased and thus spoiled. Labels are ordered according to rule (2.4) and can
be combined with the least upper bound (unionsq) and greatest lower bound (sqcap) operators that, assuming a linear
ordering of the sensitivity levels, take for each domain the highest or lowest corresponding level in either label,
respectively:
LaunionsqLb(t) =
 La(t) i f La(t)≥ Lb(t)Lb(t) otherwise (2.5)
LauLb(t) =
 La(t) i f La(t)≤ Lb(t)Lb(t) otherwise (2.6)
Since privilege over a tag is represented by the lowest level ∗, processes would lose privilege when receiving
information by non-privileged processes (with tracking label higher than ∗). Therefore, a further operator unionsq∗ is
introduced to allow processes to retain privilege over a tag when receiving information with higher classifica-
tion:
LaunionsqL∗b(t) =
 ∗ i f Lb(t) = ∗La(t) otherwise (2.7)
The second innovation of the Asbestos’ model is represented by discretionary labels, four label types that
can be specified by a process when sending information and can be used as a means to enforce discretionary
controls, i.e. to give more flexibility to mandatory controls dictated by the traditional information flow rules.
The four discretionary labels are T+, T−, C+ and V . Their functions are described in Table 2.2, where the
symbols ⊥ and > are used to indicate the lowest and highest label in the lattice, respectively.
Asbestos also allows processes to restrict the information flows to and from specific Inter Communication
Ports (IPC) (i.e. the channels used by processes to communicate with each other) by associating them with a
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Label Default Value Usage
T+ ⊥= {∗} Increases a message’s tracking label. Used when a message contains
information at a higher sensitivity then the sending process itself (e.g.
for a process with privilege).
T− >= {3} Decreases the receiving process’ tracking label. Used to declassify data
or grant privilege. Setting it to non-default values requires privilege.
C+ ⊥= {∗} Increases the receiving process’ clearance label. Setting it to non-default
values requires privilege.
V >= {3} Declares an upper bound on the sender’s tracking label. Used to
represent the maximum sensitivity level the sender process intends to
use.
Table 2.2: Asbestos discretionary labels: data senders can use these labels to enforce discretionary control on
data exchanges
clearance label PCport . Given two communicating processes, a sender P and a receiver Q, P can append to its
message the four discretionary labels so that Q can receive the message only if the following rule is satisfied:
TPunionsqT+ v (CQunionsqC+)uPCport (2.8)
In other words, the least upper bound of the tracking label of the sender process (representing the most sen-
sitive information it might communicate) and the T+ discretionary label must be dominated by the least upper
bound of the receiving process’ clearance label and the C+ discretionary label, constrained by the clearance of
the port used for the communication. Once the communication has been permitted and the message has been
sent, the receiving process’s tracking label is modified according to the following rule:
TQ← ((TPunionsqT+unionsqTQ)uT−)uT ∗Q (2.9)
In other words, the message’s sensitivity is considered to be the least upper bound of the sender process’
tracking label, the T+ discretionary label and the receiving process’ tracking label. The T− discretionary label
is then used to declassify the message. Finally, the last part of the formula restores privilege so that the operation
does not eliminate it from the receiving process’ label.
Let us consider an example with two processes, a sender P and a receiver Q and two tags, nuclear (n) and
privacy (p). Table 2.3 reports the results of several example message exchanges. In the first example, the
message exchange fails because the tracking level for tag n of the sender process is higher than the clearance
level of the receiving process. In the second example the message exchange is allowed and the tracking level for
tag p of the receiver process is increased to 2. However, the receiver process’ privilege for tag n is preserved. In
the third example the message exchange fails because the sender’s process purposely increments the message’s
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TP T+ T− CQ Old TQ New TQ Result
1 {n 3, p 1} - - {n 2, p 2} {n 1, p 1} {n 1, p 1} Failure
2 {n 2, p 2} - - {n 2, p 2} {n *, p 1} {n *, p 2} Success, preserved privilege
3 {n 1, p 1} {n 3, p *} - {n 2, p 2} {n 1, p 1} {n 1, p 1} Failure
4 {n 1, p 1} - {n 0, p 3} {n 2, p 2} {n 1, p 1} {n 1, p 1} Failure
5 {n *, p *} - {n *, p 1} {n 3, p 2} {n 3, p 2} {n *, p 1} Success, granted privilege,
declassification
Table 2.3: Examples of Asbestos data exchanges
tracking level for tag n to a level higher than the receiver process’ clearance level. In the fourth example the
message exchange fails because the sender process tries to declassify the tracking level of the receiver process
for tag n without having privilege for it. Finally, in the fifth example the sender process manages to grant
privilege for tag n to the receiving process and to declassify its tracking label for tag p to level 1.
While capable of enforcing traditional information flow controls, this solution also allows sender processes to
manipulate the sensitivity of messages considering the actual amount of information they contain, and allows
privileged processes to grant access to other processes (i.e., to increase their clearance) in a discretionary
manner. Note that, since data labels can contain a (hypothetically) infinite amount of domains and every
application defines its own domains, no interference occurs between the application’s protection requirements.
Both Asbestos, the decentralised label model and the existing information flow control systems are limited
in the type of controls they can express. Usage control requirements are broader and require a set of controls
that go beyond clearance control and access control lists. For example, there are cases when mandatory poli-
cies should be overridden in the specific context in which the data access is being requested. For instance, in
emergency situations low-clearance rescuers may be authorised to access a victim’s private data if his life is at
risk or if not enough high-clearance rescuers are available at the scene. Also, the enforcement mechanisms put
forward by both Asbestos and the decentralised label model assume that controls over user clearance are per-
formed before the data is actually disseminated by whoever is sending it. This is not always a safe assumption,
as users who are not the data owners may have no interest in controlling whether recipients should be allowed
to receive the data before re-disseminating it. Despite their limitations, floating labels are necessary and will be
used in our solution to the derived data problem described in Section 1.2.
2.4 Access Control Policies
Discretionary policies are rules specifying who (the user, subject or principal of the policy) can, or cannot,
execute which actions on which resources (the target or object of the policy), and under which conditions.
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Context-dependent conditions restrict authorisations on the basis of the situation where the access request is is-
sued, for example considering the request’s time or the requestor’s location. Content-based conditions constrain
authorisations on the basis of the content of the policy object. History-based conditions restrict authorisations
depending on the accesses previously authorised (as in the Chinese Wall policy [BN89]). Finally, obligations
are conditions that make access depend on the execution of specific actions by the requesting user. Obligations
can be interpreted in several different ways. We broadly divide them into obligations on the enforcing system
(the ones we will consider in the rest of this thesis), i.e. automatic procedures that are performed by the en-
forcement module of a policy system [DDLS01, xac05], and obligations on the user, i.e. obligations that must
be performed by the user accessing the data and whose execution the system must verify [CLM+09]. Several
declarative policy languages have been devised since the access matrix model to specify conditions restricting
the validity of authorisations [Lam74]. Each language supports different models for representing both data and
subjects. Data can be organised hierarchically (to represent a containment relationship [DDLS01], as for XML
data [BCF01, BBC+00, DdVPS02, DdVPS00], or to represent an “is-a” relationship, as in object-oriented pro-
gramming), in sets on the basis of different criteria (as for the Chinese Wall data model [BN89]) or according
to the relational data model [SdV00]. Subjects can be organised in groups (e.g. in UNIX operating systems),
hierarchically (e.g. in RBAC policies [SCFY96]), or be represented by certificates attesting their attributes or
trust relationships [RL96, CEE+02, HMM+00].
The need to organise users and objects to avoid the burden of a per-user, per-object policy specification, has
led to the problem of exception management, i.e. authorisations applicable to all members of a user/object
category (being it a user’s role, group or an object’s class or container) but few. This is why many languages
support both positive and negative authorisations, i.e. the specification of both access permission and denial
rules. Traditional approaches relied instead on only one of the two authorisation types, adopting either a closed
policy denying all accesses for which there is no specified positive authorisation, or an open policy permitting
all accesses for which there is no specified negative authorisation. However, two problems arise when using
both authorisation types. The incompleteness problem, occurring when no policy has been specified that applies
to a given access request, and the inconsistency problem, arising when both positive and negative authorisations
have been specified that apply to the same request (i.e. a modality conflict occurs). To address these problems,
policy languages usually have constructs allowing the specification of a default policy that is applied whenever
no other policies apply to a given request, and of conflict resolution strategies that decide which of several
conflicting policies should be applied to a given request.
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<license> 
   <grant> 
      <cx:print/> 
      <cx:digitalWork> 
         <cx:locator> 
            <nonSecureIndirect URI="http://www.cg.com/r.spd"/> 
         </cx:locator> 
      </cx:digitalWork> 
      <validityInterval> 
         <notAfter>2001-12-24T23:59:59</notAfter> 
      </validityInterval> 
   </grant> 
</license>
Figure 2.4: XrML’s core concepts and example license
2.4.1 XML Markup Authorisation Languages
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) has been widely used and extended to support the specification of dif-
ferent access control concepts, resulting in the creation of several rights expression languages (RELs) mainly
used for digital rights management. Although the several proposed languages differ in scope and syntax, com-
mon concepts and design principles can be identified. The eXtensible Rights Markup Language (XrML)
[Gua01], the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [Ian02], the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Lan-
guage (EPAL) [PSK+03] and the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [xac05] are
maybe the most representative of all.
XrML
XrML is the standard rights expression language for protection of MPEG-21 digital resources. An XrML policy
or license is a collection of grants, i.e. of elements through which the license’s issuers (usually the owners of
the protected resources) bestow an authorisation (a right) upon a principal. Both issuers and principals are
specified in terms of the public/private key pairs they possess. Figure 2.4 illustrates a simplified model of the
core elements of an XrML license and an example policy permitting the printing of an online resource before a
specified time.
ODRL
ODRL is often used in place of XrML. The elements at the basis of an ODRL policy are assets, rights and
parties. Parties include both principals and rights holders (corresponding to XrML licence issuers). Rights
holders specify ODRL policies (rights) as offers over resources (assets). Whenever a principal requests and
obtains access to an asset from its originator, she is issued the corresponding license in the form of an agreement,
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<o-ex:offer> 
   <o-ex:asset> 
      <o-ex:context> 
        <o-dd:uid>UID</o-dd:uid> 
      </o-ex:context> 
   </o-ex:asset> 
   <o-ex:permission> 
      <o-dd:print> 
         <o-ex:constraint> 
            <o-dd:count>2</o-dd:count> 
         </o-ex:constraint> 
      </o-dd:print> 
      <o-ex:requirement> 
         <o-dd:prepay> 
            <o-dd:payment> 
               <o-dd:amount o-dd:currency=AUD>20.00</o-dd:amount> 
            </o-dd:payment> 
         </o-dd:prepay> 
      </o-ex:requirement> 
   </o-ex:permission>
   <o-ex:party> 
     <o-ex:context> 
        <o-dd:uid>x500:c=AU;o=RightsDir;cn=Alice Ryan</o-dd:uid> 
        <o-dd:name>Corky Rossi</o-dd:name> 
     </o-ex:context> 
   </o-ex:party> 
</o-ex:offer> 
Permissions
Conditions RequirementsConstraints
PartiesAssets
Figure 2.5: ODRL’s core concepts and example offer
that is a version of the original offer adapted to her specific identity and the context of her request. Both offers
and agreements contain permissions, i.e. the set of actions allowed over the asset. Figure 2.5 depicts a simplified
model of ODRL’s core concepts and an example offer authorising Alice Ryan to a maximum of two accesses to
an online resource, provided a payment of 20 Australian dollars is performed in advance. The model explicitly
distinguishes amongst: 1) constraints, i.e. restrictions on permissions such as temporal restrictions or limited
number of allowed accesses; 2) requirements, i.e. obligations such as payments that must be fulfilled before
access is granted, and 3) conditions, i.e. events that may occur during access and that might invalidate the
corresponding authorisation. Both parties and assets are specified via unique identifiers. As for XrML, this
requires a centralised management of all identities.
EPAL
EPAL is a language for writing privacy policies to handle data through fine-grained positive and negative
authorisations. As opposed to XrML and ODRL that assume a set of predefined and universally understood
terms, EPAL lets the parties involved in the data exchange define a common vocabulary providing all the terms
for user and data categories (that can also be organised in hierarchies), purposes (the declaration of the reasons
for which recipients need to access data), actions, containers (the context of access requests) and obligations.
Policies can then be specified that refer to specific vocabularies. Figure 2.6 depicts a simplified model of EPAL’s
core concepts and an example policy authorising paramedics to access for one day John Doe’s data for first aid
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Vocabulary Policy
<epal-policy >
  <epal-vocabulary-ref id="vocabulary1" 
   location="http://www.ibm.com"/>
   <rule id="rule1" ruling="allow">
     <user-category refid="paramedics"/>
     <data-category refid="health records"/>
     <purpose refid="first aid"/>
     <action refid="read"/>
     <condition refid="condition1">
      <predicate
      refid=".../epal#string-equal">
       <function
        refid=".../epal#string-bag-to-value">
        <attribute-reference
          container-refid="DataUserInfo"
          attribute-refid="DataUserID"/>
       </function>
       <attribute-value>John Doe</attribute-value>
      </predicate>
     </condition>
     <obligation id="retention">
       <parameter id="days">
         <value>1</value>
       </parameter>
     </obligation>
  </rule>
</epal-policy>
User 
categories
Data 
categories
Purposes
Actions
Obligations
Containers
Rules
Conditions
Figure 2.6: EPAL’s core concepts and example
purposes.
XACML
XACML is a popular XML-based standard specifying both an authorisation policy language and an access
request-decision-response data-flow protocol and message format. While the language shares many elements
with XrML, ODRL and EPAL, we consider the policy evaluation and enforcement protocol exemplary. Many of
the components that will be part of the solutions we propose throughout this thesis come from XACML’s model
or are extensions and modifications of its components. Figure 2.7 shows the classical components deployed to
perform the protocol. First, a policy decision point (PDP) interacts with a policy administration point (PAP)
to retrieve the most recent available of policies (step 1). Each access request (containing information about
the requesting subject, the requested resource, the requested action and the request context) must then be sent
from an application to a policy enforcement point (PEP) that acts as a protection layer between the application
used by the subject to perform the access and the requested resource (step 2). The PEP queries the PDP via
a context handler to obtain an access decision (steps 3 and 4). The PDP looks for policies applicable to the
request and can request attribute values to the context handler (step 5). A policy information point (PIP) is
queried to obtain information on subjects, context or on the resource itself (steps 6 to 10). Once policies have
been evaluated, a response containing the access decision and a set of obligations is returned to the PEP (step
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Figure 2.7: XACML data-flow diagram. The numbers express temporal ordering amongst the exchanged mes-
sages
11) that can authorise the access (step 12). When enforcing the policy decision and thus before authorising
or denying the access, the PEP must perform the set of obligations returned (step 13). This implies that the
obligations belong to a predefined set of procedures the PEP can execute. The proposed scheme is at the base
of most of the existing policy enforcement platforms.
At the base of any XACML policy is a Policy or PolicySet element. A PolicySet can contain multiple Policy
and PolicySet elements and even references to policies contained in remote locations. When an access request
is issued, the PDP finds the applicable policies by matching the values of action, subject, resource and environ-
ment attributes returned by the PIP or attached to the request with the corresponding constraints specified in the
target and condition elements of the policies. Each attribute can have an issue date and an issuer identifier and
conditions can be specified both on the attribute’s value and issuance information. Figure 2.8 depicts a simpli-
fied model of XACML’s core concepts and an example policy permitting access to anyone on a “SampleServer”
online resource, provided an email is sent to log the access. Since more than one rule per policy or more than
one policy might be applicable to the same request and given that both positive and negative authorisations are
possible, XACML allows the specification of combining algorithms indicating how conflicts between policies
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<PolicySet PolicySetId="examplePolicySet"> 
  <Target>
      <Subjects>
        <AnySubject/>
      </Subjects>
      <Resources>
        <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:
        string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
             SampleServer</AttributeValue>
          <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/
          XMLSchema#string"
             AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"/>
        </ResourceMatch>
      </Resources>
      <Actions>
        <AnyAction/>
      </Actions>
    </Target>
  <Policy PolicyId="examplePolicy1">  
    <Rule RuleId="rule2" Effect="Permit"> 
    </Rule>  
    <Obligations>  
      <Obligation  
          ObligationId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:example:obligation:email" 
          FulfillOn="Permit">
      </Obligation>
     </Obligations>  
  </Policy>  
</PolicySet>
Figure 2.8: XACML core concepts and example policy
can be solved. Examples are: “deny-overrides” (if a rule or Policy returns a denial, then the PolicySet returns
a denial), “permit-overrides” (if a rule or Policy returns a permission, then the PolicySet returns a permission)
and “first-applicable” (the first Policy applicable for the specific request overrides all the others).
Although still limited in this sense, the possibility to specify time constraints, limited number of accesses
or to interrupt access when certain conditions are verified represent a first step for XML-based authorisation
languages towards the specification of usage control policies.
Besides those presented here, several other languages exist and are often considered a good choice for differ-
ent applications, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [CLM+] . We here intended to
just give a flavour of the kind of access control policies that can be specified and not to fully cover all available
technologies. However, the use of these solutions has been limited by their complexity and the lack of a formal
semantics that made their actual enforcement very difficult. In fact, whilst the policy syntax is well-specified,
the interpretation and evaluation of the policies is left to the specific implementation of the PDP. This resulted in
differing implementations that are rarely compatible and thus usable in an open environment. This also makes it
impossible to compare policies from different organisations or decide whether a policy has been satisfied or not
from, for example, an audit log. As we will describe later, we will use a simplified formalism to specify poli-
cies that actually reproduces XACML policies. For the sake of this thesis we must also emphasise that all such
languages lack constructs to specify controls on derived data. They can control how data can be transformed
(i.e. who can perform which action on which resource) but not what protection will be applied to the output of
the transformation (Issue 3). Also, the enforcement models used to actually apply the policies specified in such
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languages have mostly tried to reproduce the XACML model and thus its limitations. In particular, the model
does not allow recipients to access data when there is no connectivity and thus when the PEP of the remote
authority possessing the data decryption keys cannot be contacted (Issue 3). Moreover, it assumes that all users
are willing to send their credentials to such remote PEP, despite these being possibly private or confidential and
the authority being possible untrusted by the user (Issue 2).
2.4.2 Access Control Policies for Hierarchical Domains
Managing modern access control systems usually involves a large number of resources and subjects that might
need to access them. This complexity inevitably results in high administrative costs and long deployment
cycles. To address this problem and make system management more scalable, many solutions rely on a hi-
erarchical organisation of the managed elements. This allows administrators to group subjects and resources
into categories explicitly (e.g. roles and groups for subjects, containers and sets for resources) that can be
more easily controlled. It is particularly important here to distinguish between users, groups and roles. Users
are identified individuals, groups are named sets of users and roles are named sets of privileges that can be
bestowed upon users. The hierarchical organisation of resources also results in the definition of several policy
propagation modalities, i.e. of strategies deciding how the result of policy evaluations at given levels in the
hierarchies influences policy evaluations at underlying levels. Some example policy propagation strategies are
[JSSS01]:
• No propagation: policies are not propagated;
• No overriding: all policies applied to an object are propagated to the underlying objects in the hierarchy,
regardless of the existence of other contradicting policies;
• Most specific override: policies applied to an object are propagated to the underlying objects if no
policies specified for lower-level objects exist that contradict them;
• Most general override: policies applied to an object are applicable and propagated to the underlying
objects if no policies specified for higher-level objects exist that contradict them;
• Path overrides: policies applied to an object are propagated to the underlying objects if not overrid-
den. A policy applied to an object o overrides a contradicting policy of an higher-level object o′ for all
underlying objects of o only for the paths passing from o [BJS99].
Similarly, whenever modality conflicts arise, i.e. whenever either propagated or non-propagated policies
return different results for the same authorisation request, a conflict resolution strategy must be applied. Some
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Figure 2.9: Policy evaluation process for hierarchical domains
example conflict resolution strategies are [JSSS01]:
• No conflicts: the presence of conflicts is considered an error;
• Denials override: negative authorisations take precedence over positive authorisations;
• Permissions override: positive authorisations take precedence over negative authorisations;
• Strong over weak: authorisations can be specified as being strong or weak, where strong authorisations
override weak authorisations [BJS99];
• Nothing takes precedence: decision is deferred to specifically defined decision policies.
Several other solutions are possible. Dong et al. [DRD08] proposed to use labelled logic programs to
prioritise policies and thus realise different conflict resolution strategies. We emphasise that the relative pros
and cons of both policy propagation and conflict resolution strategies depend on the specific usage scenario
and its requirements. Whenever we favour confidentiality over availability, an all-propagate deny overrides
strategy is preferable, whereas if we favour availability a no propagation permit overrides strategy would be.
More complex strategies offer more control to the policy writer, but also make it more complex specify policies
and verify their future behaviour. Figure 2.9 depicts a simple policy evaluation process for hierarchical domains.
Once policies have been propagated and conflicts resolved, there might still be some accesses that are neither
authorised nor denied. In this case, decision policies (or default policies) are used to determine the final access
decision. Examples are the open and closed default policies described earlier.
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Access Control for XML Documents
XML documents can be considered collections of nested elements and a perfect example of hierarchical organ-
isation of data. Following the widespread adoption of XML as a standard data model, there has been an ever
increasing attention and need for solutions that allow the specification and enforcement of security restrictions
on XML documents. Author-X [BCF01, BBC+00] is one of the first tools for protection of XML documents
that have been proposed. The tool had some important features that distinguished XML protection from tradi-
tional access control solutions: 1) it supported both set-oriented and document-oriented protection by allowing
the specification of security requirements at both document type definition (DTD) level (i.e. requirements ap-
plicable to all documents satisfying a certain structure) and document level; 2) it supported both positive and
negative authorisations for specific elements in the XML document’s graph structure; 3) it allowed policy prop-
agation at different levels of granularity (i.e. it allowed authorisation decisions for certain XML elements to be
passed on to the elements’ children at controllable levels of depth).
Author-X realises protection at different levels of granularity exploiting the structured characterisation of
XML and DTD documents. Policies can be applied to sets of documents satisfying the same DTD or to
specific sections, subsection and attributes of specific documents. Authorisations are of 5-tuples of the form
(subjects, targets, privilege, prop-opt, sign) where the privilege term indicates the requested access mode (read,
navigate, write and append), prop-opt indicates the method of propagation of policies through the different
levels of the XML tree (none, cascade, or first level) and sign indicates the sign of the permission (denied
or granted). Policies are stored as an XML file (the “policy base”) while another XML file stores the list
of users and their credentials (the “credential base”). Policy targets are specified as either a DTD file name
(indicating that the policy applies to all documents of that type) or as an XML file name together with an
XPath expression [xpa99] identifying specific sub-elements of the document. Subjects are instead specified as
XPath expressions over the credential base. Propagation options control if a policy applies to its target elements
only, to its targets’ direct children or to all its targets’ indirect children. Figure 2.10 depicts an example policy
authorising secretaries from the sales department to access purchase documents. Carrier employees working
for the company named “CCX” can read a specific purchase document for their company but cannot read the
description of the contained items.
The Author-X’s conflict resolution strategy is a more specific overrides - deny overrides strategy where
policies referring to inner elements in the XML structure prevail over policies referring to higher-level elements
or DTD files. If policies specified at the same level of granularity conflict, then denial decisions prevail.
When a recipient requests access to a document and once an authorisation decision has been taken for all
elements of the document, the server storing the document prunes it prior to release so that elements the recip-
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<policy_base> 
   <policy_spec cred_expr="//secretary [department="sales"]" 
     target="Purchase_order.dtd" priv="ALL" type="GRANT" prop="CASCADE"/ > 
   <policy_spec cred_expr="//carrier_employee[company="CCX"]" 
     target="Purchase_order.xml" path = "//Purchase_order[Purchase_order/
        carrier/name="CCX"]" 
     priv="VIEW" type="GRANT" prop="CASCADE"/ > 
  <policy_spec cred_expr="//carrier_employee[company="CCX"]" 
     target="Purchase_order.xml" path = "//item" priv="VIEW" type="DENY" 
        prop="CASCADE"/ > 
</policy_base> 
Figure 2.10: Author-X example policy
ient cannot read or navigate are selectively removed. A different solution devised to support push distribution
from the server to recipients encrypts the sections of the document protected by the same set of policies with
the same cryptographic key. The resulting document can then be sent to all the recipients that also receive the
appropriate subset of keys. For authoring rights (i.e. write and append), the policy enforcement is executed by
the server when the document is sent back from the user to be stored, as the server removes from the document
all non-authorised modifications.
Damiani et al. [DdVPS02, DdVPS00] proposed an access control model based on the definition and enforce-
ment of access restrictions directly on the structure of XML documents. The authors defined three hierarchies
for users and groups of users, IP addresses and symbolic names (URLs) whose Cartesian product is used as
the hierarchy for policy subjects. Authorisations can thus be specified for users regardless of their physical
location, for physical locations regardless of the user identity or for both. Policy targets are instead specified
as a combination of a URI and an XPath expression to identify specific sub-elements of XML documents.
Authorisations can be specified as:
• Positive or negative;
• Local or recursive: the authorisation can either be applied to the object’s attributes only or recursively to
the object’s sub-elements. Authorisations propagate down the XML tree until a conflicting one is found,
thus realising a more specific overrides conflict resolution strategy.
• DTD: the authorisation can either be specified for a document type or for specific documents. By default,
document-level authorisations override DTD-level authorisations.
• Hard or soft: Soft authorisations are document-level authorisation that can be overridden by conflicting
DTD-level authorisation, while hard authorisations are authorisations that cannot be overridden. If two
hard authorisations conflict, document-level authorisations still override DTD-level authorisations.
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Whenever several authorisations defined at the same level conflict, a most specific subject - denials override
conflict resolution strategy is applied. In other words, if a user is part of more than one group in the subject
hierarchy so that more than one authorisation can be applied, then the authorisations applicable to the most
specific group (i.e. the one at the lowest level) override the others. Amongst these, negative authorisations
override positive ones. Once an authorisation has been determined for each element in the XML structure, the
document is pruned so that all the subtrees that cannot be accessed are eliminated. The attributes of elements
that cannot be accessed but that cannot be eliminated completely (because some of their subelements can be
accessed) are also removed.
The main problem with both this approach [DdVPS02, DdVPS00] and Author-X [BCF01, BBC+00] is that
they do not scale well. For example, the Author-X key generation process may result in a vast amount of
keys depending on the XML file size and must be performed every time there is a change in the policy or
credential base. Moreover, these approaches place a significant administrative burden on the policy writer who
has to specify complex XML-based policies for every document she wants to publish. DTD-level authorisation
alleviate this problem, and this is why we take a similar approach in our solution. Also, both approaches
do not consider what happens to the policies associated with XML elements when the XML document is
transformed, for example with one of the many XML transformation languages and engines available nowadays
(e.g. XQuery). Also, these approaches assume all users are connected and able to contact the policy evaluation
authority that can issue decryption keys and filter the data. This limits the solutions to specific environments
and makes them unusable in situations such as the one described in our emergency scenario (Issue 3).
Miklau et al. [MS03] proposed a framework where fine-grained authorisations are specified through a
modified version of the XQuery language [xqu10]. Rights to access a document or part of it are specified as
possession of given sets of cryptographic keys that are used for encryption. An example authorisation policy is
depicted in Figure 2.11 stating that users who want to access the analysis element of all “subject” elements in a
document must possess the “registration key” (that is distributed by the document owner to rightful users) and
must know the content of the DNAsignature element of the same subject.
  SUFFICIENT
  FOR          $x in /doc/subjects/subject 
  KEY          getKey("registration")
                    $x/analysis/DNAsignature/text()
  TARGET   $x/analysis
Figure 2.11: Authorisation example: registration key and content of DNASignature necessary to access analysis
elements
According to the specified policies, every element in the XML document is associated with a Boolean ex-
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pression over a set of encryption keys (e.g. (k1 ∧ k2)∨ k3) indicating the sets of keys necessary to decrypt it.
The document is then normalised so that every element is associated and encrypted with one key only. This is
obtained by creating new hidden “fake” elements protected with the original keys and containing shares of the
new key needed to decrypt the original element. Encryption is then performed according to the XML Encryp-
tion Syntax and Processing standard [IDS02]. Whilst this solution allows to specify new types of conditions
such as the knowledge of a specific document subelement, it still does not address the main issues we consider
in this thesis. First, policies are not transformed to adapt to documents being modified (Issue 1). Second, since
keys are distributed beforehand to users that thus do not need to contact remote authorities, it is not possible to
evaluate usage conditions that depend for example on changing context (e.g. time of the day, location etc). Sim-
ilarly, access and usage monitoring and revocation is impossible. Once keys have been distributed, they cannot
be claimed back by the data owner. These are the main limitations of this type of solutions to the problem of
usage control in disconnected environments (Issue 3).
Crampton [Cra04] proposed instead to generate a key hierarchy (see Section 2.5.1) [AT83, MTMA85] such
that knowledge of the key associated with an element of an XML document would allow a user to derive
the keys for all subsequent elements. The structure of the hierarchy is obtained by specifying authorisations
through XPath Filter expressions [xpa02] and using their containment relationship (intuitively, an expression
e1 is contained by an expression e2 if the set of elements it returns is a subset of the elements returned by
e2). Unfortunately, deciding whether an expression contains another one is undecidable in general [Woo02,
NS02, MS04] and the proposed approach is thus restricted to fragments of the XPath Filter language. Also, the
solution has the same problems related with access and usage monitoring and revocation described above for
the proposal of Miklau et al. [MS03].
Flexible Authorisation Framework
The Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF) [JSSS01] is an access control framework based on a logic-
based policy language called the Authorization Specification Language (ASL). Authorisation subjects in
FAF can either be users, groups of users or roles and can thus be part of one of two distinct hierarchies (groups
and roles hierarchies). Authorisation objects can either be elements from a data structure (e.g. a file system)
or roles and can thus as well be part of one of two distinct hierarchies (objects and roles hierarchies). A FAF
authorisation can be seen as a tuple (o,s,sign) where o is a member of one of the two object hierarchies, s
is a member of one of the two subject hierarchies and sign indicates whether the authorisation is positive or
negative. An ASL authorisation is a rule of the form:
51
cando(o,s,sign)← L1& . . .&Ln (2.10)
where o is the authorisation object, s is the authorisation subject, sign is the sign of the authorisation and
L1 . . .Ln are literals (atomic possibly negated conditions) that must hold for the authorisation to be valid. Lit-
erals can express ordering or membership relationships in one of the available hierarchies (with the in and
dirin predicates), application-specific predicates (e.g. with the binary predicate owner indicating the owner of
an object) or history-based conditions (with the done(o,u,r,a, t) predicate indicating whether user u with role
r has executed action a on object o at time t). ASL also includes predicates to represent derived (or propa-
gated) authorisations (dercando), decision policies (do), conflict resolution strategies (overAO and overAS) and
a propositional symbol for integrity constraints (error), i.e. restrictions on the content of data after it has been
accessed.
Despite its flexibility and the wide range of policies ASL can express, it still does not allow users to specify
policies for derived data (Issue 1). Moreover, its evaluation process assumes that the central evaluator possesses
all credentials for all users who request access, despite these being possibly confidential or private (Issue 2).
Ponder2
Ponder2 [DDLS01, RDD07] is a declarative, object-oriented language for the specification of management and
authorisation policies. The core idea of the language is that resources and subjects are organised in the same
distributed domain structure under the common definition of managed objects. Domains form a tree structure
(as those depicted in Figure 2.14) where nodes can overlap (contain the same objects) and be physically placed
on different remote locations. Managed objects can interact with each other through procedure or function calls
or by triggering events. Policies are used to control the allowed procedure calls via authorisation policies and
to control responses to triggered events via event-condition-action (ECA) rules. Domains, events and policies
are themselves managed objects, thus easing the administration process. A Ponder2 authorisation policy is
composed of the following terms:
• Sign: either negative or positive to indicate whether the policy is a negative or positive authorisation;
• Subject: the managed object in the domain structure invoking a remote procedure call on another man-
aged object;
• Action: the invoked remote procedure call;
• Target: the managed object in the domain structure responding to the remote procedure call;
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• Condition: the conditions over the call’s parameters that must hold for the policy to be valid;
• Focus: the indication of the side of the interaction where the policy must be evaluated. It can either be
“t” (target) or “s” (subject).
Human testing! Patients!
History case! History case!
Data access request!
Data access response!
PEP 1!
PEP 2!
PEP 4! PEP 3!
Policy Evaluation Point!
Request arch!
Reply arch!
Figure 2.12: Evaluation points for authorisations in Ponder2
An authorisation’s focus represents at which point of the interaction between client object and server object
the policy is evaluated (Figure 2.12). Policies can: 1) permit or deny the client object to invoke a service; 2)
permit or deny the server object to accept an invocation; 3) permit or deny the server object to send back certain
return values; 4) permit or deny the client object to receive certain return values.
Figure 2.13 shows two example policies, the first preventing researchers from the Medical Research Centre
(MRC) from requesting medical information from untrusted doctors in the Sacred Hearth Hospital (SHH), the
second preventing doctors from SHH from issuing medical information to untrusted researchers in MRC.
  subject: root/MRC/HR dpt/Human testing
  action: "medicalInfo" 
  target: root/SHH/Untrusted/Doctors
  focus:"s"
  reqneg
  subject: root/MRC/Untrusted/Researchers
  action: "medicalInfo" 
  target: root/SHH/MedAffairsDpt/Neurology/Doctors
  focus:"t"
  reqneg
Figure 2.13: Ponder2 example authorisation policies
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Figure 2.14: Conflicting policies in Ponder2
In Ponder2, policies are propagated in the hierarchy of managed objects so that policies applied to a given
domain are also applied to all its nested domains and objects. Ponder2 resolves conflicts by allowing policies
to be defined as final (so that they cannot be overridden) and by applying a default conflict resolution strategy
for unsolved conflicts. The strategy is based on the calculation of the length of the path between subject
and target of a given call. We must thus distinguish between two cases: conflicts between final policies and
conflicts between normal policies. In the first case, policies with the longest path between subject and target
have precedence. In the second case, policies with the shortest path have precedence. The rationale behind this
is that more specific policies should take precedence over more generic ones. However, since final policies are
intended to override more specific ones, their conflict resolution strategy must be reversed. If policies with the
same path length conflict, then negative policies have precedence. In the examples in Figure 2.14, the managed
object s in domains c and a, sends a call to managed object t in domain d and b. Assuming policies are not
final, in example (a) the positive authorisation p2 with subject c and target d has precedence over the negative
authorisation p1 with subject a and target d; in example (b) the negative policy p2 has precedence, while in
example (c) the negative policy p1 has precedence.
While Ponder2 gives the possibility to specify different and complex policies in a very simple syntax, its
hierarchical domain model where all managed objects are connected and managed by the same administrator
is not suitable for dissemination control, where different entities might be disconnected and have little or no
knowledge of each other (Issues 2 and 3). Also, its authorisation model implies subjects are characterised only
by the domains they belong to and no conditions can be specified apart from boolean expressions on the function
call’s parameters. Finally, Ponder2’s policy model is oblivious of whatever happens to managed objects. Their
content or even their behaviour might change but the policies applied to them would remain the same (Issue
3).
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2.4.3 Trust management languages
“The most fundamental difference between traditional security systems and trust management systems is that
in the former trust is static and pre-defined while in the latter trust is dynamic and established on-the-fly”
[Don08].
In traditional access control systems, users are first authenticated and universally identified and only after they
are assigned roles, rights, keys or can be properly evaluated on the basis of the available policies. In other words,
the access control system determines whether users are trusted when ascertaining their identity. This is usually
achieved via a centralised authority who knows how to evaluate all identity and attribute credentials users can
present. However, in modern large scale networks, applications are distributed across several administrative
domains that know little about each other’s users and their attributes. In such a scenario, trust relationships
must be created and modified on the fly as new users enter and leave the system. Trust management solutions
depart from the traditional separation of concepts between authentication and authorisation and make use of
digital certificates, i.e. of signed statements certified by certification authorities, to describe chain of trusts
between entities such as an access control server and an unknown user.
As we will describe in the following, trust management systems suffer from a few shortcomings. First, enti-
ties that must take a trust decision on others must be able to gather all digital certificates that could build a chain
of trust. This is not an easy feat, especially in highly distributed environments or even more in disconnected
environments such as our crisis management scenario (Issue 3). Second, certificates may contain private infor-
mation and users may not be so keen on releasing them (Issue 2). Third, the creation of chains of trust relies
on users delegating authority over their trust relationships to other users. For example, Alice may delegate the
decision over her list of trusted people to Bob, stating that she trusts whoever Bob trusts. However, Bob may
further delegate his authority, and Alice would loose control over the list of her trustees completely. Finally,
while the policy languages for trust management we will describe in the following are also used to specify
access control requirements, they all lack constructs to specify how derived data can be protected (Issue 1).
Policy Maker
Policy Maker [BFL96] was one of the first proposed trust management systems. A Policy Maker policy, or
assertion, makes use of public cryptographic keys to identify users and to bind their identities with privileges.
An assertion has the form:
Source ASSERTS Authority Structure WHERE Filter
where Source represents the source, or writer, of the assertion and can be either a public key to represent an
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external user or a policy identifier to represent a policy specified by the local evaluator. An Authority Structure
indicates the users that the assertion refers to and thus contains one or more public keys. Finally, a Filter
contains the constraints to be satisfied for the assertion to hold. For example, the assertion:
policy ASSERTS keyAlice WHERE action = read
specifies that, for the local policy writer/evaluator, Alice can perform the read action. Chains of trust can be
created when several assertions written and signed by different sources are combined:
policy ASSERTS keyBob WHERE authorisereadby(Bob)
keyBob ASSERTS keyAlice WHERE action = read
The first assertion states that the local policy writer authorises Bob to authorise other users to perform the
read action, while with the second assertion Bob actually authorises Alice to read. The final result is that the
local policy writer actually authorises Alice to read.
Policy Maker does not specify any format for the signed credentials containing the assertions and any syntax
and semantics for filters, leaving the responsibility to the calling application. It does instead offer a tool to
query the trust management engine and verify whether specific actions can be authorised or not. Queries have
the form:
key1,key2 . . .keyn REQUESTS ActionMatch
where the ActionMatch is the context of the query that must satisfy the policies’ filters. An example query
satisfying the previous chain of assertion would be:
keyAlice REQUESTS action=read, authorisereadby(Bob)
Trust Policy Language
With the Trust Policy Language (TPL) [HMM+00], IBM merged RBAC with trust management. In RBAC
users are not assigned permissions directly but rather through a level of indirection represented by roles. Roles
are assigned permissions and organised in an inheritance hierarchy while users are assigned to roles to obtain
the corresponding permissions. TPL extends RBAC by using trust management concepts to assign users to
roles. Each role has one or more rules stating what conditions a user must satisfy to be assigned to the role,
where rules are conditions on the set of credentials signed by third parties and that the user must present. Again,
roles can be chained specifying rules that require certificates to be signed by any member of other roles.
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<GROUP NAME= "Hospitals"> 
    <RULE> 
         <INCLUSION ID="from_self" TYPE="Recommendation" FROM="self"> 
         </INCLUSION> 
         </FUNCTION> 
    </RULE>
    <RULE> 
         <INCLUSION ID="reco" TYPE="Recommendation" FROM="hospitals" REPEAT=2 DEPTH=3> </INCLUSION> 
         <EXCLUSION ID="warn" TYPE="Warning" FROM="hospitals">
         <FUNCTION>
               <GT> 
                  <FIELD ID="reco" NAME= "Level"></FIELD> 
                  <CONST>1</CONST> 
               </GT>
          </FUNCTION> 
   </RULE> 
</GROUP> 
Figure 2.15: Example TPL policy
Policies are written in XML and consist of a sequence of role definitions through the <GROUP> tag. Each
<GROUP> element can contain several <RULE> elements, each specifying the set of credentials that must be
presented in the <INCLUSION> tag and the condition that they must satisfy in the <FUNCTION> tag. For
each credential specification it is also possible to specify whether a minimum number of the same credential
signed by different issuers should be presented and whether the chain of trust should be limited to a certain
depth. The approach is similar to those proposed by other trust management solutions, but TPL explicitly
caters for negative certificates, i.e. certificates on the basis of which a role membership should not be granted.
These can be specified via the <EXCLUSION> tag whose semantics is “there does not exist a certificate X
(in the local repository) such that the rule’s function holds”. Figure 2.15 shows an example policy stating that
entities can be assigned to the “hospitals” role if they possess a recommendation from the policy writer himself
or if they possess at least two recommendations signed by entities that are already members of the “hospitals”
role. Any entity with a “warning” certificate signed by a hospital should instead be excluded.
TPL also lets the policy writer specify where credentials can be found in case the user under evaluation
cannot (or does not want to) provide all of them. This is done via the <REPOSITORY> tag that indicates
a location in terms of a URL or in terms of other roles. However, while the latter possibility introduces the
problem of contacting all members of the specified roles to obtain the credentials (they might be unreachable
or might simply refuse to cooperate), the former reduces the system’s degree of distribution as repositories
are in the end just centralised servers. Also, even if repositories could take decisions on who is authorised to
access the stored credentials, privacy is a big issue of the system. Credentials subjects and issuers should be
the only entities to decide who should be allowed to access the credentials themselves, lest the risk that their
private information is disseminated amongst unknown and undesired recipients (Issue 2). In this case instead
the credentials subjects and issuers have no control over the locations and recipients their information is sent
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to.
SPKI/SDSI
Rivest and Lampson originally proposed the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [RL96] as an
alternative, decentralised public-key infrastructure. At the same time, the Simple Public Key Infrastructure
[Ell99] was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) with the motivation that the existing
X.509 infrastructure was too complex. Given their many similarities, SDSI and SPKI were later merged in a
unique framework called SPKI/SDSI [CEE+02], and this is how we will refer to them in the following.
In SKPI/SDSI every public key is associated with a local name space, i.e. with a set of identifiers whose
values (the entities they refer to) make sense only for the owner of the corresponding public key. No global
names, i.e. identifiers that have a unique value for all public keys (users), exist. A local name is thus a (key, id)
pair where key represents the public key of the owner of the name and id is the actual identifier of the name.
For example, (KAlice, friends) is the local name used by Alice to identify all of her friends. Users can then use
their private keys to sign certificates. Two types of certificates are possible:
• Name certificates are statements binding a local name to a value, where a value can be either a set of
keys or can refer to other names, thus possibly interconnecting different namespaces. A name certificate
can be seen as a tuple (K,A,S,V ) where K is the issuer’s public key whose private key must also be
used to sign the certificate, A is an identifier that together with K defines a local name, S is either a key
or a name that is being associated with the local name, and V is the certificate’s validity. For example,
the certificate (KAlice, friends, KBob, (August, September)) signed by KAlice indicates that Alice considers
Bob to be her friend between August and September. The certificate (KAlice, friends, (KBob, friends),
(August, September)) indicates instead that Alice considers Bob’s friends as her friends between August
and September.
• Authorisation certificates are statements granting or delegating a privilege to a user. An authorisation
certificate can be seen as a tuple (K,S,d,T,V ) where K is the issuer’s public key whose private key
must also be used to sign the certificate, S is either a key or a name for the users who are receiving the
privilege, d is a Boolean value indicating whether the granted privilege can be delegated or not, T is the
authorisation specification and V is the certificate’s validity. For example, the certificate (KAlice, KBob,
true, read profit statement, 1 year)) signed by KAlice indicates that alice is granting Bob the right to read
her profit statement for 1 year and that he can pass this privilege down to other users. The certificate
(KAlice, friends, false, read profile, 1 year)) signed by KAlice indicates instead that Alice is granting all of
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her friends the right to read her profile for 1 year, but they cannot pass this right to anyone.
It is easy to see that certificates can be used to specify access control lists and that they can be chained to
construct a trust path between two users who know nothing about each other. In [CEE+02] the authors proposed
an algorithm to find a suitable chain of certificates proving a user is authorised to perform a given action,
assuming all necessary certificates are available. However, as for other trust management solutions, assuming
that all users possess all signed credentials necessary to build a trust chain from them to any evaluator might be
not realistic. Also, such an assumption violates the privacy of the owners and subjects of the certificates who
might not want to disclose information about their local namespaces (Issue 2).
RT
The RT framework [LMW02] is a family of languages for the specification of role-based trust management
and authentication policies. The several versions of the language build on top of the basic language RT0 and
add new possibilities to what could already be expressed with TPL, SPKI/SDSI, Policy Maker or other systems
like KeyNote [BFIK99] and REFEREE [CFL+97]. The access control model that RT languages represent is
also called attribute-based access control (ABAC) and is based on the idea that authority over attribute assertion
can be delegated, is completely decentralised and attributes can be inferred from other ones.
RT0 assertions represent signed credentials that assign roles or delegate authorities. There are three types of
credentials:
• Simple membership: roles are denoted by terms of the form A.R, where A is the authority assigning
entities to role R. Therefore, a credential signed by entity A and containing an assertion of the form
A.R← E asserts that entity E has been assigned role A.R by A. Only A can assign role A.R, so every
entity defines its own local name space. For example, the assertion Alice.friends← Bob indicates that
Alice considers Bob as one of her friends.
• Simple inclusion: A can also define a role A.R to contain different roles A j.Ri where A j can either be
or not be the same authority as A. The statement A.R← A j.Ri defines a domination or containment
relationship between the two roles A.R and A j.Ri. The semantic is: “each entity with role A j.Ri is
automatically assigned also to role A.R”. Intuitively this credential represents a delegation of authority
over role A.R from authority A to authority A j. For example, the assertion Alice.friends← Bob.friends
indicates that Alice considers all of Bob’s friends as her friends too.
• Linking inclusion: Delegation can also be expressed with more complex patterns such as A.R← A.Ri.Rk
where the authority over role A.R is delegated to all entities with role A.Ri. For example, the assertion
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Alice.friends← Alice.relatives. f riends indicates that Alice considers all of her relatives’ friends as her
friends too.
RT1 extends RT0 by allowing parameterised roles. In RT1 a role is specified with the term A.R(h1 . . .hn) where
h1...hn are parameters representing role attributes or connecting different roles. Attribute-based delegation can
thus be obtained with the assertion A.R← A j.Ri(h1...hn).Rk, that states that A delegates the authority over
role A.R to every entity A j.Ri satisfying the attributes h1...hn. RT1 also introduces a fourth type of credential:
intersection inclusion. For example, the assertion A.R← A1.R1 ∩A2.R2 ∩ . . .∩An.Rn states that every entity
assigned to all roles A1.R1, A2.R2 ... An.Rn is also assigned to role A.R.
RT2 extends RT1 with the notion of o-sets. An o-set is a group of logically related objects that are syntac-
tically represented as RT1 roles. We will not explain in details RT2, but just illustrate an assertion example
showing how the new concept can be used to describe permissions. The assertion A. f ileAccess(read,?F :
A.documents(?pro j))← A.team(?pro j) states that A allows all the members of a project to read documents of
the same project. The question mark in the assertion is used to indicate named variables, while the colon is
used to introduce a constraint over an attribute (in this case a value set).
RT T introduces manifold roles and two role operators that allow the specification of separation of duties
(where an entity can be granted a right only if a specific different one has not been already granted) and
threshold (where the authorisation of multiple parties is required) policies. RT D introduces instead the concept
of role activation and its delegation, i.e. the possibility to select what role can be activated for each access
session (i.e. a time frame where some granted rights are valid). This allows access requestors to avoid using
credentials and consuming them (if they are consumable) when they are not needed and to overcome separation
of duty policies when possible.
An issue with the RT languages is that intermediate steps in the delegation chain cannot be controlled. Only
the first step of the delegation can in fact be constrained with attribute conditions, while all the others are
completely left to the discretion of the delegated authorities.
SECPAL
SecPAL [BFG10] is an extensible policy language for authorisation specification. Access requests are treated
as logical queries evaluated against a knowledge base of predefined logical clauses. Predicates are used to
assign rights to users and delegate them. A SecPAL authorisation policy is composed of a set of assertions of
the following form:
A says fact if fact1, . . ., fact2, c
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where A is the principal issuing the assertion, fact1, . . ., fact2 are the conditional facts that must hold for the
assertion to be valid, and c is a constraint on the values of the variables contained in the assertion (e.g. temporal,
inequality, path and regular expression constraints). Each fact facti specifies a property of a principal. Facts are
composed of at least an entity identifier and a verb phrase, where verb phrases can have several forms such as:
can doAction [parameters]
has access from [parameters] till [parameters]
is attribute
can sayD fact
can act as entity
where the verb phrase can sayD can be used to nest facts and obtain delegation. In particular, D is the
delegation flag and can be either 0 or∞, indicating whether the delegated right can be exertend only by the direct
delegated principal or can be infinitely re-delegated, respectively. For example, the parameterised delegation
policy:
FileServer says user can say∞ x can access resource if user can access resource
states that users can pass on their access rights to other users. Attribute-based delegation, i.e. delegating the
authority to assert whether a subject holds an attribute only to other parties that hold other attributes, can also
be obtained. The following policy states that a shop gives a discount to students every Friday, where subjects
can be defined as students by universities that are in turn certified by the board of education:
Shop says x is entitled to discount if x is a student till date,
currentTime()≤ date, currentDate() = Friday
Shop says univ can say0 x is a student till date if univ is a university
Shop says BoardOfEducation can say0 univ is a university
Delegation can also be bound to a specific length of the delegation chain different from 0 and ∞ by chaining
a specific number of can say0 verb phrases. The verb phrase can act as can instead be used to express role
membership and role hierarchies. For example, the policy:
NHS says FoundationTrainee can read resource
NHS says SpecialistTrainee can act as FoundationTrainee
NHS says SeniorMedPractitioner can act as SpecialistTrainee
NHS says Alice can act as SeniorMedPractitioner
builds a role hierarchy valid for the NHS principal where a privilege is first assigned to a role and then
inherited by its senior roles. Negative conditions are also possible, thus allowing separation of duties, threshold
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and prohibition policies. Policy evaluation in SecPal is performed by translating assertions into equivalent
constrained Datalog programs. However, this is based on the assumption that all assertions are available to
the Datalog engine. As for other trust management solutions, this assumption is not only unrealistic but again
violates the privacy of the individuals to whom the assertions refer (Issue 2). In fact, once all assertions have
been given to the service running the Datalog engine, users have no control over them.
2.5 Enforcement Platforms for Data Control
Once an organisation has chosen the most suitable access control model or policy language to express its data
protection requirements, mechanisms must be put in place that actually enforce the specified controls on data
access and usage. Enforcement architectures can vary widely according to the application scenario they are
needed for [PSS00]. In this thesis we distinguish between two main types of architecture:
• Non-interactive data sharing architectures (NIDSA): non-interactive architectures require potential
data recipients to interact with the data originator or a delegated entity only once, prior to any access
request. The initial interaction usually results in the distribution of a set of privileges or access rights on
the basis of the available policies (usually in the form of a cryptographic key that can be used to decrypt
several documents) that expire after a predefined time interval during which they can be reused with no
further interaction with the original issuer.
• Interactive data sharing architectures (IDSA): interactive architectures require data recipients to in-
teract continuously with the data originator or a delegated entity to obtain access to data. Each access to
each document requires a different interaction with a remote service that evaluates the requesting user on
the basis of the available policies and releases the access (usually by issuing cryptographic keys that can
be used to decrypt one document). The XACML enforcement architecture described in Section 2.4.1 has
been the basis for most IDSA architectures.
We underline that all solutions that fall in these two categories and that we describe in the following do not
consider the problem of derived data (Issue 1). Once data has been published and associated with policies,
these cannot be modified when data is transformed.
Since it is often the case that data is required to cross the originating organisation’s boundaries to be used by
partner organisations or external individuals, enforcement mechanisms are often integrated with Data Sharing
Agreement (DSA) architectures. A DSA [SSR06] is a common set of rules regulating the exchange, handling
and usage of shared data that partner organisations agree on and are expected to enforce in their respective
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Figure 2.16: DSA architecture scheme
corporate environments. Therefore, with the term DSA architecture we indicate the set of components deployed
between partners organisations to manage the joint specification of one or several DSAs and to map the agreed
rules to the specific models and languages of each organisation so that they can be enforced (Figure 2.16). As
such, a DSA architecture can be deployed on top of both IDSA and NIDSA enforcement architectures to which
it provides the policies to be enforced.
2.5.1 Non-Interactive Data Sharing Architectures
............
Authorities
1. Cryptographic key distribution
3. Data dissemination
2. Data creation and
secure packaging
............ 4. Data decryption 
and access
Figure 2.17: Non-Interactive Data Sharing Architecture
Non-interactive data sharing architectures are based on the a priori distribution of one or more cryptographic
keys amongst potential data recipients, according to the roles or attributes they have in the organisation they
belong to. The keys can then be used to access only a subset of the disseminated documents (Figure 2.17).
The advantage of using NIDSA architectures is that documents can be protected (or published) before dis-
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semination at any time, also when connectivity is not available, and can be similarly accessed. On the other
hand, NIDSA architectures suffer from two main shortcomings. First, it is not possible to revoke access rights.
Once keys have been distributed by an authority to recipients, they cannot be prevented from accessing the
documents the keys allow them to access, nor it is possible to know when they access them. Also, since keys
are distributed prior to any data dissemination on the basis of static criteria, no dynamic evaluation of context
conditions can be taken into consideration to influence access decisions. Second, it is extremely difficult to dis-
seminate data across organisational boundaries without re-publishing it, since key distribution requires a unique
key generation and distribution authority shared amongst all organisations cooperating in the data exchange.
When passing from organisation A to organisation B, data should first be decrypted by a member of A and
passed to a trusted member of B for re-encryption.
Key Management for Access Hierarchies
Access hierarchies are structures defined by an inheritance relationship over privileges and are a common
concept in access control. Each node in an access hierarchy represents an access level, i.e. a set of privileges
that are inherited by the higher levels. An example access hierarchy is depicted in Figure 2.18. The CEO
of a company has all the privileges of both the head of the R&D department and the head of the production
department, who in turn have all the privileges granted to all engineers working for the company.
CEO
Engineer
Head of 
R&D dpt
Head of 
production
(L0, K0)
(L1, K1) (L2, K2)
(L3, K3)
Y02 = K2⊕H(K0,L2)Y01 = K1⊕H(K0,L1)
Y23 = K3⊕H(K2,L3)Y13 = K3⊕H(K1,L3)
Figure 2.18: Example access hierarchy and associated keys
Atallah et al. [AFB05] proposed a cryptographic scheme to assign privileges organised in an access hierar-
chy in the form of a secret cryptographic key, so that no further evaluation of the users is necessary to assess
their access level when they try to access disseminated data. Figure 2.18 shows an example of the scheme.
Each access level i is assigned a public label Li and a secret cryptographic key ki while each edge connecting
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two levels i and j is assigned a public label yi j = k j⊕H(ki,L j) where H is a secure hash function and ⊕ the
xor operator. It is easy to see that any user at access level i can derive the secret keys for the underlying levels
j as k j = yi j⊕H(ki,L j) and thus decrypt all documents encrypted with it.
Taylor et al. [AT83, MTMA85] developed a different model where every node ni in the hierarchy is assigned
a key ki generated as follows. A public integer ti is assigned to each node ni such that t j divides ti if and only if
n j dominates ni. An authority then selects a random secret key k0 and a secret pair of large primes p and q and
publishes their product M = pq. Each key is then generated as ki = k
ti
0(mod M). If n j dominates ni, then ti/t j
is an integer and ki can be computed as k
ti/t j
j = k
t j(ti/t j)
0 (mod M). If ti/t j is not an integer this computation is
considered infeasible as it requires extraction of roots modulo M, the product of two unknown primes. To avoid
collusion between users, the authors also propose a collusion resistant scheme based on a particular selection
of the ti values.
Attribute-Based Encryption
The term “attribute-based encryption” is used to indicate a family of cryptographic schemes [BF01, SW05,
Cha07, BSW07, OSW07] where data encryption can be bound to an authorisation policy specifying conditions
on the set of attributes recipients must possess to be able to decrypt the data. Attributes are usually distributed
by an attribute authority in the form of a set of private parameters. The same authority also publishes a set of
public parameters that can be used to encrypt and, combined with private keys, decrypt data. One of the basic
schemes [SW05] allows data originators to specify a set of attributes and an error tolerance parameter d such
that recipients must possess at least d of the specified attributes to access the data. Attributes are represented by
the first |U | elements of Z∗p, where U is the attributes set and p is a large prime number. The published public
parameters are:
T1 = gt1 . . .T|U | = gt|U | ,Y = e(g,g)y (2.11)
where y, t1 . . . t|U | are chosen uniformly at random from Zp, e is a bilinear map (i.e. a function such that for all
a and b, e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab) and g is a generator for the group whose prime order is p. A private key for the
set of attributes w ⊆U consists of the set of components (Di)i∈w where Di = g
q(i)
ti where q is a polynomial of
degree d−1 such that q(0) = y. Encryption of a message M for the set of attributes w′ is obtained as:
E = (w′,E ′ = MY s,{Ei = T si }i∈w′) (2.12)
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where s is randomly chosen from Zp. Given a ciphertext E encrypted for the attribute set w′ and a private key
for the attribute set w such that |w∩w′| ≥ d, the cleartext can be obtained as:
E ′
∏i∈S(e(Di,Ei))4i,S(0)
=
Me(g,g)sy
∏i∈S (e(g
q(i)
ti ,gsti))4i,S(0)
=
Me(g,g)sy
∏i∈S (e(g,g)sq(i))4i,S(0)
= M (2.13)
where S is any subset of dimension d of w∩w′, 4i,S(0) is the Lagrange coefficient and the last step in the
equation is obtained via polynomial interpolation.
Successive developments of the basic scheme led to solutions where more complex conditions could be spec-
ified to restrain access. In key-policy attribute-based encryption [GPSW06, OSW07] ciphertexts are associated
with sets of descriptive attributes and users’ private keys with policies. Policies are Boolean expressions over
attribute values indicating which ciphertext users can access. In ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
[BSW07] users’ private keys are associated with sets of descriptive attributes and ciphertexts with policies in-
dicating who can access them. A multi-authority scheme [Cha07] was also proposed where private keys can be
distributed by different authorities.
2.5.2 Interactive Data Sharing Architectures
............
Authorities
1. Data creation
2. Data 
publication
3. Secure 
packaging
4. Data dissemination
5. Access 
request
6. Evaluation and 
Access release
7. Data usage
Figure 2.19: Interactive Data Sharing Architecture
Interactive data sharing architectures are based on the online authentication and authorisation of data recipi-
ents at the moment they request access to data. Both academia and industry have proposed several approaches
to the problem, which is often referred to in industry as enterprise rights management (ERM) or digital rights
management (DRM). Although the proposed approaches vary in aspects such as policy/rights deployment and
data protection mechanisms, common design principles and functionality can be identified (Figure 2.19). First,
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data is associated with access rights (or usage control policies) and cryptographically protected before distribu-
tion to recipients (publication). Then, a trusted evaluation authority (TA), often the originator himself, responds
to access requests, evaluates recipients’ rights and issues the decryption keys. A trusted component running on
the recipient devices that we will refer to as the virtual machine (VM), ensures that rights are locally enforced.
Specific architectures differ in their management of user authentication, policy and rights retrieval, audit of user
actions and other tasks [Aut05, Mic05, MPB03, PSS00, PHB06].
The advantages of IDSA architectures are the possibility to evaluate contextual conditions and revocation
lists for credentials at the moment recipients request access, and the possibility of deploying inter-organisational
links so that recipients can either contact a TA in their own organisation or in an external partner organisation.
Although used in many ERM products and in research, this architecture has several limitations. First, the set of
TAs is statically and explicitly defined. Changes in this set such as adding a new TA or removing an existing
one, require defining new agreements, establishing new trust relationships and implementing them in terms of
key exchanges, trust records etc. A second issue concerns the availability of the TA: if recipients cannot contact
the specified TA, they cannot access the data received. Furthermore, current protocols assume that recipients are
willing to present their credentials to the authority designated by the data originator even when credentials may
be confidential. A last issue arises in particular in organisational environments where partners do not know the
internal structure of the organisation with whom they interact. In such situations, it is difficult for the originator
to specify access rules based on internal roles or to specify which entities in the partner organisation are entitled
to issue or verify specific credentials. Instead, recipients are typically better placed to choose which authority
could better evaluate their credentials amongst a scope of acceptable authorities defined by the originator (Issue
2). Finally, IDSA architectures suffer from the obvious problem described by Issue 3, as lack of connectivity
makes them almost completely unusable.
Microsoft Rights Management Services
Microsoft Rights Management Service (MS RMS) [Mic05] is Microsoft’s ERM solution for data protec-
tion in enterprise environments and is perhaps one of the solutions that mostly represent the generic IDSA
architecture described above.
Each organisation willing to participate in the data sharing must provide a root RMS server connected to
an Active Directory system for user authentication. Authentication results in the issuance of a rights account
certificate (RAC) containing the user’s ID and email address. To realise cross-organisational authentication,
servers also establish trust relationships with each other so that RACs signed by a server can be verified and
accepted by several others. Root servers can also authorise other servers to work as publishing/licensing servers
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Figure 2.20: Microsoft RMS data protection
(i.e. TAs), generating a publishing/licensing server hierarchy. Figure 2.20 illustrates MS RMS’s protection
scheme. VMs encrypt data with a symmetric key and protect it for a publishing server. The encrypted key is
then sent, together with the list of user IDs authorised to access the data, to the publishing server that includes
them in a signed publishing licence. An offline publication, i.e. the creation of a publishing licence without
contacting a publishing server, is also possible but only for privileged users. When recipients try to access a
protected document, their VM sends the publishing licence and the recipient’s RAC to the publishing server.
If the recipient’s ID is included in the access control list of the publishing licence, the server releases the
decryption key in the form of a use licence.
Despite its IDSA architecture, rights revocation and modification is an issue of RMS. Rights are in fact
contained in publishing licences and are distributed together with the encrypted documents. Revoking a right
would mean deleting all the distributed copies of its licence. Revocation lists can be used to invalidate issued
licences or certificates and to prevent users with specific RACs from requesting new licences. However, no
fine-grained rights modification is possible. Once a licence has been revoked, recipients must obtain a new,
more recent one.
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EMC Documentum Information Rights Management Services
EMC Documentum Information Rights Service (formerly Authentica ERM) [EMC, Aut05] is a completely
centralised solution where, apart from policy evaluation, trusted servers are also used as storage points. Data
publication is performed by encrypting the data with a symmetric key that is then stored, together with an
access control list and the data’s identifier, on a server. The encrypted data can then be disseminated together
with a reference to the publishing server (if more than one exists) so that recipients can contact it to obtain
the corresponding decryption key. Servers also manage audit logs and authentication (that can be realised via
different systems such as LDAP, X.509 digital certificates, Windows NT domains etc). While with this solution
offline publishing is not possible, users can easily modify their published access control lists at any time after
the publication by simply contacting the publishing server. The system also provides an off-line access mode.
When access to a document is requested for the first time, if the corresponding policy allows for off-line access,
then a temporary lease (corresponding to an RMS use licence) is generated and cached on the client’s machine.
Here, the VM is trusted to delete it after expiration. Another feature of this solution is the possibility to
enforce mandatory policies, i.e. rights and rules specified at corporate level that are automatically associated
with documents when they are distributed through specific controlled channels (e.g. e-mail gateways, network
folders and other data sharing systems). The servers managing the services (e.g. SMTP or FTP servers) simply
associate the mandatory policies with all incoming data automatically, with no distinction.
Sticky Policies via Identity-Based Encryption
Casassa-Mont et al. [MPB03] proposed a high-level model and a related technical solution that allows users to
enforce their privacy polices and, at the same time, makes organisations more accountable whilst dealing with
users’ data. The solution is based on the so-called sticky policies paradigm, i.e. on a tamper-resistant binding
between data and the policies used to protect it. The binding assures that the policies are available wherever
the data is received so that a proper evaluation can be performed. Figure 2.21 depicts the proposed high-level
architecture. Data originators who must send sensitive data to external unknown recipients first encrypt it and
bind it with sticky policies. This is obtained by encrypting the data with the identity-based encryption (IBE)
scheme that allows any string to be used as an encryption key. In this case, a policy string is used as the key,
where any policy model or language can be used. To obtain a valid IBE decryption key, the data recipient,
who has received the encrypted data and the policy, must interact with a TA and provide the information and
credentials required by the policy. The TA must also be provided with the correct policy or it will not be able
to generate the correct decryption key. This is why the data-policy binding is considered to be tamper-resistant.
Upon positive evaluation of the policy, the TA can generate the decryption key and release it to the recipient
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Figure 2.21: High Level ERM Architecture based on the sticky policies paradigm
who can then access the data.
With respect to the Microsoft Rights Management Services, this solution has the advantage that the publica-
tion phase can be performed while being offline, with no need to contact the remote trusted authority to obtain
encryption keys or signed publishing licences. Information can also be encrypted several times for different au-
thorities, so that the recipient must receive authorisation from all of them. Similarly, different parts of the same
document can be encrypted for different authorities, each responsible for a subset of the protected information.
Accountability is obtained by making TAs log all access requests and released decryption keys.
2.6 The Trusted Platform Initiative
The root of trust of all the solutions we have presented so far, i.e. the basic set of components in a system
that can be trusted to behave correctly and that ensures all other components behave correctly, is represented
broadly by two software components: the virtual machine running on the data recipient’s machine that ensures
data is used according to the data originator’s policies, and the evaluation authority evaluating policies and
issuing decryption keys to virtual machines. In this case the term correct behaviour must be intended with
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respect to the expectations of both the data originators and recipients. In other words, a correctly behaving
data protection system ensures that only users authorised by the data originator can access the data, while at
the same time no information of the data recipients is used for purposes other than policy evaluation. The two
components can be broken down further and identified with the set of components of the XACML reference
model (Figure 2.7). It is easy to see how compromised components can affect the behaviour of the system
and be detrimental for both data recipients and originators. A compromised PDP could return arbitrary results,
granting access to data to unauthorised users or denying access to authorised ones. It could even disseminate
the data recipient’s private credentials it received for the policy evaluation. Similarly, a compromised PEP
could release decryption keys (once received from an evaluation authority) or unprotected data, or not perform
required obligations. A compromised PIP could hide certain credentials or generate false context information,
while a compromised PAP could issue wrong policies. In both cases the PDP would be tricked into wrong
evaluations. A compromised or malicious application receiving the disclosed data from the PEP could release
it publicly.
As data protection systems offered to the public were continually affected by the problem of untrusted soft-
ware environments, it became clear that new solutions were needed. Not only the components of the protection
system had to be trusted, but the entire environment where they were installed and run, including the operating
system and all of the applications running on it. In fact, most DRM systems were being circumvented by ma-
licious applications capturing unprotected data as it was being disclosed (e.g. played by speakers or displayed
by a monitor). Trusted computing (TC) [Gro, Sch03, Fel03] indicates a new family of technologies aimed to
improve computer security through changes in existing hardware architectures. TC originates from two major
projects (the Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base and the Trusted Computing Group, former
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance) driven by a wide collaboration between original equipment manufactur-
ers and software firms. Motivations come from the need to ensure the integrity of software components so that
they can be trusted to enforce security controls correctly. One approach that has been traditionally adopted by
most of the existing ERM systems is to manage and restrict administrative privileges on client machines so that
users are not able to modify critical system components. However, it is hard to check or verify the integrity of
remote systems without appropriate hardware support. TC provides this support by reducing a machine’s root
of trust to a single chip, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
TC encompasses five main functionalities, whose implementation or very availability depend on the specific
TC product:
• Endorsement key (EK): every TC platform possesses a public/private key pair (although some manu-
facturers do not provide one, in the rest of this thesis we will assume platforms with an available EK)
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that can be used for secure communications with external components or to sign data for authentication.
The key is provided at manufacturing time and never leaves the TPM chip;
• Memory curtaining: sensitive areas of volatile memory are isolated and made unaccessible to untrusted
or unauthorised software components;
• Secure input and output: protected paths are established between software/hardware components for
secure data communication. Malicious or tampered components can be detected and excluded;
• Sealed storage: private information is bound to and encrypted for a specific software/hardware configu-
ration. Cryptographic keys are not memorised but created at run-time according to the current execution
environment. Configurations different from the original one cannot decrypt formerly secured informa-
tion;
• Remote attestation: Authorised third parties can detect changes to a remote computer configuration and
calculate a trust level for its run-time environment. The TPM can generate certificates specifying the
applications currently running or installed.
The Trusted Computing Group’s architecture [DR] is based on the existence of three roots of trust, i.e. three
entities that must be trusted implicitly because there is no other way their trustworthiness can be explicitly
verified. The trustworthiness of the remaining components in the architecture directly descends from one of
the three roots of trust: the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM), the root of trust for storage (RTS)
and the root of trust for reporting (RTR). While the three roots of trust are stored in the TPM’s non-volatile
memory, the TPM also includes 16 volatile platform configuration registers (PCR) that are used to store plat-
form configuration measurements in the form of SHA-1 hash values of applications running on the platform
or of configuration and data files. Measurements are stored by extending a PCR, i.e. by running the following
operation:
PCR := SHA-1(PCR | measurement)
Whenever a PCR is extended, the corresponding measurement is also stored in a stored measurement log (SML)
that resides in the hard drive and is thus not protected by the TPM. The rationale behind this is that while the
SML can be read to know what components are running on a platform, it is not possible to alter it since it would
then not correspond to the stored PCR values that can be easily recalculated.
The CRTM is the BIOS boot block code. It measures and stores the integrity of other parts of the BIOS before
passing control to them. The BIOS measures the hardware configuration of the machine and the integrity of
the bootloader and passes control to it. Finally, the bootloader measures the integrity of the operating system’s
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kernel. In the end, all components running in the machine up to the OS level are measured and the measurements
stored in the PCR. Note that this trusted boot process (Figure 2.22) does not prevent untrusted components from
being run, but memorises them so that remote attestation is possible.
Before starting an interaction, a remote party (the challenger) might require an attestation of the platform’s
integrity. To do so, the attestator must send to the challenger its SML and PCR values. The challenger can then
first verify if the attestator has an untrusted configuration by comparing the SML records with a local database
of trusted and untrusted components, and then calculate their hash values and compare them with the received
PCR values. To ensure that such values have not been tampered with, they should be signed by the attestator’s
TPM with its EK. Since the EK is uniquely linked to the machine it belongs to, this process might disclose the
attestator’s identity. To avoid this, the attestator’s TPM generates an attestation identity key (AIK), signs it with
the EK and sends it to a remote trusted third party (TTP), usually an hardware manufacturer. The TTP verifies
that the AIK has been signed by a key belonging to a valid TPM (e.g. not included in a revocation list), and
generates and signs an AIK certificate that the attestator can then send to the challenger, together with the SML
and PCR values signed by its TPM with the AIK. The challenger can now verify if the attestator is trustworthy.
The EK thus works as the RTR (Figure 2.23).
Sealed storage is realised by generating a hierarchy of encryption keys whose root is the storage root key
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(SRK) that works as the TRS, intermediate nodes are RSA keys (storage keys) used to encrypt their child keys
in the hierarchy and leaf nodes are RSA keys (binding keys) used to encrypt symmetric keys. The AIK is an
example storage key encrypted by the storage root key. Data can then be protected with a simple symmetric key
that can be moved to a different machine, or can be bound to a specific TPM platform or particular configuration.
This is realised by generating a binding key that is directly bound to a set of PCR values, so that the TPM
releases it only if the current PCR values are the same.
Several proposals have been made to extend this basic architecture. Maruyama et al. [MSN+04] proposed a
trusted boot process to load a valid operating system capable of enforcing mandatory controls (e.g. SELinux).
With its Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [ELM+03] Microsoft proposed to separate a plat-
form into a trusted environment and an untrusted environment, so to provide robust access control while re-
taining the openness of traditional architectures. Applications that need to protect themselves or their data can
thus run either entirely or in part in the trusted environment, while other applications can run as they normally
would. The integrity measurement architecture (IMA) proposed by Sailer et al. [SZJvD04] realises remote
attestation by measuring all the programs and code before they are loaded into the system to run.
2.6.1 Trusted Computing Applications
TC has a number of different applications, from hard drive encryption to ERM/DRM systems. Sandhu et al.
[SRZ06] proposed a framework of three layered models to analyse requirements for data protections in the
context of TC. The three layers are policy models, enforcement models and implementation models, hence the
name PEI models (Figure 2.24). Intuitively, any of the solutions presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 could be
used as a policy model while any of the architectures and specific products presented in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2
could be used as enforcement and implementation models, respectively.
The different implementation models can then be deployed on top of a TC platform that guarantees the
correct behaviour and integrity of the running components. An example architecture for the enforcement of
access control rules exploiting a TPM chip was proposed in [SZRC06]. As the authors emphasise, TC is
particularly important when enforcing dissemination controls, as it makes it easier to determine the identity of
a machine through its TPM and AIK and thus decide whether it should be allowed to receive a disseminated
object. The proposed solution is based on an extension of the trusted boot process. After the OS kernel has
been loaded and launched, it verifies the integrity of a component running in user space called trusted reference
monitor (TRM), equivalent to the virtual machine of traditional IDSA solutions. Both the OS and the TRM
are assigned a public/private key pair by the TPM. The OS’s pair is signed and sealed by the platform’s AIK
and signs and seals in turn the TRM’s pair. The TRM acts as a safe wrapping around data that grants access to
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applications. Whenever data access is requested by a user to a remote party, remote attestation is performed to
verify not only the TPM’s and OS’s integrity, but also the integrity of the TRM. If the verification succeeds, the
remote party encrypts the data for the requesting user’s TRM and sends it together with a set of access control
policies. These contain the list of integrity measurements the requesting user’s machine must satisfy for the
TRM to release access to the application.
In other words, TC can be used as a means to ensure a virtual machine or reference monitor properly pro-
tects data and accessing applications properly handle it. Problems can arise in open settings where different
applications or versions of the same application can be used to access data and universally valid integrity mea-
surements are difficult to define. More complex forms of remote attestation such as property-based attestation
[SS04] and dynamic property-based attestation [NV10], which focus on the certification of high-level proper-
ties of a platform that can be deduced by its low-level configuration, have been proposed to address this issue.
Also, if different organisations that use different certification authorities and trusted third parties take part in the
data sharing, there might be problems in the validation of key certificates and integrity measurements. How-
ever, this is not a problem if we assume that all users access data via the same application and use the same
certification authorities, as we did in Section 3.3. We also emphasise that while TC ensures components behave
as expected, it cannot control users’ behaviour, especially when users can influence the operations a trusted
application is performing (e.g. via a command line). Trust on users depends on what actions they can perform.
In other words, there are cases when release of sensitive data cannot depend solely on the verification of a
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TRM’s integrity, but also on what kind of trust can be placed on the TRM’s final user.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the three main components that constitute modern data protection systems:
policy models and languages, enforcement mechanisms and trusted platform technologies. The works presented
serve a two-fold purpose. First, we introduced the basic concepts the rest of this thesis draws from: information
flow, trust management and policy languages for authorisation specification. Second, we pointed out some of
the main limitations of the presented approaches. While existing policy languages allow the specification of a
wide variety of policies, they do not allow data originators to express how such authorisations may be inherited
by derived data. Policies are static in that once they have been associated with data, they cannot be modified
to satisfy the protection requirements of entities whose data is changing. Similarly, policies cannot transit from
the original data to its derivations.
We then presented some of the existing enforcement mechanisms and architectures and pointed out their
shortcomings, so to define the information security scenario to which this thesis contributes. We distinguished
in particular between interactive data sharing architectures (ISDA), that cannot be used when connectivity is
not available, and non-interactive data sharing architectures (NISDA) that cannot enforce context-based condi-
tions or cannot work with users outside the organisation distributing the permissions/keys. This distinction is
particularly important to us since rather then using NISDA architectures for policy enforcement, we chose to
adapt ISDA architectures by merging them with trust management solutions so that they can be used in partially
disconnected networks.
The high-level aspects of the architecture we propose, together with our preliminary work on trusted com-
puting technologies, is described in the next chapter.
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3 Architecture
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter aims to describe the basic components of the architecture at the basis of our solution and to
highlight which novel elements it includes. These will be further investigated in Chapters 4 and 5 where we
will also progressively build proof of concepts of the design presented in this chater. In Section 3.2 and Section
3.3 of this chapter we specify the threat model and assumptions we considered for our design. We then give
a general overview of the data protection architecture in Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5 we describe the
integration of the architecture with trusted computing technologies.
3.2 Threat Model
3.2.1 Protection Objects
While the main objective of data protection systems is to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of disseminated
data, we must also consider the following other information objects involved in the primary protection process
and requiring protection:
• Metadata: Data is usually associated with descriptive information that can be used by both data re-
cipients and by policy decision points when making authorisation decisions. Integrity of the associated
metadata needs to be guaranteed as compromised metadata can greatly affect the decision process. For
example, if metadata contained the ID of the object’s owner and this were modified, a possibly unau-
thorised subject could get access to the data. Moreover, in many scenarios metadata may be considered
confidential as it can reveal information on the data content.
• Policies: Policy integrity must be guaranteed to ensure correct authorisation decisions are taken for every
request. Policies can also be considered confidential as they may contain the identity of users authorised
to access the data or may be used to obtain the needed credentials in non-legal ways.
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• Credentials: As for metadata and policies, integrity of credentials used in the policy evaluation process
must be guaranteed. While we deem the use of digital signatures in traditional certification standards
(e.g. X.509) sufficient to verify credentials’ integrity, we consider a different problem. Users’ identity
and attribute credentials may in fact be considered private and should thus be protected when being sent
from a data recipient (or credential provider) to a trusted policy decision point.
3.2.2 Adversary
The overall trust model considered in this thesis is that of a trusted data originator who needs help in protecting
her resources, but also of a potentially malicious recipient - i.e. a user that, after data reception, might try to
use it in violation of the originator’s policies. Our solution is thus aimed at proposing a non-circumventable
information security mechanism that data originators can rely on when disseminating data amongst unknown
and potentially malicious recipients. These include malicious users in honest organisations (i.e. organisations
participating in a DSA), curious but not malicious users that can attempt to stray from the intended data usages
if the opportunity arises, and malicious unknown users (i.e. users that do not belong to any organisation par-
ticipating in a DSA). We do not consider the case of a malicious organisation agreeing and participating in a
DSA, as most of the time decisions on the amount of trust that can be put on high-level organisations rely on
controls put in place by traditional legislative systems or on the reputation, brands and ongoing relationships of
the involved entities.
Besides malicious users, when dealing with changing data we must also consider the case of honest but
incompetent recipients, i.e. recipients who can access the data and modify it, but that cannot be trusted to
perform correct modifications or to specify correctly what policies the new data should be associated with.
This is a particularly important aspect, as many of the security attacks nowadays mainly exploit users’ mistakes
or naı¨vety or conversely the provision of unusable security systems. A wrongly specified policy can cause
a data leakage as much as a weak password or a weak cryptographic key. Also, while we do not consider
malicious data originators, we must consider honest but curious data originators, i.e. originators who attempt
to learn potentially private details on users by disseminating protected data and forcing recipients to provide
their credentials for policy evaluation.
Note that this adversary model is asymmetric, as it does not consider malicious organisations falsely accusing
data recipients of misusing disseminated data. This aspect of the mutual relationships between data originators
and recipients is outside the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 3.1: Attack tree for data protection architecture. Shaded attacks are dealt with by mainstream products.
Non-shaded attacks are dealt with natively by our proposed architecture
3.2.3 Threats
Figure 3.1 depicts the indicative set of threats we considered when designing our architecture, where we con-
sider as threats all the attacks on the protection system that users can perform to obtain unauthorised access
to data. These were chosen as the most likely attacks used nowadays by users trying to compromise existing
DRM and ERM systems or to gain information they would normally have no access to. Malicious users can
attack data protection systems by either trying to compromise the authentication process, the policy decision
process, the enforcement process or the system’s availability. We emphasise that in this thesis we do not deal
with threats that aim to attack human vulnerabilities of an organisation rather than its information system such
as bribery of employees, industrial espionage etc. Such threats must still be dealt with to guarantee data con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability through the provision of a safe operational envelope comprising physical
controls, human training and best usage practices within which the automatic protection tools can operate.
Attacks that try to compromise the authentication process (e.g. credential forging, collusion, IP spoofing etc)
have been the focus of intensive research and we will not deal with them in this thesis. A different attack we
consider instead comprises curious data originators trying to learn private details on data recipients when eval-
uating their access requests. This can be achieved by disseminating protected data whose publishing server (in
the case of Microsoft RMS, described in Section 2.5.2) or policy evaluation authority is under the originator’s
control and can thus disclose the content of the received credentials.
The policy decision process can be compromised by either modifying the policies or the metadata needed
during the evaluation. In both cases, the attack type depends on how policies and metadata are stored. If
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policies and metadata are stored on a server, the attack can be performed by compromising the communication
between the server and the data originator at publishing time (e.g. with man-in-the-middle attacks, substitution
attacks etc.), or by attacking the policy and metadata store directly. Otherwise, if the policies and metadata
have been attached to the data and are disseminated along with it, the attacker can try to modify them directly.
Many security protocols and cryptographic techniques have been proposed to both attach policies and metadata
to data and to protect their integrity. However, since we propose a new data protection and policy decision
protocol, we also described how the integrity of policies and metadata is protected.
The most common attack on the policy enforcement process is based on installing malicious software in the
same environment where the PEP (see Section 2.4.1) or virtual machine run. Eventually, data must be streamed
without protection to authorised recipients, to be either displayed on a video, played on speakers and so on.
During the streaming, malicious software can capture the streamed data and save it back with no protection.
Similarly, malicious software can try to read data decryption keys once they have been downloaded to access
received data rightfully. Another attack consists in substituting critical software components in the enforcement
architecture with malicious ones (that for example do not force the recipient to perform obligations, or do not
enforce continuous controls on data accesses). In general, these attacks all deal with the inner vulnerabilities
of a software environment over which malicious data recipients have complete control and in which policies
must be enforced. While in traditional ERM systems deployed in corporate environments users have no control
over the machines they use, which are rather controlled by a trusted administrator, we also consider the case
of malicious data recipients acting outside of any trusted organisation and who thus maintain control over
their own platforms. These users could install any malicious software beside the virtual machine needed to
access data and thus bypass the data protection. Therefore, these untrusted software environments constitute a
problem we must deal with. This is why a trusted computing platform is required to ascertain the integrity of
the enforcement.
Availability can also be compromised by adversaries in a number of ways (e.g. denial-of-service attacks).
This traditional type of attacks have been extensively studied. Otherwise, availability could be compromised
when users retain data and refuse to exchange it. Cryptographic protocols do not deal with Denial of Service
attacks caused by retained or not exchanged messages, and we do not try to detect message loss as communi-
cation protocols already deal with it. However, we must still deal with the case where data unavailability is not
caused by external attacks, for example when remote components of the overall data protection system (such
as publishing servers or credential providers) are not reachable because connectivity is not available. This is an
intrinsic condition of the dissemination environment rather than the result of a malicious attack, but it is still a
risk to the system’s operations.
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Finally, we consider a particular set of attacks that can be performed when no control is enforced on data
derivation. If a user is authorised to modify some data she received, she might introduce sensitive information
that requires a higher level of protection than what the original policies provide. Similarly, a user may create
new sensitive data and not associate it with any policy at all, or with insufficiently strict policies. She might
even specify policies that do not allow anyone to access the disseminated data, thus making it useless. In other
words, a wrong policy specification can lead to either data unavailability or to leakages of sensitive data. This
is due to the discretional aspect of policy specification, whereas in corporate environments mandatory policies
should also be specified at organisational level.
3.3 Data Model
Contrary to those who conduct information flow studies, we do not make any assumptions about the means
through which data is disseminated or locations where the data can be received. Once the data leaves its
originator device, it becomes impossible to predict the paths it may follow, i.e. it is impossible to predict
the behaviour of recipients. Recipients can re-disseminate the data in different ways (via USB keys, emails
etc.) and to recipients the originator may not know. However, we do assume a “homogeneous environment”
where every user is equipped with the necessary hardware and software to access the data, as described in the
remainder of this thesis, and where all recipients share a common vocabulary/ontology and trust an agreed
set of authorities for the certification of identities and basic attributes, so that signed credentials (e.g. X.509
certificates) can be universally interpreted and verified.
While data is encrypted and can be freely transmitted between users, there are specific moments in our
protection protocols where decryption keys are exchanged and must be protected (e.g. after a policy has been
positively evaluated). In these cases, the communication is considered to be secured for both integrity and
confidentiality via standard protocols (e.g. a Diffie-Hellman exchange or other protocols). In scenarios where
connectivity is not available (as in the crisis management scenario described in Section 1.3) and credentials
cannot be verified with their issuers, we consider a validity time frame (e.g. of the duration of the crisis at hand)
during which revocation lists are assumed not to change (even if we propose an approach for these situations
in Section 5.3.3). For these scenarios, we do not make any assumptions about the short-range communication
technologies that can be employed (e.g. bluetooth, active RFID etc). Communications that need to be secured
(e.g. to exchange keys) could thus use the specific technology’s security protocols or higher level protocols
built on top of the technology’s basic communication features.
Despite the generality of the approach we propose, the examples we provide will focus on the protection of
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Figure 3.2: High level architecture of the proposed data protection solution. Arrows represent logical depen-
dencies and not actual exchanged messages
XML documents. XML has been chosen because of its generality (many data models can be translated into an
XML structure), the existence of several development tools and because it allows us to reason about the effects
that associating different policies with different parts of the same data structure has on data protection.
3.4 Architecture Overview
Figure 3.2 depicts the high-level data protection architecture we propose to enable usage and derived data
control and usage control in partially disconnected networks. The dotted components implement the novel
contributions of this thesis. On one hand, we introduce new components (for example, with respect to the
XACML reference architecture) such as the derived data controller and the disconnected operations manager.
On the other hand, we propose new implementations or integration of already existing components such as the
policy decision point located on remote evaluation authorities or the trusted platform architecture components.
Shaded components represent aspects of the architecture that are outside the scope of this thesis, meaning that
we will only describe their expected behaviour but we will not provide any details on their possible implemen-
tation. In the following we introduce the well-known components, their interactions and how trusted computing
technologies have been integrated into the architecture to ascertain the integrity of the recipient’s enforcement.
The arrows connecting the components in Figure 3.2 represent logical dependencies and not actual exchanged
messages.
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In the remainder of this thesis we will use the terms client and virtual machine interchangeably to indicate the
set of interconnected components installed on user devices and with which applications interact to access the
data. Clients interact with remote services (the secure token and certification architecture, the DSA architecture
and evaluation authorities) and with the protected data package disseminated amongst users. As we will see
later, the protected package is not an actual component as it is unable to perform any computation. However,
it contains all the information needed to access the data and evaluate the applicable policies. This is why we
explicitly represent it in Figure 3.2. We depict the trusted platform architecture as a stand-alone component as
it is completely transparent to the rest of the architecture, meaning that its removal does not compromise the
operation of the other components. However, we stress that removing it implies that users can and must be
completely trusted to correctly enforce policies associated with the data they receive and use.
3.4.1 Data Sharing Agreement Architecture
Disseminated data often crosses organisational boundaries and needs to be accessed by users belonging to
organisations different from that of the data originator. To guarantee that usage controls can be enforced in
all organisations where data can be received, it is important that the organisations exchanging data agree on
a common policy vocabulary so that policies and identity and attribute credentials can be interpreted in the
same way in every organisation’s environment. Since organisations must specify policies that allow recipients
to access their data, they need to know how to refer to such authorised recipients when they belong to other
organisations. For example, they may need to know the role structure of the other organisations. This is also
why organisations must agree on a common set of certification authorities for identity and attribute certificates.
Organisations also need to know how their data will be used once it has been received by other organisations.
Not only who can and should access it, but also how the data will be processed. In other words, organisations
must agree on the set of procedures through which data can be accessed and transformed. Similarly, originators
need to know what obligations recipients in other organisations can perform, so that they can write policies
accordingly. For example, originators may require recipients to notify them of each access performed on data.
Such requirements and policies must be agreed by all organisations so that controls can be enforced properly
and so that no arbitrary policy is specified that causes data to be unusable for some organisations that need it.
Organisations must also agree on a set of trusted evaluation authorities, i.e. on a set of entities they all trust
for the evaluation of policies. Each organisation may be required to provide its own evaluation authorities, or
third-party services could be used. A data sharing agreement is a necessary tool for organisations to agree on
these details and write policies valid throughout all environments where data could be disseminated.
The data sharing agreement architecture is the set of software services that allow organisations to agree
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on a common set of usage control policies and that make such policies available whenever required. A DSA is
expected to be in place prior to any data dissemination as it contains the constraints under which data dissemi-
nation and usage can be carried out.
Besides the standard legal notation referring to the relevant legislation regulating data secrecy, a typical DSA
must specify: 1) the operations, objects and subjects which are under the DSA’s regulation, 2) the security
policies (or vocabulary to write them) and 3) the penalties for violating the agreement. Figure 3.3 depicts an
example scenario where the police force and ambulance services agree on sharing data. They first sign a DSA
containing all the policies regulating the data exchange. If any policy is violated and the violation is detected,
both the partners can then rely on more traditional law enforcement mechanisms to solve their disputes. DSAs
may also include additional specifications, such as procedures to resolve disputes, to revise the agreement etc.
In this work we focus on the core DSA components. Discussion of further extensions, detection of violations
and penalties are beyond the scope of this thesis. While mechanisms to recover from violations are left for future
work, our proposed solution does consider break-the-glass policies where violations are allowed by design, for
example when a privileged rescuer deems data access more important than data protection and disseminates the
data to users that would not normally be authorised (see Section 5.4).
Ambulance 
ServicesPolice Data 
Sharing
Legal 
disputes
Data Sharing 
Agreement
Figure 3.3: Data Sharing Agreement for the crisis management scenario
Definition 3.1 A data sharing agreement is a 7-tuple (ID, S, A, EA, CA, UP, V ) where ID is the unique
identifier of the agreement, S is the scope of the agreement, A is an attribute vocabulary describing subject,
data, and context attributes, EA is the specification of the trusted policy evaluation authorities, CA is a set of
secure token and certification authorities, UP is the specification of the agreed usage control policies and V
is a set of violation procedures applicable whenever the terms of the agreement are breached by one of the
partners. The scope S is defined as a triple (E, ts, tt) where E is the set of all partner organisations signing the
agreement and ts and tt are respectively the start and end dates of the agreement, specifying the time period
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during which the agreement is considered valid.
For the moment we will not delve into the details of how both the set of evaluation authorities EA and usage
control policies UP are specified, as this is part of the solutions we describe in the next chapters (Chapter 4
introduces the notation and format we use to specify usage control policies, while Chapter 5 describes how
evaluation authorities can be specified). When an entity agrees to a DSA it promises to enforce the policies
contained in UP for the data provided by the partner entities. This ensures that the security requirements of the
data originator are satisfied. Given our assumption that credentials are universally interpreted and understood,
the common vocabulary A is sufficient to avoid the need for a translation from high-level DSA policies to low-
level and organisation-specific enforceable policies. In other words, once the set UP has been specified on a
DSA, all partner organisations can equally evaluate and enforce the policies. Note that despite the fact that
we are here considering a DSA containing the set of usage control policies UP, this is not strictly necessary
if the organisations agree on allowing their individual originators (e.g. employees, teams etc.) to specify their
own policies for their disseminated data, independently. In this case, the DSA would only contain the details
necessary to properly interpret policies (such as the vocabulary). If an organisation agreed to such a DSA, it
would promise to enforce any policy associated with the data by its originator.
Therefore, the simplified DSA architecture we consider consists of just a set of remote repositories where
details on the DSAs can be stored and that clients and evaluation authorities can poll at start-up and periodically
later to retrieve the latest available policies. The policy administration point (PAP) in the client architecture
is responsible for querying the DSA repositories, keeping a local copy of the current policies and DSA and
returning them to the other components when required for policy evaluation. The updates of the available
policies can be either pushed by the DSA repositories to the clients at regular intervals, or pulled by the clients
at every access request. The choice of the best approach depends on the specific application scenario. A
push approach is for example preferable when updates are performed only at specific and predefined intervals,
but would require a Service Level Agreement between the DSA repository and the involved organisations to
guarantee the updates are performed whenever necessary, so that no stale policy is ever evaluated. To reduce the
overhead and the number of communications necessary to disseminate the new policies, the repository could
for example analyse the policy updates and determine their impact and scope, so to decide whether distribute
them and to whom. On the other hand, a pull approach guarantees that policies are always correct, but has a
cost in terms of non-necessary communications whenever no new policies have been changed.
We emphasise that while DSAs are useful to define how data is shared, used and protected amongst partner
organisations and to establish a common vocabulary for the policy specification, policies can be enforced also
in the absence of a DSA and we do not assume a DSA to be necessarily present in the scenario considered in
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Figure 3.4: High-level interaction for data publication
rest of this thesis. When users with no pre-existing agreement meet and share data, this is protected with the
policies each individual user has available. If data from the two users is merged, the new data is protected by
a set of policies that equally results from the merging of the two users’ policies. More details are given in the
next two chapters.
3.4.2 Data Publication
Data publication is the process of protecting data before it is disseminated, so that only authorised recipients
can access it. The architecture we propose is capable of working in different modes of operations so that it
can cater for both scenarios where connectivity is available and scenarios where it is not. This condition is
periodically checked by the communication manager that can then switch between connected and discon-
nected operation modes. In the following we will describe how connected operations are carried out, while
disconnected operations will be covered in Chapter 5.
The central component of the architecture is the policy enforcement point (PEP) that acts as an interface
between the applications used to access data and the data itself. Figure 3.4 depicts the high-level interaction
between the data originator’s client and the external services needed for data publication while Figure 3.5
depicts the message exchange triggered by a publication request. The PEP first queries the communication
manager on the state of the connection. If connectivity is available (as we assume for now) the PEP asks the
PAP to obtain the latest DSA updates from a remote DSA repository. It then encrypts the data (and metadata),
generates a publication license containing the decryption keys and attaches to it the data and metadata. The
details on how this is actually realised will be described in Sections 4.7.2, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. The licence and the
encrypted data can then be disseminated amongst recipients.
3.4.3 Policy Evaluation and Enforcement
All requests to access and use published data are forwarded from a client application to the PEP that coordinates
the other components to return an authorisation decision and disclose (i.e. decrypt) the protected data. Figure
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Figure 3.5: Interaction of components for data publication
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Figure 3.6: High-level interaction for policy evaluation
3.6 depicts the high-level interaction between the data recipient’s client and the external services needed for
policy evaluation while Figure 3.7 depicts the message exchange triggered by usage requests. The PEP first
queries the communication manager on the state of the connection. If connectivity is available (as we assume
again) the PEP asks its local policy information point (PIP) to access the data package’s metadata and pub-
lishing licence and sends them along with an evaluation request to an evaluation authority. In Chapter 5 we will
describe how different evaluation authorities can be selected. Once it has received the usage request, metadata
and publishing licence, the remote evaluation authority’s PEP queries its PAP for policies applicable to the re-
quest (depending on the attached license) and returns to the client the list of necessary subject credentials. The
client’s PEP then queries its local PIP and returns the required credentials (or part of them) to the evaluation
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Figure 3.7: Interaction of components for policy evaluation
authority. The authority’s PIP can then query the secure token and certification architecture to verify the
received credentials, revocation lists and to retrieve tokens containing the context attributes or missing user cre-
dentials required by the evaluated policies. Once all necessary information has been retrieved, the authority’s
policy decision point can evaluate all the policies applicable to the request and return an authorisation decision.
If the authorisation is positive, then the evaluation authority returns to the client the list of attributes that must
be monitored during the use, the set of obligations to be performed and the decryption keys necessary to access
the data package (or part of it). An internal thread of the client’s PEP is then instructed to check the attributes
to be monitored periodically, so that a local policy evaluation (i.e. an evaluation performed by the client’s
local PIP, PDP and PAP) can be triggered periodically (e.g. whenever an attribute changes) for the policies
whose constraints refer to monitored attributes. If any new authorisation decision is negative, the current use is
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interrupted. In this thesis we consider obligations as procedures performed by the PEP upon a request (as for
XACML [xac05] and Ponder [DDLS01]). In other words the PEP simply executes a set of internal well-known
procedures such as sending a notification e-mail or executing an online payment. After obligations have been
performed with no errors, the PEP can decrypt the data package with the received keys and return the disclosed
content to the requesting application. If the requested action causes the data to be transformed, the derived
data controller component will take care of transforming the data and modifying the associated metadata so
that new policies (that satisfy the new data’s security requirements) will become applicable. We will describe
the derivation process in Chapter 4.
The PEP is also responsible for keeping track of the current access sessions. Several subsequent evaluations
of the same request might in fact be unnecessary if the interval between one request and the other is short
(depending on the system’s configuration). Examples are several subsequent “save” actions on unmodified
documents. An access session is the time interval during which only one policy evaluation is required for the
the same access requests, i.e. for requests to perform the same action on the same object. The duration of the
access sessions is a parameter that depends on the PEP configuration and that can be specified in the DSA.
3.5 Trusted Computing Integration for Policy-Driven Remote Attestation
A policy evaluation that returns a positive authorisation for a usage request does not guarantee by itself that the
policies will actually be enforced once decryption keys have been released to the requesting recipients. Correct
enforcement depends on the integrity of the virtual machine’s components and processes running on recipients’
devices. As we described in Section 2.6, verifying the trustworthiness of the accessing applications, as well as
of the entire software and hardware environment where data is received, is pivotal for data protection. To this
end we integrated our data protection architecture with trusted computing technologies in general and remote
attestation mechanisms in particular.
As described in Chapter 2 remote attestation requires that a trusted verifier is able to verify the integrity of
a software environment based on a digitally signed list of hash values. The process of verifying this evidence
requires the verifier to maintain a large up-to-date database of acceptable software components. However,
a simple Boolean decision regarding the presence of untrusted software running on a machine may not be
enough to verify its integrity. For example, “acceptable” behaviours may depend on specific compositions of
system components and their versions. Or, a data originator might not require a trusted platform verification,
preferring easy and fast data dissemination over protection (as it may be the case in emergency scenarios) or
deeming simple policy evaluation sufficient. Considering these requirements, usage control policies should
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Figure 3.8: High level architecture for policy-driven remote attestation
be able to specify whether remote attestation is required or not and, if required, which conditions should be
satisfied by system components.
Figure 3.8 depicts the high-level data protection architecture with the actual components introduced for re-
mote attestation. The PIP adapter is a daemon running on the client machine and acting as a “listener” service
that waits for requests on a particular port. It interacts with system-level libraries that measure the system’s
state using the TrouSerS (trusted computing software stack) API for accessing the various functionalities of the
TPM. In particular, the trusted platform module takes measurements according to the trusted boot process and
integrity measurement architecture (IMA) described in Chapter 2. When a policy explicitly requires a mea-
surement from the TPM, the PIP fetches it from the PIP adapter and forwards it to the evaluation authority as a
credential. It consists of:
• TPM quote (i.e. a signed composite hash of the selected platform configuration registers, PCRs);
• TPM credentials;
• values of selected TPM PCRs (chosen depending on what the policy wants to check - this includes PCR-
10);
• the IMA measurement list (i.e. the list of all the executable and application-related files loaded).
We entrust evaluation authorities to act as attestation authorities as connecting to specialised verifiers could
be difficult when connectivity is not guaranteed. As we will see in Chapter 5, this also means that every
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client machine must be able to act as an attestation authority for other clients and thus store an up-to-date
list of the acceptable and expected hash values of various programs. When the evaluation authority receives
such a credential, it passes it to its local PIP for further evaluation. The integrity verifier verifies the TPM
quote using the credentials provided for the TPM and the received PCR values. In other words, it verifies the
signature on the PCRs and uses the IMA measurement to re-compute the value of PCR-10 by aggregating all
PCR values. The re-computed value is then compared with the received value to verify the IMA measurement
list was correct. Finally, the hash values of the applications (and their versions) in the verified IMA list are
checked against the available database to verify that they can all be trusted. Depending on the outcome of
the verification process, the integrity verifier returns to the PDP an attestation certificate with the required
credentials (e.g. specifying the version of certain libraries, the running applications etc.), as specified by the
evaluated policy. The certificate can then be used like any subject or context certificate received by the secure
token and certification architecture or directly by the recipient’s client. The same approach could also be used
in combination with more complex forms of remote attestation such as property-based attestation [SS04] and
dynamic property-based attestation [NV10]. We here propose the basic policy-based attestation mechanism
that allows a policy to specify constraints on the specific components in the attested platform. Extending
this mechanism to allow policies to specify constraints on a platform’s high-level properties [SS04] would be
straightforward.
Using this approach, trusted platform verification is treated as an optional requirement to be included into
usage policies and that depends on the discretion of data originators or, in our case, of the authors of the
DSA. If policies do not require trusted platform verifications, the PIP adapter and integrity verifier could be
removed from the proposed architecture with no effect on the rest of the components, as if they were external
certification authorities. In other words, the main advantage of this approach is that it completely separates
the policy enforcement components and architecture from the trusted platform components, allowing greater
flexibility in the policy specification and enforcement.
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter mainly served the purpose of “setting the scene” for what is described in the rest of this thesis.
First, we described the high-level threat model and basic assumptions we considered when developing our
architecture. We believe the assumptions we considered are realistic and do not hinder the validity of our work.
We then introduced the concept of data sharing agreement (DSA). Despite not being the focus of our work, the
existence of a DSA architecture is at the basis of our proposal. It allows us to specify how policies are created
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in the first place and distributed amongst data originators. The solutions we present in the next chapters all
start from the specification of a set of policies in a DSA, either to define the set of usage control policies (in
the set UP) or the set of trusted evaluation authorities (in the set EA). In the rest of this thesis we expand upon
the presented architecture introducing the new components that constitute the major contributions of our work.
These components modify the data publication, policy evaluation and enforcement procedures thus enabling
derived data control in partially disconnected networks. The content of the DSA is also described in more detail
to include the information needed by the new components to work properly.
Finally, we described how we integrated trusted platform technologies into the presented architecture. The
system relies on trusted hardware and uses the integrity measurement architecture to verify whether the envi-
ronment where policies must be enforced can be trusted. In other words, policy evaluation authorities can verify
remotely the set of components installed in recipients’ machines and decide to not issue decryption keys on the
base of the configurations found. For example, a machine may be considered untrustworthy if it has installed an
anti-DRM software such as QTFairUse, or if it has an old version of the PEP component known for a security
vulnerability. Our policy-driven approach allows us to prove the integrity of a system while decoupling autho-
risation logic from remote attestation. This grants organisations more flexibility when specifying authorisation
policies that can now contain conditions on the hardware and software configuration of the data recipients’
machines. For example, this solution allows the specification of policies where access to data on machines with
untrusted components is constrained by more or different obligations, for example higher payments, to balance
the risk of data leakage.
92
4 A Data Labelling System for Derived Data Control
4.1 Chapter Overview
One of the possible purposes of inter-organisational cooperations is the creation of new IP through the sharing
and processing of existing knowledge. On one hand, new produced information is often more valuable than
what was originally shared and its protection is thus a major concern whenever companies initiate business
or research partnerships. Protecting only the data that is initially shared is often not sufficient. On the other
hand, the newly created information is sometimes less valuable than what was originally shared, or simply
there is a need to disseminate it more quickly and to a broader public (e.g. if confidential information such as
the location of a weapon storage site were used to create an off-limit warning information on a digital map).
However, decisions on what kind of protection should be applied to the newly created data cannot be left solely
to the user or organisation who directly created it, as the input information might come from different partners
who have the right to impose their own requirements. In this Chapter we present a solution to derive protection
requirements for derived data. Our solution considers not only the requirements specified in a DSA by the
partner organisations, but also the requirements of the input data used in the derivation process, the decisions
users take (whenever allowed) on the protection of the data they create and the characteristics of the derivation
process.
The problem of controlling derived data was informally described by Park et al. while discussing their
UCONABC family of models [PS04]. The authors defined derived data as an object created as a consequence of
exercising rights on an original one (e.g. a log file). Stemming from this definition, we define derived data as an
object created as a consequence of performing a transformation on one or several original ones. The concept
of transformation, i.e. any function applicable to one or several data objects that either modifies them or returns
a new one, is the fundament of our solution. To be able to control derived data, it is necessary to define a
strictly controlled set of transformations that can be used to modify data. It is in fact necessary to know, for
each transformation, what kind of output it creates so that it can be associated with the correct policies. Each
of these transformations must then be characterised to capture part of the protection requirements of the output
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it produces.
We chose not to commit to a particular language from the many available, but rather to define an high-
level notation to express XACML-like policies in a simple and readable form. The notation is introduced in
Section 4.2 while Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe how policies can be combined into a lattice of policy sets, the
policy structure that forms the basis of our solution. Section 4.5 introduces the concept of content verification
procedure and transformation and describes the mechanism for derived data control while Section 4.7 describes
how our solution is applied to protect XML documents and integrated with the architecture presented in Chapter
3. Finally, the solution is evaluated with an extensive example drawn from the emergency scenario described
in Section 1.3 and compared with existing solutions.
4.2 A Notation and Semantics for Policy Languages
Our solution is based on the XACML-based notation and policy semantics used by Rao et al. [RLB+] that we
modify to include new constraints and obligations. Also, while Rao et al. (and XACML) consider actions as
part of the policy constraints (thus allowing the specification of a policy valid for different actions), we bind
actions directly with the policy ID, so that each policy specifies constraints for one action only. As we will
see later, this is done to ease the “partial ordering” of policy sets. Intuitively, the notion of policy semantics is
defined by the set of requests that are permitted and the set of requests that are denied by the policy. We first
give some basic definitions:
• AT T is a finite set of attribute names. Attributes characterise context, data and subjects, have a name
ai ∈ AT T and a domain of possible values dom(ai). We assume names are unique, so that no ambiguities
can arise;
• Op = {>,≥,=, 6=,≤,<} is the set of all inequality and equality operators used to compare attribute val-
ues; inequality operators can be used only to compare values from ordered or partially ordered domains;
• A is the set of all actions that can be performed. Actions have a name acti ∈ A.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we will ignore the distinction at syntactic level between attributes
whose values belong to ordered or partially ordered sets and attributes whose values are not ordered, as the
meaning will be clear from the context. We define a request context as:
Definition 4.1 A context q ∈ Q is a set {(a1,v1) . . . (ak,vk))} where a1,a2, . . .ak ∈ AT T are attribute names,
vi ∈ dom(ai) for 1≤ i≤ k are attribute values. Set Q is the set of all possible request contexts.
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Intuitively, a request context is the set of subject, object and context attributes that can be verified at the
moment a subject requests permission to perform an action on an object. We therefore define an action request
r as:
Definition 4.2 An action request r ∈ R is a pair (q,act) where q ∈ Q is a request context and act ∈ A is an
action. Set R is the set of all possible action requests.
A policy can then be defined as a function P : R→ {Y,N,NA} that given an action request r ∈ R returns a
value in {Y,N,NA}, indicating whether the action is allowed, denied or a response could not be determined.
The policy semantics is defined as:
Definition 4.3 The semantic meaning of a policy P ∈ PS is a 2-tuple < RPY ,RPN > where RPY and RPN are the set
of allowed and denied requests, respectively, and RPY
⋂
RPN = /0. Set PS is the set of all policies.
The condition on the disjunction of the two sets RPY and R
P
N is an internal consistency condition that is enforced
by the policy syntax and construction at the base of our solution. The described semantics is general enough to
represent several policy languages such as XACML. Similarly, we must define a general policy syntax. To do
so we define an atomic Boolean expression and a compound Boolean expression as:
Definition 4.4 An atomic Boolean expression ae can be:
• A constraint on an attribute value of the form ai c where ai ∈ AT T ,  ∈ Op and c ∈ dom(ai);
• A constraint on two attribute values of the form ai a j where ai,a j ∈ AT T ,  ∈ Op and dom(ai) =
dom(a j);
Definition 4.5 A compound Boolean expression ce ∈CE is the association of a set of atomic Boolean expres-
sions via the logical operators ∧ and ∨. Set CE is the set of all compound Boolean expressions.
Examples of compound Boolean expressions are: (time < 8am∨ time > 8pm) and (role = manager ∧
location = South Kensington Campus). We specify a policy as:
Definition 4.6 A Policy P ∈ PS is a tuple (act, DSact , ASact) where act ∈ A is an action and DSact ⊆ CE,
ASact ⊆ CE are respectively a deny constraint set and an allow constraint set, containing the conditions that
must hold to respectively deny or allow an action request.
In other words policies specify a set of constraints over typed attributes whose values range over predefined
domains. Policy decision can then be defined as a function Pact(r) (Figure 4.1) that given an access request r
95
Figure 4.1: Function representing the policy evaluation process
substitutes free variables in its Boolean formulae with values from r’s context and returns an access decision
depending on whether the disjunction and conjunction of compound Boolean expressions in the deny and allow
constraint sets evaluate to true. Also, we consider that the evaluation procedure is based on the closed world
assumption, so that atomic Boolean expressions are evaluated to false if r’s context does not provide a value
for any of their variables. For the sake of simplicity, we did not include a negation symbol in the notation,
since negation is implicitly included in the atomic expressions. Note that the ordering of evaluation of the
policy expressions implies a deny overrides rule for conflict resolution. We decide to support both negative
and positive authorisations as exceptions often need to be dealt with (e.g. denials for large groups of users
but few [SdV00]). The not applicable (NA) return value is introduced as not all policies might be applicable
to all requests. In this sense, NA cannot be treated as a default denial or permission as it would disrupt the
result given by other applicable policies. Consider for example a policy P1 granting access to Alice only and
a policy P2 granting access to Bob only, both associated with the same data item. When Alice files an access
request, P1 will return Y and P2 will return NA. If the result returned by P2 was considered N by default and
the conflict resolution strategy were a deny override strategy, Alice would be denied access. The NA result
is instead ignored and does not have any effect on the final access decision. Default decisions can instead be
applied if no policies are applicable to a specific access request, i.e. if all policies return NA, as we will see
later.
This particular representation might seem redundant as compound Boolean expressions could be used rather
than constraint sets to represent policy constraints. However, this format eases the lattice construction we will
introduce later and still allows users to specify any Boolean expression as access constraints. In other words,
this makes the notation with which we specify how policies are organised simpler. Usage control requirements
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such as obligations and continuous controls can also be introduced. We can define obligations as:
Definition 4.7 An obligation o∈O is a procedure call act(parameters) where act is an action to be performed
before access to data is granted. Set O is the set of all obligations.
In this sense, the semantics of obligations is the same considered in the XACML model. Obligations can be
easily introduced in the definition of a policy function as:
Pact(r) =

if r.act 6= act < NA, /0 >
else if r |= ∨
ce∈DSact
ce < N,{o1 . . .ok}N >
else if r |= ∧
ce∈ASact
ce < Y,{o1 . . .ok}Y >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
where policy decisions also contain the corresponding set of obligations that must be performed when request-
ing access. As for the other constraints, obligation’s free parameters are also substituted with values from r’s
context. As we have already described in Chapter 3, obligations are intended as procedures to be automatically
performed by the PEP when receiving the policy evaluation result from the PDP and before granting access
to the data. If there are errors during the execution or the obligation cannot be performed, the PEP denies
access (even if the policy result was Y ) and logs the failure. In this way the system is never in an inconsistent
state as only the completion of an obligation is considered as the “committing time” for policy decision and
decryption key release. Policies can thus be represented as (act, {o1 . . . ok}Y , ASact , {o1 . . . ok}N , DSact) tuples.
Continuous controls (i.e. the monitoring of specific conditions throughout the whole duration of the access to
the data that could invalidate the original policy decision and revoke the access) do not need to be included in
the notation as attribute monitoring depends on the enforcement mechanism rather than on the policy model
and simply consists of a continuous re-evaluation of the same policies. In other words, after access has been
granted, the PEP keeps requesting a new policy evaluation to its local PDP at regular intervals (depending on
the system’s configuration) or whenever the value of an attribute used in the policy changes, so that access can
be revoked if the policy evaluation result changes into a denial. More complex conditions could be specified
where only certain attributes and conditions need to be monitored. However, this is a matter of optimisation
rather than modelling since it simply allows the PEP to request re-evaluations of only a subset of policies. Note
that this differs from the UCONABC model where ongoing obligations can also be specified (i.e. obligations
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to be performed at regular intervals during the access). In our implementation, obligations are performed only
once when access is requested and policy re-evaluation does not force the PEP to perform them again. We
stress that the inclusion into our model of such additional controls would be straightforward, but we did not do
so as this type of obligations have been already treated in other works [PS04, CLM+09] and are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
An example policy for the crisis management scenario described in Section 1.3 to protect personal informa-
tion of victims in the accident area may state that access should be granted to all police or ambulance rescuers
in the area or in a hospital and that such access should be logged. Such policy can be specified as:
Pread(r) =

if r.act 6= read < NA, /0 >
else if r |= zone 6= hospital∨ zone 6= emr. area < N, /0 >
else if r |= role≥Volunteer∨ role≥Constable < Y,{(log(“read”,role,name,dataID)}>
otherwise < NA, /0 >
where we assume rescuers are organised in two role hierarchies, one for the ambulance services and one for
the police force whose leaves are volunteers and constables, respectively. Note that the policy does not specify
any target. While the compound Boolean expressions might simply include conditions to identify target objects
(e.g. an equality condition on a document ID or document type) we decided not to do so because policies
are associated with objects through sensitivity levels, as we will describe later. Similarly, the action may be
included in the compound Boolean expressions rather than be bound directly to the policy ID. This would make
for a simpler notation. Our choices come from the need to strictly organise policies and will be clarified later.
4.3 Sensitivity Domains and Data Labelling
Our solution stems from the idea that data can be protected under different domains and for different inde-
pendent reasons. For example, data may be protected because it contains private or commercially sensitive
information, or it may be related to public safety or national security. As in multi level security (MLS) systems
and Asbestos in particular (see Section 2.3.2), we identify each of such domains (or competence areas) with a
security tag and associate it with the data. When the data is modified, the amount of sensitive information it
contains for each of the applied domains can either increase or decrease, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Data sensitivity can vary on a fixed range of discrete sensitivity levels for each of the defined domains.
However, multi level security and mandatory access controls might be too rigid for real-world applications, even
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Domain 1
Domain 3
Domain 2
Domain n
....
Sensitivity level
Added information Removed information
Data content
Figure 4.2: Mutable information sensitivity for different domains
when discretionary policies are specified to operate within the boundaries of the mandatory policy. Exceptions
cannot be dealt with and the tranquillity principle of the Bell-LaPadula model must be respected, i.e. objects’
classifications cannot be changed during normal operations.
While inspired by MLS systems, our approach does not use clearance labels. User clearance should in fact
be determined at run-time depending on both context (e.g. time and location) and user attributes and not with
a statically assigned label. Moreover, we consider that the classification of an object can vary if (and only if)
its content is modified (in other words, as long as data is not modified, it maintains its original classification).
As such, data sensitivity class changes according to the use data is subjected to when received and accessed by
recipients. To cater for changing classifications, we devised a solution where each sensitivity class is associated
with a set of policies that are applied to objects with that classification. When an object’s classification changes,
its applicable policies change accordingly. We associate sensitivity classes with policy sets by defining a lattice
of policy sets isomorphic to the lattice of sensitivity classes. In other words, sets of policies must be ordered
into a lattice according to the protection level they provide. Figure 4.3 depicts an example lattice defined over
two sensitivity domains, privacy (p) and integrity (i). The example shows four ordered sets of policies, two
that controls the read and write actions for the privacy domain and two that controls the read and write actions
for the integrity domain. How ordered policies can be specified and a lattice created will be explained in the
following section.
As in Asbestos, data classification labels representing sensitivity classes are defined as sets of (tag, level)
pairs. Each (tag, level) pair is mapped to at most one policy for each action (Figure 4.3) so that the ordering
of levels corresponds to the ordering of policies. In other words, each sensitivity level for each tag defines the
policies that must control the usage of the so-classified objects and every lattice of data classification labels
implies an isomorphic lattice of policy sets (policy lattice in short). Therefore, data is classified under a single
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({Pread, Pwrite}, {Pread, Pwrite})
({Pread, Pwrite}, {Pread, Pwrite})
p = privacy tag
i = integrity tag
Pread = everyone can read high-integrity content with sensitivity level 0 i,0
Pread = everyone can read high-integrity content with sensitivity level 1 i,1
Pread = everyone can read private content with sensitivity level 0 p,0
Pread = only medics and police constables can read private content with sensitivity level 1 p,1
Pwrite = everyone can write high-integrity content with sensitivity level 0 i,0
Pwrite = only police constables can write high-integrity content with sensitivity level 1 i,1
i,1 i,1p,0
((p,1), (i,1))
((p,0), (i,1)) ((p,1), (i,0))
((p,0), (i,0))
(p,1) -> Pread, Pwritep,1
(i,0) -> Pread, Pwritei,0 i,0
(p,0) -> Pread, Pwritep,0
(i,1) -> Pread, Pwritei,1 i,1
(tag,level) pairs to policies mappings:
Pwrite = everyone can write private content with sensitivity level 0 
Pwrite = only medics and police constables can write private content with sensitivity level 1 
p,1
p,0
p,0
p,1
p,0
i,1 i,1p,1 p,1
({Pread, Pwrite}, {Pread, Pwrite})i,0 i,0p,0 p,0
({Pread, Pwrite}, {Pread, Pwrite})i,0 i,0p,1 p,1
Fully ordered sets of policies:
Figure 4.3: Mapping from lattice of data labels to lattice of policy sets
node of the lattice at any one time depending on its data classification label. Consider two types of documents
being disseminated amongst rescuers at the scene of an accident. One contains personal information of a victim
found in the area and the other contains information on the rescue operations. Figure 4.3 depicts the policy
lattice for such documents. Initially, the documents’ labels are {(p,0) (i,0)} for documents about victims and
{(p,0) (i,1)} for documents about the operations. In other words, everyone can read documents of both types,
but only police constables can write information on the state of the rescue operations. According to the usages
data is subjected to, its classification (i.e. its data classification label) can then either increase or decrease in the
lattice (how this is realised will be shown later). In other words, the set of policies applied to the data keeps
changing depending on the transformations applied to the data. For example, let us consider the case where
someone writes information about her own medical history in an initially empty document about victims. The
document’s classification is immediately increased to {(p,1) (i,0)} so that only medics and police constables
can read and write it. This approach also allows data originators to protect data integrity as policies are not
limited to control read accesses but can also control different operations that can be performed on the data to
modify it (e.g. “write”).
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In the following we describe how well-formed policy lattices, i.e. lattices where an increase in data classifi-
cation actually corresponds to the application of a set of stricter usage control policies, can be constructed.
4.4 Policy Lattices
4.4.1 Policy Specification
Our policy lattice construction is based on the notion of semantics given in Section 4.2. The protection level
provided by a policy can only be measured in terms of the requests that are permitted or denied by the policy.
This is measured by the policy’s provided security level (PSL):
Definition 4.8 The provided security level of a policy P ∈ PS is a relative measure of the access requests P
authorises, obtained with the following rule:
∀Pi,Pj ∈ PS : PSLPj ≤ PSLPi ⇐⇒ RPiY ⊆ RPjY ∧RPjN ⊆ RPiN
In other words, a policy’s provided security level PSLPi is greater or equal to PSLPj if the set of requests
authorised by Pi is a subset of the set of requests authorised by Pj and the set of requests denied by Pj is a subset
of the set of requests denied by Pi. Not applicable (NA) results do not affect this relationship.
Given a set of sensitivity tags T S and the lattice of data classification labels that their discrete sensitivity
levels generate, we associate each (tag, level) pair with at most one policy for each possible action that can be
performed on data (multiple policies for the same action can be easily combined into one with a conjunction
or disjunction of their individual constraints). Given a data item with a certain classification label, we can
therefore determine the applicable policies for all sensitivity domains. In the example of Figure 4.3, the data
label {(p,0) (i,1)} indicates that the data is associated with policies Pp,0read and Pp,0write for the privacy domain
and with policies Pi,1read and P
i,1
write for the integrity domain. However, we must guarantee that the policy lattice
implied by the lattice of data labels is well-formed, i.e. that higher sensitivity levels correspond to policies
with an higher PSL. In other words, the higher an object classification, the fewer access requests are granted.
To construct such a lattice, we constrain the way policies are specified by users. Rather than directly writing
policies that will later be included in a lattice, we let users specify the individual constraints that must hold at
each sensitivity level, for each tag. The set of policies associated with a given (tag, level) pair is then constructed
as a combination of the individual constraints of all levels up to that one. This restriction ensures a monotonic
growth of the constraints that must be satisfied to obtain access at higher sensitivity levels, thus guaranteeing
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that the so-created policy lattice is well-formed (see Section 4.4.3 for a more detailed proof). Constraints are
specified by defining each tag t as a chain of sensitivity levels:
t : ∗→ ({ f alse},{true})→ (Dt,1,At,1)→ ...→ (Dt,n,At,n)
where Dt, j and At, j are sets of compound Boolean expressions ceact (at most one for each possible action act)
and n is the maximum sensitivity level for tag t. Dt, j and At, j represent the individual constraints that must
hold at every sensitivity level and that will be used to build up the deny and allow constraint sets for policies
associated with each (tag, level) pair. The sensitivity levels of a given tag correspond to the PSLs policies must
provide to protect data sufficiently. The ∗ level indicates that a security domain is not applicable to the data
item, i.e. that the data must never be protected under that domain, whereas sensitivity level 0 indicates that the
data is not currently protected. In both cases any action is allowed with no obligations. To include obligations
in this model, we can simply redefine a chain of sensitivity levels as:
t : ∗→ ( /0,{ f alse}, /0,{true})→ (Ot,1N ,Dt,1,Ot,1Y ,At,1)→ ...→ (Ot,nN ,Dt,n,Ot,nY ,At,n)
where each level is also associated with the supersets Ot,iN = {Ot,iN,act1 . . .O
t,i
N,act j} and O
t,i
Y = {Ot,iY,act1 . . .O
t,i
Y,act j}
of obligatory actions valid at that level. Therefore, each action is associated with two sets of obligations, one
for negative and one for positive evaluations.
Given a chain of sensitivity levels for each tag, a set of policies for each action can be determined that are
totally ordered according to their PSL, as described in definition 4.8. We define the policy applicable to an
action request r = (q,read) ∈ R for a data item with sensitivity level l for tag t as:
Pt,lact(r) =

if r.act 6= act < NA, /0 >
else if r |= ∨
ceact∈Dt,i
i≤l
(ceact) < N,
⋃
i≤l
Ot,iN,act >
else if r |= ∧
ceact∈At,i
i≤l
(ceact) < Y,
⋃
i≤l
Ot,iY,act >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
(4.1)
In other words the deny constraint set for a policy associated with level l and action act, DSlact , comprises
all the compound Boolean expressions ceact ∈ Dt,i for the protection levels lower than l. Similarly, the allow
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constraint set for a policy associated with level l and action act, ASlact , comprises all the compound Boolean
expressions ceact ∈ At,i for the protection levels lower than l. Note that the equation does not contain any
reference to policy subjects or objects. This is because both subjects and objects are identified by the set of
constraints that can include conditions on subjects’ and objects’ attributes.
Consider an example privacy domain to protect the personal information of the victims of an accident.
Information should be accessible by all police or ambulance rescuers in the emergency area or in a hospital
(privacy sensitivity is equal to 1). However, access to data containing medical information (privacy sensitivity
is equal to 2) can be granted only to someone who possesses a first-aid expertise certification or is a paramedic
or medic. Also consider the read action as the only possible one. We represent this case by defining two
sensitivity levels for privacy:
p : ∗→ ( /0,{ f alse}, /0,{true})→ ( /0,Dp,1, /0,Ap,1)→ ( /0,Dp,2, /0,Ap,2)
associated with the following compound Boolean expressions:
Dp,1 = (ceread = {zone 6= hospital∨ zone 6= emr. area})
Ap,1 = (ceread = {(role≥Volunteer∨ role≥Constable})
Dp,2 = /0
Ap,2 = (ceread = {aid exp.= true∨ role≥ Paramedic})
where the inequality operators applied on roles are based on an existing role hierarchy (or partial order) where
medics are higher-level rescuers than paramedics and volunteers. Hence, the corresponding encoding for the
two policies applicable at privacy level 1 and privacy level 2 is:
Pp,1read(r) =

if r.act 6= read < NA, /0 >
else if r |= zone 6= hospital∨ zone 6= emr. area < N, /0 >
else if r |= role≥Volunteer∨ role≥Constable < Y, /0 >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
Pp,2read(r) =

if r.act 6= read < NA, /0 >
else if r |= (zone 6= hospital∨ zone 6= emr. area) < N, /0 >
else if r |= (role≥Volunteer∨ role≥Constable)
∧(aid exp.= true∨ role≥ Paramedic) < Y, /0 >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
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The proof that policies corresponding to different levels of the same tag and to the same action are totally
ordered on the basis of their provided security level is given in Section 4.4.3.
4.4.2 Policy Ratification
Given the above allow and deny constraint set combination rule, it is possible that redundant policies are created.
Consider a compound Boolean expression at level i requiring that a user has at least a paramedic role and an
expression at level j with i < j requiring that a user has at least role medic, where medic dominates paramedic
in the considered role hierarchy. In the policy obtained for level j the paramedic condition is redundant and
could be eliminated.
In the general case, using a chain of compound Boolean expressions can lead to redundant policies. To avoid a
waste of computational resources, it might be useful to reduce a policy to its minimal form, i.e. a form where no
conditions can be removed without changing the output of the policy evaluation for any given request. However,
finding the minimal form of a constrained Boolean expression, for example using binary decision diagrams
(BDDs), is a well-known NP-complete problem [BW96]. It is therefore only possible to apply heuristics for
fast reductions. Given a specific Boolean expression representing a policy, we could for example transform
it in Conjunctive Normal Form or Disjunctive Normal Form and perform a dominance check between atomic
conditions contained in the same conjunct or disjunct, and then a coverage check between distinct conjuncts or
disjuncts [AGLL05]. However, this solution has two main drawbacks. First, given our definition of constraint,
dominance checks cannot cause the deletion of a constraint that is the only one specified over a specific attribute.
This means that the number of credentials that must be gathered for a policy evaluation would remain the same
after a reduction operation. Second, a reduction step might cost more than evaluating redundant constraints.
This is why we do not take any action to reduce policy redundancy. Similarly, a redundant or even conflicting
set of obligations (e.g. closing and opening a connection) could be defined. However, conflicting obligations
are application-specific in the sense that conflicts depend on the semantic of the involved obligations. This kind
of conflicts can be detected and thus solved with existing techniques [CLM+09].
Besides redundant policies, the allow and deny constraint set combination rule we described also allows the
specification of inconsistent constraints at different sensitivity levels and thus the creation of policies that deny
all requests. However, we do not consider such policies as errors, since it should always be possible to specify
situations where a data object must be sealed forever. If this is not the case and data is put out of reach by
mistake, recovery mechanisms must be put in place to take the data classification back to a consistent state. As
already stated, recovery mechanisms are left for future work.
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4.4.3 Lattice Derivation
Once a set of tags has been specified as described above, their totally ordered sensitivity levels automatically
generate a lattice where sensitivity classes are actually policy sets. In the following we demonstrate that:
• policy sets are partially ordered according to the PSLs of their individual policies, i.e. the policy lattice
is isomorphic to a lattice of data classification labels;
• the set of sensitivity classes, together with the ordering relationship amongst policies (that is equivalent
to the flow relation of traditional information flow systems), constitute a well-formed lattice.
Our information flow model is defined by:
PM = 〈SC,→,⊕〉
where SC is the set of all sensitivity classes (i.e. of sets of Pt,lact policies) and → is a flow relation defined on
pairs of sensitivity classes that indicates the permitted information flows. In particular, A→ B indicates that
any object protected by the policies contained in A can also be protected by the policies contained in B (i.e.
the policies in B are at least as restrictive as the policies contained in A). The third component, ⊕, is a class-
combining operator on SC defining how to label information obtained by combining information from other
sensitivity classes and will be described later. Given our construction, we define→ as:
A→ B⇔∀Pt, jact ∈ A ∃ Pt,iact ∈ B | PSLPt, jact ≤ PSLPt,iact
In other words, B dominates A if and only if for each policy Pt, jact in A there exists at least one policy P
t,i
act in
B defined for the same tag and action and that provides a higher security level. We must now demonstrate that
this rule holds for all flow relations created when specifying a set of tags and their chains of sensitivity levels.
For simplicity in the notation we also assume only one action is available.
Demonstration 4.1 Let us consider two policies Pt,iact and P
t, j
act such that i ≥ j. We must prove that PSLPt,iact ≥
PSLPt, jact . This follows immediately from the construction of the policies. Consider the policy corresponding to
the first sensitivity level for tag t:
Pt,0act(r) =

if r.act 6= act < NA, /0 >
else if f alse < N, /0 >
else if true < Y, /0 >
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The policy allows every request (and returns an empty set of obligations) and denies none, i.e. RP
t,0
act
Y = R and
RP
t,0
act
N = /0. We call this policy the zero policy. Each policy at successive levels Pt,i ∀ i > 0 adds a disjunction of
Boolean conditions to the deny rule and a conjunction of Boolean conditions to the allow rule. This increases
the number of denied requests and restricts the number of allowed ones, i.e. RP
t,i
act
Y ⊆RP
t, j
act
Y and R
Pt, jact
N ⊆RP
t,i
act
N ∀ i> j.
From the definition of PSL we can therefore derive that PSLPt, jact ≤ PSLPt,iact .
Note that the solution we are proposing is not the only possible one and different approaches can be taken to
order policies according to the definition of PSL we have given.
To show that 〈SC,→〉 forms a lattice in our model we must establish that:
• SC is finite;
• 〈SC,→〉 is a partially ordered set;
• SC has a lower bound ⊥ such that ⊥→ A ∀A ∈ SC;
• There exists a least upper bound operator on SC, unionsq.
SC is finite as an obvious consequence of the limited set of sensitivity tags and levels (and thus policies) that
it is possible to specify. To demonstrate that 〈SC,→〉 is a partially ordered set we must demonstrate that the
flow relation→ is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric, that is:
• A→ A ∀A ∈ SC (reflexivity);
• A→ B∧B→C⇒ A→C ∀A,B,C ∈ SC (transitivity);
• A→ B∧B→ A⇒ A = B (antisymmetry).
Demonstration 4.2 The three properties can be easily proven by proving that they hold when comparing
individual policies rather than sensitivity classes. Reflexivity is immediately proven as given a policy Pt,iact ,
PSLPt,iact = PSLPt,iact . Reflexivity then holds for sensitivity classes if it holds for all of their policies. Transitivity
can be proven similarly. Given three policies Pt,iact , P
t, j
act and P
t,k
act such that PSLPt,iact ≤PSLPt, jact and PSLPt, jact ≤PSLPt,kact ,
the total ordering given by PSLs requires that PSLPt,iact ≤ PSLPt,kact for consistency. Finally, given two policies P
t,i
act
and Pt, jact such that PSLPt,iact ≤ PSLPt, jact and PSLPt, jact ≤ PSLPt,iact , consistency requires that PSLPt, jact = PSLPt,iact , proving
antisymmetry.
The sensitivity class containing zero policies for all tags acts as the lower bound ⊥ for SC. In fact, for each
policy Pt,iact , PSLPt,iact ≥ PSLPt,0act . The least-upper bound operator unionsq can also be easily obtained as the operator
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that given two sensitivity classes returns a sensitivity class containing for each tag the highest level in the input
classes. In other words the operator returns a sensitivity class associated with the policies with the highest PSL
in the input classes, for each tag and action:
LaunionsqLb(t) =
 La(t) i f La(t)≥ Lb(t)Lb(t) otherwise (4.2)
where La indicates a label, and thus a tuple of (tag, level) pairs in the lattice isomorphic to the policy lattice
and La(t) indicates the numeric value of the label’s sensitivity level for tag t. We can then show that:
• A→ AunionsqB and B→ AunionsqB;
• A→C ∧ B→C⇒ AunionsqB→C.
Demonstration 4.3 Both properties are derived from the very definition of unionsq and →. For every policy Pt,iact
associated with A, AunionsqB is associated with either the same policy, or a policy Pt, jact from B such that PSLPt,iact ≤
PSLPt, jact , thus proving the first property. If for every policy P
t,i
act associated with A and P
t, j
act associated with B there
exists a policy Pt,kact associated with C such that PSLPt,iact ≤ PSLPt,kact and PSLPt, jact ≤ PSLPt,kact , then AunionsqB cannot be
associated with a policy with PSL higher then the corresponding policy in C, thus proving the second property.
Therefore, defining a set of tags and their chains of sensitivity levels leads to the construction of a lattice of
policy sets. The existence of a greatest-lower bound operator u and of a highest bound > (the sensitivity class
containing the policies with the highest possible PSL for all tags) is implied by the above properties. We can
thus define u as:
LauLb(t) =
 La(t) i f La(t)≤ Lb(t)Lb(t) otherwise (4.3)
4.4.4 Policy Decision
Policies defined for each tag are fully ordered according to their PSLs. Introducing new tags allows us to specify
more policies that are relevant for different sensitivity domains and to generate a policy lattice whose minimal
element is ⊥ and maximal element is >. Therefore, data can be associated at any moment with a sensitivity
class Ld and thus with a set of currently applicable policies P
Ld
act = {Pt1,l1act ,Pt2,l2act , . . .Ptn,lnact } for each action, such
that an access request r = (q,act) is evaluated as follows:
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PLdact(r) =

< N,ON >⇐⇒∃Pt,ltact | Pt,ltact (r) = N
< Y,OY >⇐⇒∃Pt,ltact | Pt,ltact (r) = Y∧
¬∃Pt,ltact | Pt,ltact (r) = N
< NA, /0 >⇐⇒∀Pt,ltact | Pt,ltact (r) = NA
(4.4)
where ON and OY are the sets of all obligations returned by all policies returning a negative and positive
evaluation, respectively. In other words, an access request is not authorised if at least one policy specified for
the requested action and associated with the current sensitivity class returns N. Otherwise, if at least one policy
returns Y the access request is authorised. This implies that a deny overrides rule is applied whenever different
policies return conflicting results. Not applicable results (obtained if all policies from all tags return NA) can
be treated differently according to the specific application scenario. A default permission or denial could be
returned or decision might be deferred to specific non-conflicting decision policies [JSSS01]. In the remainder
of this thesis we will use a default deny policy so that not applicable results correspond to denials.
4.5 Data Labelling
4.5.1 Content Verification Procedures
When it is first created, data must be immediately associated with the most suitable policies in the policy lattice.
Associating new data with level 0 is not a viable solution, as it assumes data is initially empty or not sensitive.
To determine the initial sensitivity of data we introduce the concept of content verification procedure (CVP),
similar in spirit to the integrity verification procedures (IVP) used in [CW87]. An IVP is defined as a procedure
meant to verify the validity of the state of constrained data items after transformation procedures are executed
on them. In our case, CVPs are used on newly created data to determine their sensitivity based on their content.
A similar concept was also used to classify database elements in multilevel relational databases [LDS+90, JS91]
where elements in relational tables were classified on the basis of their actual value rather than according to the
relational column they were members of. Content-dependent conditions for discretionary policies [SdV00] are
also similar in concept to CVPs.
A content verification procedure is a Boolean function that verifies specific conditions or properties on the
data content. A good example of CVP is a well-known function that is widely used nowadays, for example
by Google Maps: the face recognition function. Consider a video being taken by a CCTV camera installed in
a building. The video must be kept private as it shows people entering and leaving the area. However, this is
not true if no one appears in the video. Once the recording stops or even while video is streaming from the
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camera into a nearby workstation, the new data must be correctly labelled to protect people’s privacy. Rather
then relying on a trusted user to label the data as it is created, we propose to verify automatically whether the
data contains sensitive information (in this case human faces) and to label it accordingly. Other examples are
functions that analyse the structure of XML data or the values of spreadsheets [GZS09].
Whenever new data is created, the initial level for each tag in its classification label is decided by the results
of the CVPs specified in a DSA by the cooperating organisations. We consider the granularity of DSAs to
be fine enough so that the number of CVPs to execute is not overwhelming. In other words, given several
organisations sharing data at different levels, we assume several different DSAs to be put in place for each level
(such as “working groups” constituted by cooperating sub-departments), so that not all possible CVPs for the
whole partnership must be executed but only those related to the specific level/group within which the data was
created. When defining tags and their chains of sensitivity levels, a CVP is associated with each level:
t : ∗→ ( /0,{ f alse}, /0,{true},CVPt,0)→ (Ot,1N ,Dt,1,Ot,1Y ,At,1,CVPt,1)→ ...→ (Ot,nN ,Dt,n,Ot,nY ,At,n,CVPt,n)
where the value returned by CVPt,i indicates whether the data should be labelled with level i for tag t. Note
that the ∗ value is applied whenever no CVP returns true, otherwise the highest level whose CVP returns true is
applied. CVPs are particularly useful whenever the initial sensitivity level for a given tag should not be decided
manually by the data originator but on the basis of higher-level corporate policies. Otherwise, a simple CVP
can be used that asks the data originator to input a specific initial sensitivity level for the data (in the following
we will indicate this CVP as Req).
We can now re-define the example privacy tag introduced in Section 4.4.1 to include content verification
procedures:
p : ∗→ ( /0,{ f alse}, /0,{(true)}, isText())→ ( /0,Dp,1, /0,Ap,1,NamesOrAddresses())→
→ ( /0,Dp,2, /0,Ap,2,MedIn f o())
where NamesOrAddresses() and MedInfo() are two CVPs verifying whether the data contains personal names
or addresses and medical information, respectively. Note that we automatically protect textual data with privacy
level 0, implying that all textual information can potentially be private.
4.5.2 Transformation Labelling
After data has been associated with an initial classification label and disseminated amongst unknown recipients,
we must ensure that its content always conforms to one of the sensitivity classes contained in the lattice,
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independently of the usages it is subjected to. Relying on content verification procedures to relabel data every
time it is modified is not a viable solution, as some data properties cannot be verified by any CVP. Clark and
Wilson [CW87] already showed how protecting data integrity requires a strict control over the set of valid
transformations that can be performed. They defined transformation procedures as the only procedures that are
allowed to modify or create new constrained data items. Control over the set of transformations allowed the
authors to enforce the well-formed transaction requirement so that only legitimate (i.e. integrity preserving)
actions could be executed by users. Similarly, we aim to guarantee that after each transformation data can still
be classified under the policy lattice provided initially and that such classification can be found easily. To do so
we pre-define a set of transformation functions through which users can modify or create new data, and define
a class-combining operator ⊕ that specifies the class to which the output of a specified transformation belongs.
Our definition of ⊕ differs from the one given by Denning [DD77] in that the result returned by the operator
depends on the particular transformation used to transform the inputs.
To determine the result of the ⊕ operator we characterise transformation functions by associating them
with different transformation labels. First, each transformation is associated with a classification label Lc
containing a sensitivity level for each existing tag. Each (tag,level) pair in Lc represents the minimum sensitivity
level of the output data for that tag. The default level for tags in a classification label, if not specified explicitly,
is considered to be 0, meaning that the transformation’s output is at most as sensitive as the most sensitive
input data. The range of sensitivity levels for classification labels does not include the ∗ value. Intuitively,
derived data returned by a transformation may not be sensitive and thus be associated with sensitivity level 0,
but a security requirement specified at creation time for the input data cannot be completely removed from the
derived one. Therefore derived data cannot be associated with the ∗ level, unless the original data is as well.
Besides the greatest lower bound and least upper bound operators introduced in Section 4.4.3 to combine
data classification labels, we must also consider that when a specific sensitivity domain is not applicable for
certain data (i.e. the level for the specific tag is equal to ∗), whatever transformation is applied to the data the ∗
value of the tag cannot be modified. We therefore introduce a ∗-preserving operator whose second operand is
always a classification label:
Launionsq∗ Lc(t) =
 ∗ i f La(t) = ∗LaunionsqLc(t) otherwise (4.5)
Whenever one or more data inputs with data labels Ld1 . . .Ldn are transformed through a transformation with
classification label Lc, the output is assigned label:
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⊕(Ld1 . . .Ldn ,Lc) = (Ld1 unionsqLd2 unionsq . . .Ldn)unionsq∗ Lc (4.6)
For simplicity, in the following we will use the notation:
⊕(Ld1 . . .Ldn ,Lc) =
⊔
Ldi unionsq∗ Lc (4.7)
After the execution of a transformation function, the sensitivity level for each applicable tag is increased to
be the least upper bound of the input data labels and classification label. The ∗ value is overridden if the classi-
fication labels of different input data objects have values higher than ∗ for the same tag. This happens because
while the unionsq operator combines two data classification labels, and thus the highest sensitivity level must be con-
sidered (also overriding ∗ levels), the unionsq∗ operator combines a data classification label with a transformation’s
classification label, in which case ∗ levels in the former label override higher levels in the latter label.
As it is now, the⊕ operator only considers transformations that return output data more sensitive than the in-
put data. However, transformations can also declassify data. To address this case, we associate transformations
with two declassification labels, namely the general declassification label Lg and the relative declassifica-
tion label L−. Intuitively, while the classification label represents the value added by the transformation to
the input data, the general declassification label represents the amount of sensitive information that is lost in
the transformation process. For example, a summary transformation may remove all details deemed not useful
from a document. If these details included personal information about the document’s author, then the output
summary’s sensitivity for an hypothetical privacy domain should be reduced. Each (tag, value) pair in Lg repre-
sents the maximum sensitivity level of the output data for that tag. If not specified explicitly, the default value
for tags in general declassification labels is the highest possible level for that tag, meaning that no information
is lost. With the general declassification label Lg, the ⊕ operator becomes:
⊕(Ld1 . . .Ldn ,Lc,Lg) =
⊔
(Ldi uLg)unionsq∗ Lc (4.8)
The rule first considers the loss of information in the input data due to the declassification, and then increases
the value of the declassified inputs according to the applied transformation. When for some tags’ levels the
input data does not contain enough sensitive information to be further declassified (i.e. Ld(t) ≤ Lg(t)), the
general declassification has no effect on such tags.
The relative declassification label represents the loss of information relative to the current sensitivity of the
data. Each (tag, value) pair in L− (where values are real numbers in the range [0 . . .1]) represents the reduced
sensitivity for that tag as a proportion of the current sensitivity. If not specified explicitly, the default value for
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tags in L− is 1, meaning that no information is lost. L− is also associated with a threshold value th indicating
the minimum non-integer sensitivity value under which the data is classified at level 0. Consider for example an
image data and a transformation that reduces its quality or resolution. The loss of information depends on the
current resolution of the data, thus the security level required by the output data cannot be universally defined
in a label. To apply relative declassification labels we introduce a further operator:
La−L−(t) =

∗ i f La(t) = ∗
0 i f La(t)×L−(t)< threshold
dLa(t)×L−(t)e otherwise
(4.9)
The relative declassification label allows any discrete level to be decreased by a specific percentage and then
rounded up to the next discrete level. With the relative declassification label L−, the ⊕ operator becomes:
⊕(Ld1 . . .Ldn ,Lc,Lg,L−) =
⊔
((Ldi−L−)uLg)unionsq∗ Lc (4.10)
The ⊕ operator described so far can only be applied to transformations whose output, or at least its charac-
teristics, are well-known. However, in many cases it is not possible to know in advance what the output of a
transformation will look like. Examples are transformations performed by human users, such as text editing.
A consequence of this impossibility is that a transformation may change one or more tags such that a wrong
sensitivity level is applied to the output data. To address this problem we introduce decisional labels Ld. The
decisional label associates each tag with a Boolean value indicating whether a content verification procedure is
required (as for newly created data) to determine the security level of the output data. The default value for a
tag in a decisional label is false (i.e. CVPs are not used by default). With the decisional label Ld , the⊕ operator
finally becomes:
⊕(Ld1 . . .Ldn ,Lc,Lg,L−,Ld)
 max(i) | CVPi,t = true i f L
d(t) = true⊔
((Ldi−L−)uLg)unionsq∗ Lc otherwise
(4.11)
In other words, if the decisional label is set to true for a given tag, the highest sensitivity level for that tag
whose CVP is verified is applied to the data. If the decisional label is set to true for a tag but no CVP is satisfied
after a transformation, then the data modifications are considered not valid and must be rolled back. Similarly,
the absence of a required CVP is considered an error and also leads to a rollback. Note that if the specified
CVP for a given level is a Req procedure that requires a user to enter a sensitivity level, this may correspond to
a request to the data originators of the input objects (and not to the user who is modifying the data). This means
that 1) the data originator’s identifier must always be attached to the data and 2) that a consensus amongst the
112
originators of several input objects must be found to authorise a transformation. Finding a consensus amongst
originators that might be unreachable is however an expensive and time consuming operation and not one we
will try to accomplish in this thesis, even if only one originator needs to be contacted. We instead decide to
assume that users authorised to transform the data are also authorised to decide the classification of the derived
information (if a Req CVP has been specified).
4.6 Secure transitions
Bell and LaPadula designed their model around the basic security theorem, which states that an MLS system
is secure if i) its initial state vinit is BLP-secure (i.e. it satisfies the simple security and *- properties) and ii) the
state transition function T preserves security, i.e. it moves the system from a BLP-secure state to another BLP-
secure state. As pointed out by McLean with his example called ”System Z” [McL90], the failure to control
transitions can cause several security problems in a BLP-secure system. The example describes a system with
only one transition that downgrades all subjects and objects in the system to the lowest possible classification.
The Bell and LaPadula model deals with these examples by assuming with its tranquillity principle that object
classifications should not be changed during normal operations. However, with such an assumption the model
becomes too restrictive for real-world systems. McLean proposes a new definition of security based on the
notion of secure transition, i.e. a transition where object and subject classification are changed only by subjects
trusted to do so. For McLean, a system is secure if all its reachable states are BLP-secure (i.e. simple secure
and *-secure) and its transition function is transition secure.
The first difference between our model and a traditional MLS model is that subjects are not associated with
a clearance label. Let S be the set of all subjects. We can classify subjects on the basis of the strictest policies
they satisfy for a given action act, i.e. the maximum PSL for each domain t such that they satisfy Pt,PSLact (r). Let
us call such PSL satisfied security level for action act (SSLact). Note that this classification varies over time as
policy evaluations change with the request contexts users provide. We can therefore define a subject clearance
label for action act as a set of (tag,SLLact) pairs and define a revised simple security property:
Definition 4.9 A state is simple secure if and only if for every subject that has read access to an object in the
state, the clearance label for action read of the subject dominates (in the policy lattice) the data classification
label of the object.
The second difference between our model and a traditional MAC model is that write access is controlled with
the same mechanism as read access, where we consider all calls to transformation functions as write requests.
Again, we define a revised *-property:
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Definition 4.10 A state is *-secure if and only if for every subject that is permitted to perform a transformation
f on an object in the state, the clearance label for action f of the subject dominates (in the policy lattice) the
data label of the object.
This is reasonable since both the read action and transformation functions are actions that can be associated
with policies, so that stricter policies allow less users to perform them. Our transition function is a function F :
Q×A×V →V where q ∈Q is a request context containing the subject, object and environmental attributes, A
is the set of actions that can be performed on data and V is the set of states of the system. In particular, let T R be
the set of all transformations and D be the set of all data objects in state v. Then, A = T R∪{read,createNew}.
A transition function is transition secure if and only if each transition F(q,act,v) = v′ is such that for all objects
d ∈ D and all tags t ∈ T S, if Ld(t) 6= Ld(t)′ then:
• act ∈ T R;
• act took d as input;
• at least one of the transformation labels associated with act has a non-default value for tag t or act took
as input at least another object di besides d with a different classification label;
• the issued request r = (q,act) satisfies PLdact (i.e. PLdact(q,act) = Y ). In other words a transition can modify
the classification of an object only if the subject executing it was authorised to do so. This is an obvious
consequence of the fact that access to transformations is controlled by policies associated with the same
lattice used to classify data and transformations.
Since data classification can only be changed by the operators defined in Section 4.5.2 and since the set of
transformations is pre-defined, secure transitions will always move the system into a state where data labels
are defined over the existing lattice, i.e. ∀d ∈ D :⊥v Ld v> so that further transitions would also be secure.
This is why it is important that policy sets are ordered in a lattice. If there existed a pair of sensitivity classes
without a unique least upper bound or unique greatest lower bound, we could not determine deterministically
the sensitivity class of the output of certain transformations.
We underline that traditional MLS solutions can be implemented using the proposed model by having request
contexts that only contain the requesting user’s clearance. The simple security property can then be verified by
policies that only check the dominance relationship between user clearance and data classification, while the
*-property can be verified by policies that check the opposite relationship. Also, traditional access control and
policy systems can be implemented by reducing the policy lattice to just one sensitivity level for each domain.
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4.7 Derived Data Protection Architecture
In the following sections we show how the label model described in the previous section can be applied to
protect XML documents and how it can be integrated in the high-level architecture we described in Chapter 3. In
particular, our crisis management scenario is based on the assumption that rescuers disseminate data in the form
of tactical situation objects (TSO), i.e. highly structured and pre-defined documents whose format is understood
by rescuer organisations. The implementation of the derived data manager component (Figure 3.2) uses the
XQuery and XPath languages as means to specify data transformations and CVPs. XQuery is a query and
functional programming language that can be used to query XML documents. The queries’ outputs can be saved
as new XML documents or overwrite already existing ones. In our implementation we assume the file name of
documents correspond to the name of their root XML element. This is how we determine when a transformation
overwrites (i.e. modifies) an already existing document or creates a new one. Queries can be complex enough
to eliminate, rearrange and merge XML elements, attributes and data from several documents at the same time
and can also call Java functions to perform more complex operations. For example, an XQuery transformation
may take as input a documents containing personal information about an organisation’s employees, a document
containing information about projects run by another organisation and merge them by matching employees
with projects they could participate to (e.g. on the base of their competencies described by XML attributes).
XQuery allows us to provide a flexible and general implementation of our solution.
XPath is a query language for selecting specific elements from XML documents. XPath queries can be used
to explore the XML tree of a document and select nodes on the basis of their path, attributes and content.
We define CVPs as XPath expressions taking as input XML documents and returning a list of elements that
satisfy the procedure. For example, an XPath CVP may take in input a document and return all the subelements
containing personal information (names, dates of birth etc.). This slightly differs from the model described in
Section 4.5.1 where CVPs only return Boolean values. This is due to the fact that we are now dealing with
structured data rather than atomic data objects. We can thus think of XPath CVPs as returning true for all XML
elements they select. The type and complexity of CVPs depend on the application scenario. However, we
assume that the use of XML documents and XPath facilitates the CVP specification process at DSA definition
time. If the disseminated data contains instead free text or images, the complexity of CVPs may increase
and include complex algorithms to analyse the data content. However, both CVPs and transformations could
be easily reused whenever documents have similar or standardised structures or when they contain similarly
formatted data (such as images, videos etc). As previously mentioned we assume that the set of transformations
that can be applied to data is pre-defined. Users cannot specify their own transformations (XQueries) and are
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limited to a specific set of predefined ones. For example, given two documents a DSA may state that users
can only transform documents by summarising them (with an XQuery removing specific XML elements) or
merging them (with an XQuery merging information from one document with information from an other one).
4.7.1 Data Sharing Agreement
Using our labelling model, protecting derived data means deciding the classification labels associated with it.
Users and applications manipulate data through a series of transformation functions that need to be known
in advance by all partner organisations for two reasons. First, organisations must be able to specify policies
controlling how such transformations are used on the data they disseminate, even after the data crosses the
organisational boundaries. Second, to specify how derived data must be protected, data originators must know
how transformations actually process the original data. To this end, we use DSAs as the main means for partners
to agree on a common set of transformations.
As defined in Chapter 3, a DSA is a 7-tuple (ID,S,A,EA,CA,UP,V ) where UP represents the set of usage
control policies. We can now expand this definition:
Definition 4.11 The set of usage control policies UP specified in a data sharing agreement (ID, S, A, EA, CA,
UP, V) is a 3-tuple (TAG, CVP, TR) where TAG is the set of all tags (and their chains of sensitivity levels) asso-
ciated with the agreed sensitivity domains, CVP is a set of XPath functions representing the content verification
procedures used in the tags’ definition and T R is a set of XQuery functions representing the available data
transformations.
Therefore, partner organisations agree at DSA level on the structure of the policy lattice controlling data
usage and on the set of transformations recipients will be authorised to use. For example, a DSA may contain a
CVP looking for elements containing personal information and associating them with a given sensitivity level
for the privacy domain and a transformation removing all such elements from the document, thus declassifying
the element’s privacy sensitivity level. For the rest of this chapter we will assume the term EA of the DSA
contains a static list of references to trusted evaluation authorities.
In our scenario the use of a DSA is ideal. In general, large libraries of transformations and CVPs may be
constructed on the basis of well-known regulations (e.g. the european regulations on data protection [eud12])
and be freely available for everyone to use.
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4.7.2 Data Publication
The data publication phase we propose is shown in Figure 4.4. Note that the process stems from the one
described in Section 3.4.2 with the addition of the derived data controller component. When new data is
created and a publication request is issued, the PEP first queries the communication manager for the state
of the network. If connectivity is available, the client first tries to update the policies (i.e. tags, CVPs and
transformations) it currently stores. Then, the PEP asks the requesting application to provide a set of metadata
to be published with the data. This phase is application-specific and the metadata used may widely vary.
In general, the PEP should require the application to provide at least the metadata needed for the evaluation
of the available policies. The PEP then asks the derived data controller to run all the available CVPs and
correspondingly label the data the user wants to publish. Once the data has been labelled, the PEP encrypts
it and encloses all the information needed for decryption into a publishing license that is also encrypted for
a chosen policy evaluation authority from the set EA. Finally, the licence is attached to the encrypted data
for dissemination. We will describe how data labelling and encryption are performed and the format of the
publishing licence in the following.
Consider the XML structure depicted in Figure 4.5 containing medical records of victims of an accident and
two example sensitivity tags, privacy and confidentiality. Every element can be associated with a data classi-
fication label and can be modified by a transformation. Data classification labels are associated with elements
as standard XML attributes. In the example we omit all labels with value 0 for all tags for simplicity. CVPs
are defined as labelled XPath expressions. Figure 4.6 shows an example implementation for the MedInfo() and
NamesOrAddresses() CVPs that verify whether the data contains personal names or addresses and medical
information, respectively. The first and second lines in both listings indicate the CVP’s ID and partial label
it generates if verified, respectively. For example, an XML element returned by the NamesOrAddresses CVP
would be associated with sensitivity level 1 for the privacy tag, unless it were also returned by the MedInfo
CVP, in which case it would be associated with sensitivity level 2. Figure 4.6 does not show a CVP for level 0
as it simply returns the root of the XML document (in other words, all documents are not protected by default
for the privacy domain). Therefore, these three CVPs, together with the specification of the deny and allow sets
shown in section 4.4.1, completely define the privacy tag (since no obligations are specified). We implement
particular CVPs such as a facial recognition CVP for images and the Req CVP as Java functions and group
them in an API that can be accessed via XPath through the custom namespace.
Algorithm 1 and Figure 4.7 show the data labelling process via CVPs. First, all CVPs are run on the newly
created data. If any CVP associated with level l for tag t returns one or more elements, then the sensitivity level
for tag t in the data classification label of those elements is set to l (procedure setInitialLabel). If more than
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Figure 4.4: Interaction of components for data publication
one CVP have been specified for the same sensitivity level in a tag, then the result is the disjunction of the two
CVPs. In other words, just one of them needs to return an element for it to be labelled with the corresponding
level. Whenever more than one CVP for the same tag but different level return the same element, the procedure
selects the highest sensitivity level. Finally, sensitivity levels can be propagated down the XML tree, from
parent nodes to their children (procedure propagateLevels). While we let all sensitivity levels propagate down
the XML tree, several other approaches [DdVPS02] have been proposed to determine how policies associated
with XML elements can propagate and how conflicts between propagated and not-propagated policies can
be solved (see Section 2.4.2 for examples). The same solutions can be easily applied to sensitivity domains
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<VICTIMS>
      <VICTIM status="alive" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">
<NAME>Jane</NAME>
         <SURNAME>Austen</SURNAME>
         <GENDER>F</GENDER>
         <AGE>23</AGE>
         <NATIONALITY>British</NATIONALITY>
         <DOB>1980-04-07</DOB>
 <PHONENUMBER>07877578834</PHONENUMBER>
         <ADDRESS>
     <ADDRESSLINE>390 High Road</ADDRESSLINE>
     <ADDRESSLINE>South Kensington, London</ADDRESSLINE>
     <POSTCODE>SW7 2AZ</POSTCODE>
 </ADDRESS>
         <CONDITIONS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">
     <SYMPTOMS>
 <SYMPTOM active="yes">
     <DESCRIPTION>head bleeding</DESCRIPTION>
     <FIRST-AID date="2000-01-12T12:33:00Z">bandaging</FIRST-AID>
     <SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>apply stitches</SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>
 </SYMPTOM>
     </SYMPTOMS>
 </CONDITIONS>
      </VICTIM>
</VICTIMS>
Figure 4.5: An example XML structure labelled by CVPs prior to level propagation
<CVP id="MedInfo">
    <LABEL label="privacy,2"/>
    <XPATH>//CONDITIONS | //MEDICAL_HISTORY</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="NamesOrAddresses">
    <LABEL label="privacy,1"/>
    <XPATH>//VICTIM[NAME or SURNAME or ADDRESS]</XPATH>
</CVP>
Figure 4.6: Examples of content verification procedure
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Figure 4.7: Data labelling procedure
and levels. We could for example specify a propagation bound for each tag, so that sensitivity levels above
the specified bound would propagate down the tree. We could otherwise define tags as recursive or local,
indicating whether the corresponding levels should propagate or not. However, deciding a priori which tags
propagate and which ones do not may lead to errors as it is extremely difficult to foresee all information that
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Algorithm 1: XML labelling procedure.
Input: An XML tree T , a set of CVPs P, a set of domains T S
Output: The labelled XML tree T
setInitialLabel(T,P);
propagateLevels(root(T), TS);
Procedure setInitialLabel(T,P):
forall CVPs cvp ∈ P do
t = cvp.tag;
l = cvp.level;
E = {Element e | e ∈ T, cvp returns e};
forall elements e ∈ E do
if l ≥ currentLevel(e,t) then
setLevel(e,l,t);
end
end
end
Procedure propagateLevels(e, TS):
forall elements c ∈ children(e) do
forall tags t ∈ TS do
parentLevel = currentLevel(e,t);
childLevel = currentLevel(c,t);
if childLevel ≤ 0 ∧ parentLevel > 0 then
setLevel(c, parentLevel,t);
end
end
propagateLevels(c,TS);
end
will be protected under a specific tag, and thus to decide whether its content (i.e. subelements) will need to
be protected as well or not. Different XML elements protected under the same tag may even have different
requirements for their subelements, and creating a different tag for each would cause the DSA specification to
be over-complicated. We therefore take the conservative decision of letting all sensitivity levels propagate down
the XML tree. This implies that different sensitivity levels for the same tag could be propagated down to the
same element. For example, consider a node classified with level 1 for a given tag, and its parent node classified
with level 2 for the same tag. The parent’s classification would be inherited by the child node that would then
be classified with both level 1 and 2 for the same tag. A conflict resolution strategy must therefore be applied to
decide which level elements are actually associated with. Our strategy overrides default values (* and 0) with
the closest non-default ancestor’s levels for the same tags. Non-default levels are instead not overridden by
propagated ones, as the most specific policy applies strategy dictates. This is reasonable since information that
is considered public for a given tag and is thus labelled with level 0 or * can become sensitive when included
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<VICTIMS>
     <VICTIM status="alive" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">
        <NAME label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">Jane</NAME> 
        <SURNAME label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">Austen</SURNAME>
        <GENDER label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">F</GENDER> 
        <AGE label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">23</AGE> 
        <NATIONALITY label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">British</NATIONALITY> 
        <DOB label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">1980-04-07</DOB>
        <PHONENUMBER label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">07877578834</PHONENUMBER> 
        <ADDRESS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">
           <ADDRESSLINE label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">390 High Road</ADDRESSLINE> 
           <ADDRESSLINE label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">South Kensington, London</ADDRESSLINE> 
           <POSTCODE label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">SW7 2AZ</POSTCODE>
        </ADDRESS> 
        <CONDITIONS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">
            <SYMPTOMS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)"> 
               <SYMPTOM active="yes" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">
                  <DESCRIPTION label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">head bleeding</DESCRIPTION> 
                  <FIRST-AID date="2000-01-12T12:33:00Z" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">bandaging</FIRST-AID>
                  <SUGGESTEDTHERAPY label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">apply stitches</SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>
               </SYMPTOM> 
           </SYMPTOMS>
        </CONDITIONS> 
     </VICTIM>
</VICTIMS>
Figure 4.8: An example XML structure labelled by CVPs after level propagation
into a sensitive XML container (e.g. an address included in a person’s profile). Usage of information that was
instead already associated with a non-default usage policy should not be further restricted to allow the original
intended uses. Procedure propagateLevels enforces this behaviour during the data labelling process. In the
example depicted in Figure 4.5 all XML elements but the <VICTIM> and <CONDITIONS> ones are labelled,
according to the CVPs in Figure 4.6, with the default value 0 for all domains, i.e. they are public. However,
after levels from the <VICTIM> and <CONDITIONS> nodes are propagated, all elements contained in the
<VICTIM> node are associated with privacy level 1 and all elements contained in the <CONDITIONS> node
with privacy level 2. This means that all privacy-sensitive information is labelled with the correct sensitivity
level. This situation is depicted in Figure 4.8. Conflicts between sensitivity levels must not be confused with
conflicts between policies corresponding to different tags. These are in fact solved when authorisation requests
are issued and treated with a deny overrides conflict resolution strategy, as dictated by formula 4.4.
With this mechanism, once a new XML document has been created, the derived data controller associates
each of its elements with a data label Li. The PEP then encrypts elements labelled with the same label Li with
the same symmetric key ki. For each element, its name, attributes (excluding the data label) and data content
(if any) are encrypted, but the overall XML structure is maintained. A symmetric key km is also generated
and used to encrypt the document’s metadata. The set of keys {k1 . . .kn} and km, encrypted with the public
key of the chosen evaluation authority, are then included into a publishing licence, together with a reference to
the authority itself. The license, the encrypted metadata and the encrypted data are then included in the same
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label1: key1
label2: key2
....
labeln: keyn
km
Authority ID
Publishing licence Encrypted XML document
<VICTIMS>
      <VICTIM status="alive" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">
<NAME>Jane</NAME>
         <SURNAME>Austen</SURNAME>
         <GENDER>F</GENDER>
         <AGE>23</AGE>
         <NATIONALITY>British</NATIONALITY>
         <DOB>1980-04-07</DOB>
 <PHONENUMBER>07877578834</PHONENUMBER>
         <ADDRESS>
     <ADDRESSLINE>390 High Road</ADDRESSLINE>
     <ADDRESSLINE>South Kensington, London</ADDRESSLINE>
     <POSTCODE>SW7 2AZ</POSTCODE>
 </ADDRESS>
         <CONDITIONS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">
     <SYMPTOMS>
 <SYMPTOM active="yes">
     <DESCRIPTION>head bleeding</DESCRIPTION>
     <FIRST-AID date="2000-01-12T12:33:00Z">bandaging</FIRST-AID>
     <SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>apply stitches</SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>
 </SYMPTOM>
     </SYMPTOMS>
 </CONDITIONS>
      </VICTIM>
</VICTIMS>
Protected data package
Encrypted metadata
Figure 4.9: Protected data package
package ready to be disseminated. The information appended to the encrypted document is thus:
{metadata}km | {km,(L1,k1) . . .(Ln,kn)}PKauth | IDauth
Figure 4.9 depicts the protected data package’s format. Whenever a data recipient receives the data, she can
contact the evaluation authority specified in the publishing licence to obtain the decryption keys, as described
later. The package’s integrity is also protected. If an attacker modified the publishing license by introducing a
different authority ID, the new authority would not be able to decrypt the license and thus the document and
the metadata. If the attacker modified the encrypted part of the license, the original authority would not be able
to access the decryption keys. If the attacker modified the encrypted metadata, the authority would realise the
package has been tampered with when trying to decrypt the metadata. Finally, if the encrypted data or one of
its classification labels were modified, recipients would not be able to decrypt it. In other words, modification
of any part of the package would result in the impossibility of accessing the data, but not in an incorrect policy
evaluation.
4.7.3 Policy Evaluation and Enforcement
The policy evaluation process is conceptually identical to the one depicted in Figure 3.7 and described in Section
3.4. After receiving an access request from an application, the client’s PEP queries the PIP to obtain the data
package’s publishing licence and encrypted metadata and sends them to the specified evaluation authority. The
evaluation authority checks the data labels contained in the publishing licence, reconstructs the corresponding
policies based on the sensitivity tags defined in the DSA and requests to the client’s PEP the certificates needed
for the policy evaluation. It also retrieves specific context tokens from remote services. Policy reconstruction is
a simple process that given a data classification label, for each tag combines the constraint sets up to the label’s
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Figure 4.10: Data access procedure
sensitivity level for the tag, as described by formula 4.1. For example, given the label (privacy 1,integrity 0)
for the lattice depicted in Figure 4.3, the process reconstructs the policies Pp,1read and P
i,0
read . The client’s PEP
queries its local PIP to retrieve the required credentials and sends them to the requesting authority. The set of
keys corresponding to the data classification labels whose policies are satisfied is then sent back to the client’s
PEP that can decrypt the elements of the document associated with them. The client’s PEP also removes
from the document view all XML elements that cannot be decrypted and whose contained elements are also
not accessible. If at least one of the contained elements is instead accessible, the PEP includes the container
element in the document view hiding both its (encrypted) tag name and attributes. This process assumes that if
the original document had to comply with a specific template or format (e.g. an XML schema or DTD), this is
ignored in the filtered document. Figure 4.10 depicts a simplified description of the data access procedure.
4.7.4 Data Transformation
In our implementation, transformations are specified as a combination of an XQuery and a set of labelling
rules of the form (Lc, Lg, L−, Lt , input docs, XPath expression). Since XQueries can produce complex XML
data structures, simply associating a whole XQuery with a classification label, a general declassification label,
a relative declassification label and a decisional label implies that only the root element of the output can
be labelled, or that all elements are equally labelled. This is indeed a possibility, but we aim to provide a
more flexible solution that allows each element contained in the output to have a different label. To do so we
associate each transformation with a set of labelling rules whose XPath expressions identify elements in the
output document that must be labelled according to the corresponding transformation labels. Each labelling
rule also contains a set of references to input documents that are used by the transformation to create the output
identified by the XPath expression. This is done because not all data accessed by the XQuery engine to produce
the output is used for each of the output’s subelements. For example, consider a document containing only
one XML element labelled as {(p,1) (i,0)} and another document also containing only one XML element,
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<TOXIC_ANALYSIS date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{
if (every $victim in fn:doc("victims.xml")//VICTIM satisfies 
(some $symptom in $victim/CONDITIONS/SYMPTOMS/SYMPTOM satisfies 
                 $symptom/DESCRIPTION/text() = "breathing problems" 
or $symptom/DESCRIPTION/text() = "red eyes"))
     then "toxic contamination in the area!"
     else "no contamination!"
}
</TOXIC_ANALYSIS>
<RULES>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 1)" glabel="(privacy 0)">
        <XPATH>//TOXIC_ANALYSIS</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="victims" /> 
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.11: Example XQuery transformation
this time labelled as {(p,0) (i,1)}. Now consider a transformation appending one element to the other. If we
considered both input documents when calculating the labels for the two elements in the output document, we
would label both with label {(p,1) (i,1)}, which is not a desirable result. Instead, we specify this very simple
example transformation as a combination of two labelling rules. The first rule contains an XPath expression
identifying the first element of the output document and a reference to the first input document. The second rule
contains instead an XPath expression identifying the second element of the output document and a reference to
the second input document. When calculating the labels for the two elements in the output document, we can
now distinguish between the first element to which only the first input document contributed, and the second
element to which only the second input document contributed. Figure 4.11 depicts a very simple example of
a transformation that uses victims’ information to evaluate the possibility of a toxic contamination in the area
of the accident depending on whether all victims have experienced either breathing problems or red eyes. The
estimate is inserted into an XML document containing only one toxic analysis element with a date attribute.
The only labelling rule points to the root element of the output and contains a classification label and a general
declassification label so that the element is confidential (the minimum sensitivity for the confidentiality domain
is set to 1) but not private (the maximum sensitivity level for the privacy domain is set to 0). The output in
fact does not contain any private information but is considered confidential as it contains information on a toxic
threat which might cause panic if publicly available. The relative declassification label L− and decisional label
Ld are not specified and are therefore set to default values for all tags (1 and false, respectively).
The interaction of components for data transformation is shown in Figure 4.12. When a user requests to
run a transformation, first a policy evaluation is required to verify whether the user is authorised to access the
transformation’s input data and to execute the transformation itself. Input documents are decrypted (if they are
not already accessible) and a policy evaluation is triggered as for normal data accesses. If the transformation is
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Figure 4.12: Interaction of components for data transformation
authorised, the derived data controller performs it (using an XQuery engine) on the pruned input data resulting
from the access request. If the transformation fails because of the pruning, an authorisation denial notification
is returned to the user. Consider the toxic analysis transformation shown in Figure 4.11. If the user running
the transformation could not access one or more victims’ records showing intoxication symptoms, the trans-
formation might return a “no contamination” result and false information could be disseminated. Therefore,
since the transformation may succeed anyway but return an incorrect output, an alternative solution is to deny
the transformation request altogether if any of the input documents cannot be accessed completely. Again, the
choice of which behaviour to apply depends on the specific application scenario and transformation. For exam-
ple, in the crisis management scenario we consider, rescuers may favour data availability over concerns on data
correctness, or viceversa. Once the transformation has been performed, the output document is published as if
it were a completely new document.
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Algorithm 2: Label derivation procedure.
Input: A transformation act, a set of input XML documents I, a set LR of labelling rules, a set of domains
T S
Output: The transformation’s labelled XML output O
O = executeQuery(act,I);
transformLabels(O, LR);
propagateLevels(root(O),TS);
forall XML elements e ∈ O do
dl = deriveDataLabel(getTransformationLabels(e), getDataLabels(I));
setLabel(e, dl);
end
Procedure transformLabels(O, LR)
forall Labelling rule lr ∈ LR do
(Lc, Lg, L−, Lt) = lr.transformationLabels;
D = lr.inputData;
E = {Element e | e ∈ O, lr.XPath returns e};
forall elements e ∈ E do
if e is not contained in I then
Lce = L
c
eunionsqLc; element e’s temporary Lc
Lge = L
g
e unionsqLg; element e’s temporary Lg
L−e = max(L−e ,L−); element e’s temporary L−
Lte = TrueValues(L
t
e,L
t); element e’s temporary Lt
De = De∪D; element e’s temporary input data
labelDerivation(e, Lce, L
g
e , L−e , Lte, De);
end
else
copyLabelFromInput(e,I);
end
end
end
XQuery
Transformations
Transformation 
Visualiser
usage interface
input data 
resolver
transformation 
fetcher
Database
Evaluation 
authority
decryption/
data filtering/
usage authorisation
executeQuery
transformLabels
propagateLevelspublication/encryption
Labelling Rules
XPath 
CVPslabelDerivation
Figure 4.13: Data transformation procedure
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Algorithm 2 and Figure 4.13 show the transformation and label derivation procedure. First, the derived
data controller executes all the XPath expressions of the labelling rules on the output document (procedure
transformLabels). For each returned element, the procedure should calculate its derived label according to
formula 4.11. However, the same element could be returned by more then one XPath expression associated with
different labelling rules. To cater for this case, returned elements are associated with temporary transformation
labels (Lce, L
g
e , L−e , Lte) and with the set of all input documents associated with the rules that returned them (De).
This is necessary so that the final data label for each element is created considering all labelling rules whose
XPath expression returned the element. The temporary classification label Lce is obtained by calculating the
upper bound of all classification labels of the labelling rules whose XPath expressions returned the element
e. The temporary general declassification label Lge is obtained by calculating the upper bound of all general
declassification labels of the labelling rules whose XPath expressions returned the element e. The temporary
relative declassification label L−e is obtained by keeping the highest values amongst all relative declassification
labels of the labelling rules whose XPath expressions returned the element e. Finally the temporary decisional
label Lte is obtained by keeping all true values of all decisional labels of the labelling rules whose XPath
expressions returned the element e. The rationale behind the way temporary labels are calculated is that the
output’s minimum sensitivity is defined by the highest value in all classification labels, while we consider only
the least effective declassification has been performed to guarantee the highest protection possible. Once all
elements have been associated with a set of temporary transformation labels and a set of input documents, the
label derivation procedure labelDerivation performs for each element the operation described by formula 4.11,
using the temporary transformation labels and input documents in De. In particular, the procedure considers
all data labels associated with different elements of the input documents as separate inputs. In other words,
if one of the input documents contains several XML elements, all of their labels are used as if they came
from different documents. For example, a transformation performed on the XML document pictured in Figure
4.5 would consider two separated inputs, the <VICTIM> element associated with label {(confidentiality 0),
(privacy 1)} and the <CONDITIONS> element associated with label {(confidentiality 0), (privacy 2)}. Also,
if any temporary decisional label associated with a specific element e contains a true value for a tag t, the
corresponding CVPs are run. If any CVP returns the element e or any of its subelements e′, then the CVP’s
sensitivity level is associated with e or e′, respectively. If this conflicts with another applied sensitivity level, the
highest one is chosen. Instead, when the transformation simply copies a whole element from one of the inputs,
then the corresponding data label remains unchanged. This is obtained by marking every XML element with a
unique ID at publication time. Finally, labels are propagated in the output document by the propagateLevels
procedure.
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Figure 4.14: High level architecture for derived data control
4.7.5 Components
Figure 4.14 shows the updated version of our high-level architecture including the realised derived data con-
troller. It differs from existing architectures in the role of the application used to access data. User applications
usually allow users to read data and modify it. Any performed action, starting from data disclosure to data
saving, triggers a policy evaluation to obtain permissions. The policy enforcement point (PEP) receives action
requests, coordinates the policy evaluation and returns a response to the application (and possibly the decrypted
data). We instead propose a solution where user applications only provide an interface of the list of available
transformations (including the possibility to create new data and to access existing data). This list is controlled
by the enforcement layer via the PAP that stores all XQuery and XPath functions. The policy derivation point
(PDevP) is the component responsible for labelling newly created data and transformed data. We emphasise
that the integrity of transformations is fundamental to the solution we propose. Transformations that have
been tampered with, may in fact lead to incorrect data labelling and thus data leaks. We have therefore inte-
grated trusted computing platforms in our architecture to ascertain the integrity of the components managing
the transformations.
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4.8 Evaluation
The protection provided by our approach depends on the heuristic criteria represented by both content verifi-
cation procedures and labelling rules. As such, we can only evaluate the approach by using extensive and real
examples to show that it is possible to satisfy complex requirements. In particular, we consider the actual prac-
tices regulating data sharing and protection during crisis management operations carried out by public safety
organisations in the United Kingdom and studied by BAE systems plc [GBLD]. The examples proposed here
are thus meant to be realistic as they are drawn from real case studies and practices. The specific scenario we
use is the same one described in Section 1.3.
Responders to a crisis are broadly divided into two categories. Category 1 includes emergency services, local
authorities, health bodies and environment agencies, while category 2 includes utility and transport companies,
strategic health authorities and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Each agency involved maintains and
deploys three different types of command centres from and towards which data is disseminated: gold command
centres that manage the strategic policy in the long term (weeks and months), silver command centres that
manage the tactical deployment of responders at the incident site and bronze command centres that operate
within the incident site. Figure 4.15 depicts the internal role hierarchies for the police force, ambulance services
and fire brigade. Bronze command centres in particular manage all the responders that are deployed directly in
the incident area. The figure does not show gold command centres as their operational role in the short term is
limited and not interesting for our study. The role of command centres as data hubs is particularly important
since they are the nodes where data will be transformed and re-distributed. Data is disseminated as tactical
situation objects (TSO), i.e. as XML documents containing information relevant to the responders [pc, GBLD],
thus making this scenario perfect for demonstrating our approach.
4.8.1 Disseminated Data
The information that category 1 responders share can be divided into three categories: background information
(e.g. road maps, important locations, weather), coordination information (e.g. status of each service’s response,
evacuation and rendezvous details) and incident information (e.g. the type of incident, casualties, possible
threats).
Table 4.1 shows the type of sensitive information gathered and disseminated during the crisis and the re-
sponders who need to access it. Individual responders receive information from their bronze command centres
and are therefore not included in the table. Similarly, we do not include gold command centres due to their
non-operational short-term role. Non-sensitive information is also disseminated (e.g. street maps and closures,
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RESPONDERS ACCESSED INFORMATION
bronze ambulance command (BAC) Patient’s personal information and conditions,
dangerous locations,
hazardous materials involved
bronze police command (BPC)
Patients’ personal information,
dangerous locations,
type of violence on scene,
weapons involved,
witness information,
hazardous materials involved
bronze fire brigade command (BFC)
Patients’ personal information,
dangerous locations,
hazardous materials involved
silver ambulance command (SAC) Nearby hospitals and care centres
silver police command (SPC)
Chemical-related information,
resident information,
CCTV images
silver fire brigade command (SFC) Resident information,
nearby hospitals and care centres
Table 4.1: Gathered and disseminated information
weather forecasts, rendezvous details etc.) but we do not explicitly include it in the table.
Table 4.2 shows instead how command centres transform the gathered information into new data to dissemi-
nate. The bronze ambulance command centre (BAC) uses information on the conditions of victims to generate
a document containing an estimate of the risk of toxic contamination of the area. This estimate is sent to the
silver police command centre (SPC) that combines it with a document detailing the contents of the vehicles
involved in the accident (obtained from the owner organisations) and from the responders’ reports on chemical
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CREATOR INPUT OUTPUT ACCESSED BY
BAC patients’ conditions toxic contamination estimate SPC
SPC
hazardous materials involved
toxic contamination assessment
All bronze commands
chemical-related information
(short term)
toxic contamination estimate toxic contamination assessment
All silver commands
(long term)
resident information
severity and type of the incident BPCtype of violence on scene
weapons involved
toxic contamination assessment
CCTV images blurred CCTV images Media, BFC, BPC
plans for dangerous situations BPC
casualty document
official statement Media, SPC
commander’s statement
SAC
patients’ conditions
patients’ evacuation plans BACtoxic contamination assessment
nearby hospitals and care centres
patients’ conditions toll of casualties SPC
Table 4.2: Transformed and disseminated information
spillage in the area to produce an assessment of the short and long term chemical threats and risks. Warnings on
short-term threats must then be disseminated to all bronze command centres so that they can take precautions
during the rescue operations, while information on long-term threats must be kept reserved for use after the
current situation has been settled. The silver police command also uses the information on the unfolding events
and the involved people to determine the severity and type of the accident. This information is then dissemi-
nated amongst police responders to better organise their efforts. Images obtained from a CCTV system active
in the area are blurred by the police so that faces and details such as vehicles’ plates are removed and the images
can be disseminated to the media. Finally, the police disseminates the plan to be followed in case of dangerous
situations. While the creation of this document is also based on the information gathered by responders, it is
most probably the result of human editing rather than an automatic process. This is why we do not consider
any input for its creation.
The silver ambulance command centre (SAC) combines information on patients’ conditions and nearby hos-
pitals and care centres to generate an evacuation plan for the incident’s victims. It also accounts for the casualty
tolls as new information is received. The toll is then used by the police to output an official statement to be
released to the media.
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4.8.2 Sensitivity Domains
To protect the tactical situation objects containing the data described above, the three involved agencies stipulate
a DSA containing the following sensitivity domains:
• a privacy domain (P) to protect the patients’ personal and medical information;
• an imageprotection domain (IP) to protect confidential images;
• a confidentiality domain (C) to protect information that may cause panic and that must be carefully
managed by the police;
• a media domain (M) to control the release of information to the media;
• a commercial domain (CO) to protect commercially sensitive information;
• an utility domain (U) to protect information for the involved utility companies (e.g. a problem with a
railway caused by the incident).
Table 4.3 shows the compound Boolean expressions for the six defined tags from which the policy lattice
can be derived. The policies they represent are a more elaborated and sophisticated version of the policies
described in [GBLD]. For the sake of simplicity we again consider the read action as the only possible one.
Policies controlling the use of transformations simply authorise command centres that need them to create the
data of Table 4.2. Also note that in the constraint set definitions we use a dot notation only to solve ambiguities
in attributes’ names when they refer to the TSO’s metadata. The considered tags are:
• Privacy: this tag is associated with two non-default sensitivity levels: level 1 protects personal infor-
mation so that all rescuers operating in the area or in a hospital can access it, while level 2 protects
information on medical conditions so that only the ambulance services or responders with a first-aid
qualification can access it.
• Confidentiality: this tag is associated with three non-default sensitivity levels: level 1 protects informa-
tion about the immediate dangers in the area (e.g. the dangerous locations) so that access can be granted
to all rescuers acting in the specific emergency situation. Level 2 protects more sensitive information such
as information about witnesses in the emergency area or plans for dangerous situations, so that access can
be granted only to responders directly authorised by the bronze police command centre, to higher-ranked
police officers and to fire brigade commanders. Level 3 protects high-confidentiality information that is
not immediately useful for responders but needs first to be evaluated at a silver command centre or by
police inspectors.
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• Imageprotection: this tag is associated with three non-default sensitivity levels: level 1 protects images
where gruesome details are still visible so that only rescuers can access them (fire fighters and ambulance
services are also required to be operating in the area). Level 2 protects images that show individuals’
faces so that only police responders can access them. The location of the recipient is not important
for policemen since, for example, any police officer might recognise individuals in the video with a
criminal record. Finally, level 3 protects images that have not been sanitised yet (and thus all gathered
images), since besides faces they might show sensitive details (such as the names of the possibly military
companies whose trucks have been involved in the accident) that should be removed before releasing the
images even to low-ranked police officers.
• Media: this tag is associated with only one non-default sensitivity level that protects the official police
statements that cannot be released to the public yet. This is done because the statement is publicly
released only when certain conditions are met and should be kept confidential while it is being updated.
• Commercial: this tag is associated with only one non-default sensitivity level that protects information
coming from companies involved in the accident. The companies owning the involved vehicles might for
example release information on the chemicals contained in the lorries. This information can be accessed
only by the company itself and the silver police command centre (that receives it from the company and
publishes it).
• Utility: this tag is associated with only one sensitivity level that protects information of interest for the
involved utility companies. In our example we consider British Gas as the only company involved.
In the specific scenario we are considering no obligations are specified for responders accessing protected
information. The chains of sensitivity levels for the specified tags are thus the following:
P : ({false},{(true)}, true)→ (Dp,1,Ap,1,NamesOrAddresses())→ (Dp,2,Ap,2,MedInfo())
C : ({false},{(true)}, true)→ (Dc,1,Ac,1,ConfCheck1())→ (Dc,2,Ac,2,ConfCheck2())→ (Dc,3,Ac,3,Req(3,C))
IP : ({false},{(true)}, false)→ (Dip,1,Aip,1, false)→ (Dip,2,Aip,2, false)→ (Dip,3,Ac,3, isImage())
M : ({false},{(true)}, true)→ (Dm,1,Am,1,VictimsCount())
CO : ({false},{(true)}, true)→ (Dco,1,Aco,1,Req(1,CO))
U : ({false},{(true)}, true)→ (Du,1,Au,1,Req(1,U))
where the NamesOrAddresses() and MedIn f o() CVPs have already been described in Section 4.7.2, and
Figure 4.16 depicts the others. In particular, the Con fCheck1() CVP checks whether the reports created by
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Sensitivity Levels
0 1 2 3
P
Dp,i f alse
zone 6= hospital ∧
- -
zone 6= T SO.emrArea
Ap,i true
role≥ BACVolunteer ∨
role≥ BACVolunteer ∨
-role≥ BPCConstable ∨
first−aid = true
role≥ BFCFire f ighter
C
Dc,i f alse mission 6= T SO.emrCode - -
Ac,i true
role≥ BACVolunteer ∨ role≥ BPCSergeant ∨
role≥ BPCInspectorrole≥ BPCConstable ∨ BPCAuthDocs = T SO.type ∨
role≥ BFCFire f ighter role≥ BFCFireCommander
IP
Dip,i f alse
zone 6= T SO.emrArea ∧
- -(role≥ BACVolunteer ∨
role≥ BFCFire f ighter)
Aip,i true
role≥ BACVolunteer ∨
role≥ BPCConstable role≥ SPCO f f icerrole≥ BPCConstable ∨
role≥ BFCFire f ighter
M Dm,i f alse - - -
Am,i true role≥ SPCO f f icer - -
CO
Dco,i f alse - - -
Aco,i true
id = T SO.owner ∨
- -
role≥ SPCO f f icer
U
Du,i f alse - - -
Au,i true
role≥ SPCO f f icer ∨
- -
id = BritishGas
Table 4.3: Compound Boolean expressions for the crisis management scenario
responders contain information on the dangerous locations of the area and hazardous materials involved in the
emergency. The Con fCheck2() CVP is instead used to protect information regarding possible witnesses of the
incident and the plans for dangerous situations. The isImage CVP verifies whether the document contains any
image, while the VictimsCount CVP verifies if the number of victims in the official police statement is greater
than one, in which case the statement must not be released before further approval. Finally, the Req CVPs
are used to ask the data originator whether she wants to protect the data with a specific value for a specific
tag (passed as parameters). CVPs have not been specified for all levels of all tags. When missing, they are
considered to be XPath expression not returning any element.
Note that the defined CVPs assume that responders only edit document templates, filling them with the
information they gather while moving in the incident area. This makes it possible for the XPath expressions to
search the documents properly and find the relevant information.
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<CVP id="ConfCheck1">
    <LABEL label="confidentiality,1"/>
    <XPATH>//report/dangerouslocations | //report/materials</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="ConfCheck2">
    <LABEL label="confidentiality,2"/>
    <XPATH>//report/plans | //witnesses</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="Req(3,C)">
    <LABEL label="confidentiality,3"/>
    <XPATH>/child::*[custom:Req("3","C")]</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="isImage">
    <LABEL label="imageprotection,3"/>
    <XPATH>//child::*[custom:isImage(/child::*)]</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="VictimsCount">
    <LABEL label="media,1"/>
    <XPATH>//statement[VICTIMS_COUNT > 0]</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="Req(1,CO)">
    <LABEL label="commercial,1"/>
    <XPATH>/child::*[custom:Req("1","CO")]</XPATH>
</CVP>
<CVP id="Req(1,U)">
    <LABEL label="utility,1"/>
    <XPATH>/child::*[custom:Req("1","U")]</XPATH>
</CVP>
Figure 4.16: Example Content Verification Procedures
4.8.3 Data Transformations
The so-defined chains of sensitivity levels satisfy the access and protection requirements for gathered data
specified in Table 4.1. Once protected data has reached the bronze and silver ambulance command centres
and the silver police command centre, it is used as input for several data transformations whose output must
also be protected. Let us consider the transformations described in Table 4.2. The transformation run by the
bronze ambulance command centre that generates an estimate of toxic contamination of victims is equivalent
to the toxic analysis transformation depicted in Figure 4.11 and described in Section 4.7.4. We have redefined
it in Figure 4.17 so that its output is protected for the highest-ranked police responders, thus including the
SPC. We have therefore labelled the transformation with only one labelling rule targeting the root of the output
document with a classification label Lc = {(C,3)} and a general declassification label Lg = {(P,0)}. The
output document may indeed include further details on the contamination, depending on the kind of controls
responders can perform on victims.
The toxic contamination estimate is used by the silver police command together with the reports from the re-
sponders on the hazardous materials present in the incident area and the information on the chemicals contained
in the involved lorries (that it can access) to run the toxic contamination assessment transformation depicted
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<TOXIC_ESTIMATE date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{
if (every $TOXIC_ESTIMATE in fn:doc("victims.xml")//VICTIM satisfies 
(
                       some $symptom in $victim/CONDITIONS/SYMPTOMS/SYMPTOM satisfies 
                       (
                             $symptom/DESCRIPTION/text() = "breathing problems" 
            or $symptom/DESCRIPTION/text() = "red eyes"
                       )
                  ))
 then "positive toxic contamination"
 else "negative toxic contamination!"
}
</TOXIC_ESTIMATE>
<RULES>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 3)" glabel="(privacy 0)">
        <XPATH>//TOXIC_ESTIMATE</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="victims" /> 
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.17: Toxic contamination estimate transformation
<TOXIC_ASSESSMENT date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{
<SHORT>custom:assessment(true,fn:doc("TOXIC_ESTIMATE.xml"),fn:doc("chemicals.xml"),fn:doc("reports.xml"))</SHORT>
        <LONG>custom:assessment(false,fn:doc("TOXIC_ESTIMATE.xml"),fn:doc("chemicals.xml"),fn:doc("reports.xml"))</LONG>
         }
</TOXIC_ASSESSMENT>
<RULES>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 1)" glabel="(privacy 0, commercial 0)">
        <XPATH>//TOXIC_ASSESSMENT/SHORT</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="TOXIC_ESTIMATE" /> 
        <INPUTDATA file="CHEMICALS" />
        <INPUTDATA file="REPORTS" />  
    </RULE>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 3)" glabel="(privacy 0, commercial 0)">
        <XPATH>//TOXIC_ASSESSMENT/LONG</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="TOXIC_ESTIMATE" /> 
        <INPUTDATA file="chemicals" />
        <INPUTDATA file="reports" />  
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.18: Toxic contamination assessment transformation
in Figure 4.18. We do not delve into the details of how such an assessment can be created and simply use
a Java function to obtain a short-term and a long-term assessment. The two corresponding sub-elements are
assigned confidentiality level 1 and 3, respectively, while all private information (that could be contained in the
responders’ reports) and commercial information is removed. We have thus labelled the transformation with
two labelling rules targeting the <SHORT> and <LONG> sub-elements of the output with a classification
label Lc = {(C,1)} and Lc = {(C,3)}, respectively. Both rules also include a general declassification label
Lg = {(P,0)(CO,0)} which means the output document does not contain any private or commercially sensitive
information.
The silver police command centre also uses the information contained in the responders’ reports, the in-
formation on the residents of the incident area and the toxic contamination assessment to generate a general
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 <EMERGENCY date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{
                 if (some $description in fn:doc("reports.xml")/report/dangerouslocations satisfies 
(
                       $description/violence/weapons/@weaponsinvolved = "true"
                 ) or some $resident in fn:doc("residents.xml")/residents satisfies
                 ( 
                       $resident/@dangeroussubject = "true"
                 )
then return {
                       <DANGER type="violence">dangerous subjects in the area</DANGER
                       <PROCEDURE> look for weapons </PROCEDURE>
                 }
                 if (fn:doc("TOXIC_ASSESSMENT.xml")/SHORT/@toxicitylevel > 3)                    
                 then return {
                       <DANGER type = "toxicity">potential toxic threat</DANGER>
                       <PROCEDURE> wear protective masks </PROCEDURE>
                 }
}
</EMERGENCY>
<RULES>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 1)" glabel="(confidentiality 1, privacy 0)">
        <XPATH>//EMERGENCY</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="reports" /> 
        <INPUTDATA file="TOXIC_ASSESSMENT" /> 
        <INPUTDATA file="residents" /> 
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.19: Emergency document transformation
document containing the type and severity (or threat level) of the incident. A simple version of the transfor-
mation is shown in Figure 4.19. The transformation contains warnings about the possible dangers that could
be present in the incident area, including suggestions of how to act for example if any resident is considered
dangerous or if weapons have been used, or if there is a contamination with a release of toxic chemicals thought
to be above a certain threshold. The transformation removes all private content that might be contained in the
document containing information about the residents of the area. Confidentiality must also be lowered with
respect to the confidentiality level of the toxic assessment document because all rescuers in the area should be
aware of the current risk, but must also be kept to a minimum level so that only rescuers can access it. We have
thus labelled the transformation with only one labelling rule targeting the root of the output document with a
classification label Lc = {(C,1)} and a general declassification label Lg = {(C,1)(P,0)}. Note that the trans-
formation can be arbitrarily more complex and return a document with different sensitivity levels for different
sub-elements, so that only specific responders can access them.
According to the content verification procedures associated with the imageprotection tag, all images are ini-
tially labelled with an imageprotection sensitivity level equal to 3. The image blurring transformation (Figure
4.20) used by the media notification service invokes a Java function to decrease image resolution. Several
runs of the transformation progressively reduce the amount of sensitive information contained in the images,
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<IMAGES>
{for $image in fn:doc("images.xml")/IMAGES/IMAGE
          return
  <IMAGE>custom:ResolutionDecrease($image)</IMAGE>}
</IMAGES>
<RULES>
       <RULE rlabel="(imageprotection 0.5)">
                 <THRESHOLD>0.5</THRESHOLD>
<XPATH>/IMAGES</XPATH>
<INPUTDATA file="images"/>
       </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.20: Images blurring transformation.
<VICTIMS_COUNT date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{
                 fn:count(fn:doc("victims.xml")//VICTIM[@status="deceased"])
         }
</VICTIMS_COUNT>
<RULES>
    <RULE clabel="(confidentiality 3)" glabel="(privacy 0)">
        <XPATH>/VICTIMS_COUNT</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="victims"/>
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.21: Victims count transformation
up to the point that the document can be publicly disseminated. The blurring transformation is therefore as-
sociated with a labelling rule targeting the root of the output document with a relative declassification label
L− = {(IP,0.5)} with threshold parameter 0.5 that ensures that every time an image is blurred, its imageprotec-
tion level decreases. Officers of the silver police command, who are the only entities who can access the data,
decide how many times the transformation must be run, depending on what information the images contain and
on whom they think should receive them. After the first iteration of the transformation, that removes details
such as small logos and writings, the document containing the images will thus be labelled with an imagepro-
tection level equal to 2, so that only police officers will be able to access it. After the second iteration, that
completely deletes faces, the document will be labelled with an imageprotection level equal to 1 so that all res-
cuers will be able to access it. The third iteration will remove instead all details from the scene (e.g. gruesome
scenes and plate numbers) and make the document public.
The silver ambulance command centre uses the information on victims’ conditions to calculate the number of
casualties caused by the incident. On the one hand private content is deleted, while on the other hand the output
document’s sensitivity is increased for the confidentiality tag so that only the silver police command centre
can access the information about the number of casualties until its public release. The count transformation
(Figure 4.21) is therefore associated with a labelling rule targeting the output document’s root with a general
declassification label Lg = {(P,0)} that caters for the removal of private content and a classification label
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<statement date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{</VICTIMS_COUNT count= "{data(fn:doc(VICTIMS_COUNT.xml))}">
          <TEXT>fn:doc("statement.xml")//TEXT</TEXT>}
</statement>
<RULES>
    <RULE glabel="(confidentiality 0)" dlabel="(media true)">
        <XPATH>/statement</XPATH> 
        <INPUTDATA file="VICTIMS_COUNT"/> 
        <INPUTDATA file="statement"/> 
     </RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.22: Statement update transformation
<ASSIGNMENTS date="{fn:current-dateTime()}">
{for $v in fn:doc("victims.xml")/VICTIMS/VICTIM
          return 
          <ASSIGNMENT> {$v,
              for $h in fn:doc("hospitals.xml")/HOSPITALS/HOSPITAL
              where every $d in $v/CONDITIONS/SYMPTOMS/SYMPTOM/
                      SUGGESTEDTHERAPY satisfies 
                      (some $s in $h/STRUCTURE/DEPARTMENT satisfies 
                      ($s/@name = $d/@department and $s/@freebeds>0))
              return <HOSPITAL name="{$h/@name}"/>}
 </ASSIGNMENT>}
</ASSIGNMENTS>
<RULES>
<RULE flabel="(confidentiality 1)" glabel="(privacy 0)">
<XPATH>/ASSIGNMENTS/ASSIGNMENT</XPATH>
<INPUTDATA file="victims" />
<INPUTDATA file="hospitals" />
</RULE>
</RULES>
Figure 4.23: Hospital assignment transformation.
Lc = {(C,3)}.
The transformation to update media statements (Figure 4.22) used by the silver police command centre takes
as input the victims count document and inserts it into an official statement for the media. The document is
considered sensitive only if the number of casualties is greater then zero, which can be checked using one of the
defined CVPs. The transformation is therefore associated with a labelling rule targeting the root of the output
document with a general declassification label Lg = {(C,0)} that caters for the removal of the confidentiality
protecting the statement and a decisional label Lt = {(M, true)} that ensures the number of casualties is checked
before deciding the data’s label.
Finally, the transformation to assign victims to hospitals (Figure 4.23) used by the silver ambulance command
centre generates a document associating victims with hospitals that have free beds in departments suitable to
treat their wounds. Victims’ information is copied unchanged into the new document and will therefore keep
its original labels. The general declassification label for privacy is used to represent the absence of private
information in the <HOSPITAL> sub-elements of the assignments, while the transformation is also associated
with a classification label Lc = {(C,1)} that ensures the output document’s <ASSIGNMENT> elements are
protected so that only rescuers can access them. Figure 4.24 shows a fragment of the output document where
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<ASSIGNMENTS>
    <ASSIGNMENT label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 0)">      
         <VICTIM status="alive" label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 1)">
    <NAME label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 1)">Jane</NAME>
              ....
              <CONDITIONS label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 2)">
         <SYMPTOMS label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 2)">
....
         </VICTIM>
         <HOSPITAL name = "Sacred Heart" label="(confidentiality 1),(privacy 0)">
    </ASSIGNMENT> ....
Figure 4.24: The hospital assignment document
the confidentiality level of the <ASSIGNMENT> element has been propagated down the tree to <VICTIM>
and <HOSPITAL> elements.
4.8.4 A Comparison with Related Work
Existing ERM systems either ignore the problem of derived data or offer only partial solutions. Most often
users need to republish manually the data with new policies of their choice. Atluri and Gal [AG02] provide a
definition for derived authorisations as authorisations for data derived through a reversible transformation on
some original information. They also propose a criterion (but not an actual mechanism) to verify whether a set
of derived authorisations is safe with respect to the authorisations applied to the original data, i.e. when a user
is not authorised to access the original data and cannot derive it back by applying a reversed transformation
on the derived data that she can access. However, the authors only propose a simplistic derivation method for
authorisations based on the union of the sets of all original authorisations. In [ZJMW05], the authors classify
functions to create new data objects on the basis of whether the output might be used to disclose information
on the input objects. Depending on whether the function is a disclosure function or a non-disclosure function,
the derived policy (i.e. the set of authorised access requests) is defined either as the intersection or union of
the input objects’ policies, respectively. The system is the first to directly consider and classify transformations
on the basis of how the outputs’ and inputs’ sensitivities are related. However, the solution completely entrusts
policy writers or system administrators with the responsibility to specify correct additional policies for each
transformation, which corresponds to directly specifying policies for the transformation’s output.
In information flow systems, non-secure information flows are prevented by forbidding processes from re-
ceiving data whose label is not dominated by their clearance label. However, in data dissemination scenarios no
check over the recipient clearance or rights can be performed before the dissemination as recipients are often
not known in advance. Moreover, data senders other than the data originator may have little interest in checking
the recipient’s clearance before sending the data. Controls need not be introduced at programming language
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level either by associating labels with variables and I/O channels, as in the Decentralized Label Model [ML00].
Instead data can be freely disseminated through any available channel since it is previously protected by en-
cryption. An ERM system then guarantees that only authorised recipients will be able to decrypt the data. Our
solution is based on the observation that as security labels float from data to processes and from one process
to the other, confidential content flows from data to its derivations through the transformations performed. Our
solution also allows data declassification. However, while in existing works declassification is performed di-
rectly by data owners [ML00, SS05] or at programming language level [LM09], we let declassification depend
on the transformations applied to the data. Similarly, we let the amount of sensitive information that flows de-
pend on the transformation used. Finally, while MLS and information flow systems rely on discrete sensitivity
levels and the simple security property to control data access, our solution allows the use of expressive policy
languages so that we can cater for usage controls that other systems cannot handle.
4.9 Implementation Aspects
All the components in the architecture have been implemented in Java, excluding the daemon interfacing with
the trusted computing chip that was implemented in C. The policy language and policy decision point com-
ponent we used were created in the context of the Consequence project [Con]. The derived data controller
component integrated into our proposed architecture uses the standard Java DOM libraries to evaluate XPath
expressions. The API allows the specification of custom XPath function resolvers that can be used to call Java
functions contained in external libraries. We instead used the Saxon XQuery API to evaluate XQueries. The
API allows the specification of different URI resolvers for the query processing so that the in-memory de-
crypted and pruned XML documents can be passed to the XQuery engine. Encryption has been realised using
the standard Java crypto libraries. Communications between the client components and external services such
as DSA repositories and certification authorities have been realised with standard TCP/IP connections. The
implementation caters natively for cross-organisational boundaries, as the presence of a data sharing agreement
guarantees all organisations follow the same policies and decryption keys are attached, together with policies,
to the disseminated data.
4.10 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we presented the first major contribution of this thesis, i.e. our approach to the problem of derived
data protection. We first showed how lattices of policy sets can be built by defining different security domains
and specifying for each of them a chain of sensitivity levels associated with policies. We also introduced
141
content verification procedures as the main means to classify newly created data into a defined policy lattice,
and transformations as the only way recipients have in order to modify protected data. Our solution offers a
mechanism to control data that is derived through predefined transformations and whose content can only vary
according to a predefined scheme. In this sense, the solution limits the number of ways data can be used as
it can only be transformed with strictly controlled predefined transformations. Note that “strictly controlled
transformations” does not mean simplistic, naive or limited transformations. It rather means that possibly
complex transformations are decided at organisational level. The set of defined transformations might thus be
large enough to satisfy all possible users’ requirements, depending on the application scenario. Moreover, the
set of transformations applicable to a problem domain can be defined ahead of time at organisational level, thus
liberating users from the burden of specifying exactly how their actions relate to the security policies.
The implementation of the proposed solution and its integration with the general architecture described in
Chapter 3 enables usage control on derived XML documents. The realised mechanism uses the XPath and
XQuery languages as means to analyse and modify XML documents, while the derived data controller verifies
that data is properly labelled and classified into a policy lattice for the whole duration of its lifetime. Both data
confidentiality and integrity can be achieved. The first with selective data encryption, the second by specifying
authorisations to run transformations. We emphasise that this implementation is by no means the only possible
one, and different mechanisms could be used to specify CVPs and transformations, to resolve policy conflicts
and to propagate sensitivity levels and policy decisions in the XML tree. Similarly, different policy languages
could be used to build policy lattices, as long as policies can be ordered according to their PSL.
Finally, we evaluated our approach by applying it to an extensive example scenario that was inspired by
real data protection practices followed by emergency-relief organisations in the UK. Our qualitative analysis
showed that the approach taken is flexible enough to satisfy a large variety of different requirements, and
if necessary, also to replicate traditional policy specification. If existing ERM systems had been applied to
the scenario provided, one of two outcomes would be possible: 1) no protection would have been applied to
sensitive derived documents that are supposed to be accessed only by rescuers or 2) rescuers would be entrusted
to directly specify protection requirements for all newly created and gathered data, operation that is not only
prone to human errors but would also slow down the rescue operations.
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5 Policy-based Authority Evaluation Scheme (PAES)
5.1 Chapter Overview
We have so far described a data protection architecture integrated with trusted computing technologies that
allows data to be derived from existing information and protected accordingly. Protection is realised by means
of policies associated with the data that specifies what credentials users must present and what conditions
these must satisfy for the access to be granted. However, the described solution still presents two of the main
shortcomings that are also present in most data protection systems. First, users must trust remote and unknown
policy evaluation authorities with their possibly private credentials. In existing ERM systems, all users trust
the same centralised authority provided by their organisation. Second, policy evaluation requires users to be
connected to a network to contact remote services and access to data is prevented whenever no connectivity
is available. In this chapter we present our solution to the aforementioned problems called the Policy-based
Authority Evaluation Scheme (PAES).
As we described in previous chapters, the term “policy evaluation” indicates the process through which an
entity verifies whether a set of credentials and context tokens satisfies a set of policy constraints. In Chapters
3 and 4 policy evaluation has been used to determine whether data recipients had the right to use received
data in specific ways. However, rights to use and access data are not the only type of rights that can be
determined with a policy evaluation. For example, the possibility to evaluate policies is a right on its own.
PAES is a policy evaluation scheme whose design is motivated by the idea that authority to evaluate policies
can be granted by other policies associated with them in the same manner as access to data is granted by policies
associated with the data. Therefore, in addition to specifying the criteria recipients must meet to access the data,
PAES also permits data originators to specify the criteria that authorities must meet to be trusted to evaluate
policies. The set of trusted authorities is therefore a dynamic set defined by characterisation (i.e. by the set
of constraints defined by a policy) and this confers increased flexibility in finding authorities mutually trusted
by both data originators and recipients. This permits the devolution of authority to evaluate policies from a
central TA to other parties in a controlled manner. This use of the scheme represents the second contribution
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of this thesis. Besides its use in connected environments where recipients can choose a suitable and trusted
evaluation authority amongst those that satisfy the criteria defined by data originators, the scheme can also be
adapted and used in partially disconnected environments. Consider the crisis management scenario described
by BAE systems plc [GBLD] as an example of realistic rescue and data exchange practices for public safety
organisations in the United Kingdom and presented in Section 1.3. As the context of the crisis evolves, entities
moving in the area of the accident can gain new rights such as the right to evaluate policies for other entities,
i.e. the right to become trusted policy evaluation authorities. As rescuers meet and communicate by means of
ad hoc connections, they can exchange decryption keys, evaluate each other with respect to specific policies
and grant authorisations, in particular the right to act as policy evaluation authorities or to access data. This use
of the scheme represents the third contribution of this thesis.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 gives a general overview of our approach
while Section 5.3 describes how the data protection architecture described so far can be integrated with PAES.
In particular, Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 describe the protocol and the data protection mechanism we implemented
for connected and disconnected environments, respectively; finally, Section 5.4 describes the mobility model
we consider for rescuers in the emergency area and the results of the simulations showing the validity of our
approach.
5.2 The Policy-based Authority Evaluation Scheme
We have previously defined a usage control policy Pact as the set of requirements recipients must satisfy to
perform a given action act on some data and RPactY as the set of requests satisfying it. In the data protection
architecture described so far, policies are evaluated by evaluation authorities that are trusted by data originators.
Rather than specifying a static set of evaluation authorities at publication time, we propose a solution where any
entity that satisfies some originator’s requirements can act as a policy evaluation authority. Such requirements
can again be specified as policies that must be evaluated by other authorities, iteratively. We define an authority
policy as:
Definition 5.1 An authority policy Pevaluate is a policy describing the requirements that must be satisfied for an
entity to be authorised to evaluate other policies.
In other words, while an evaluation authority can be explicitly chosen if the policy writer directly knows
and trusts it, it can also be defined by characterisation if the policy writer only knows which characteristics
an entity must present to be trusted. Let us define GP as the group of entities issuing requests in RPY , i.e.
the group of entities that satisfy policy P. For an entity to be part of GP, an evaluation authority trusted by
144
the data originator must vouch that the conditions specified in P are satisfied. The core idea of PAES lies in
the distinction between directly trusted evaluation authorities (i.e. authorities whose identity is well known
by the policy writer) and authorities defined by characterisation, i.e. defined by a policy that must in turn be
evaluated by other authorities. Traditional ERM systems only use evaluation authorities directly trusted by the
data originator, i.e. data recipients are forced to request access to a statically defined set of authorities (usually
one). In the following we use DEAP and EAP to designate the set of directly trusted evaluation authorities and
the whole set of evaluation authorities for policy P (therefore, DEAP ⊆ EAP) .
Each policy is connected with the authority policies specifying which conditions must be met to evaluate it.
Therefore, the set of all policies and their connections form a policy graph (not to be confused with a policy
lattice), which we define more formally below. For example, the sequence of policies:
usage control policy P0← authority policy P1← authority policy P2← directly trusted authority
indicates that users who want to access data protected by policy P0 must request a policy evaluation for P0 to an
entity that satisfies policy P1, as evaluated by an entity that satisfies policy P2 as evaluated by a directly trusted
authority. In other words, it represents an authority delegation chain.
Policy writers can specify policy graphs by adding authority policies besides traditional usage control poli-
cies, using the same policy language or model. In the following, we will use the terms in(n) to refer to the sets
of nodes (i.e. policies) in a policy graph with an outgoing arc towards node n and out(n) to refer to those with
an incoming node from node n:
Definition 5.2 A policy graph is a directed acyclic graph where:
• each node ni for which out(ni) 6= /0 (i.e. a non-leaf node) is a tuple (Pevaluate,i,DEAi) where Pevaluate,i is
an authority policy specifying conditions to evaluate the (possibly authority) policies Pj contained in all
nodes n j ∈ out(ni) and DEAi is the set of authorities directly trusted to evaluate Pevaluate,i;
• each node ni for which in(ni) = /0 (i.e. a root node) is a tuple (Pi,DEAi) where DEAi 6= /0 (i.e. root nodes
always have at least one directly trusted evaluation authority);
• each node n j for which out(n j) = /0 (i.e. a leaf node) is a tuple (Pj,DEA j) where Pj is a usage control
policy (i.e. leaf nodes always contain a usage control policy).
In other words, nodes with no incoming edges represent policies that must be evaluated by directly trusted
authorities (i.e. EApi = DEAi) and are the root of trust of the rest of the graph. Nodes with no outgoing edges
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Figure 5.1: Example policy graph
are instead usage control policies. Intermediate nodes represent instead the policies controlling the devolution
of authority.
Nodes in a policy graph can be classified as either loose-evaluation nodes or strict-evaluation nodes depend-
ing upon whether the entities authorised to evaluate their policies must satisfy one or more policies. More
formally:
Definition 5.3 Let ni = (Pi,DEAi) be a strict-evaluation node in a policy graph and ea be an entity acting in
the system where the policy graph is defined. Then ea ∈ EAPi ⇐⇒ ea ∈ DEAi∨∀n j ∈ in(ni) : ea ∈ GPj .
Definition 5.4 Let ni = (Pi,DEAi) be a loose-evaluation node in a policy graph and ea be an entity acting in
the system where the policy graph is defined. Then ea ∈ EAPi ⇐⇒ ea ∈ DEAi∨∃n j ∈ in(ni) : ea ∈ GPj .
In other words, an entity e is considered an evaluation authority for a policy contained in a strict-evaluation
node ni = (Pi,DEAi) (i.e. e∈ EAPi), if either (a) it satisfies all the policies contained in nodes n j = (Pj,DEA j)∈
in(ni) as evaluated by evaluation authorities ea ∈ EAPj (possibly satisfying different requirements) or (b) the
policy writer entitled it, so e ∈ DEAi. Similarly, an entity e is considered an evaluation authority for a policy
contained in a loose-evaluation node ni = (Pi,DEAi) if either (a) it satisfies any of the policies contained in
nodes n j = (Pj,DEA j) ∈ in(ni) as evaluated by evaluation authorities ea ∈ EAPj (possibly satisfying different
requirements) or (b) the policy writer entitled it, so e∈DEAi. Figure 5.1 depicts an example policy graph where
a usage control policy P0 can be evaluated by either an entity satisfying authority policy P1 or an entity satisfying
authority policy P2. Authority policy P1 can be evaluated by an entity satisfying authority policy P3. Authority
policy P3 can be evaluated by an entity satisfying authority policy P6, that in turn can only be evaluated by
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a directly trusted authority named entity1. Authority policy P2 can be evaluated by an entity satisfying both
authority policy P4 and P5. Authority policy P5 can be evaluated by an entity satisfying authority policy P7 that
in turn can only be evaluated by a directly trusted authority named entity2. More realistic examples will be
shown later.
When applying policy graphs to existing data protection systems, the set of authorities is no longer static
but automatically changes when entities no longer satisfy the specified requirements or when new ones that do
appear. Recipients (or evaluation authorities) that must be evaluated under a policy can choose their trusted
evaluator among those satisfying the corresponding authority policy and those being explicitly listed by the
policy writer. They can for example choose the authority they trust the most with their confidential credentials.
Moreover, evaluation chains can be built over different paths (i.e. with different authorities). If an authority
goes offline or cannot be reached it can be easily replaced by another one satisfying the same requirements.
This aspect forms the basis of our solution for data protection in partially disconnected networks.
PAES was directly inspired by trust management systems such as those described in Section 2.4.3. However,
when used in the context of data protection systems, these systems have a number of shortcomings. First,
their evaluation model relies on a central evaluator to which all the credentials must be presented. Second, the
policies used after the first level in the chain are often not decided by the data originator who thus loses control
over the delegation sequence. In contrast, PAES entities are only delegated the right to evaluate pre-defined
policies and authority over a policy evaluation cannot be further delegated. Also, credentials are only sent
from an evaluated entity to its trusted evaluator. Finally, traditional policy evaluation mechanisms can be easily
represented by a PAES policy graph where usage control policies can only be evaluated by directly trusted
authorities.
5.3 Architecture
In the following we show how the PAES model described in the previous section can be integrated in the
high-level architecture we described in Chapter 3 and 4 for data protection in both connected and partially dis-
connected environments. We emphasise that the description of the communication manager and disconnected
operations manager components we propose abstracts from the specific low-level communication protocols
and technologies that can be used in partially disconnected environments. Also note that integration of PAES
with the previously described derived data system requires that we modify the data publication and policy
evaluation phases described in Chapter 4. To do so, we consider policy graphs whose leaf nodes contain the
specification of the set of policies corresponding to specific (tag, level) pairs in a policy lattice. In other words,
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the PAES policy graph is used to determine which entities are authorised to evaluate the policies specified in a
policy lattice for derived data protection. However, note that PAES and our derived data protection solution are
independent of each other and can be used separately.
5.3.1 Data Sharing Agreement
When specifying and signing a DSA, organisations can include information about what evaluation authorities
are trusted according to a PAES policy graph. As defined in Chapter 3, a DSA is a 7-tuple (id,S,A,EA,CA,UP,V )
where EA represents the set of trusted evaluation authorities. In Chapter 4 we assumed that this field contained
the description of a static set of directly trusted authorities that could be chosen when publishing data. We can
now instead consider EA to contain the specification of a PAES policy graph. The actual language used in the
specification is not important, as long as it allows policies to be linked to each other. We can however use the
policy notation described previously, so that an authority policy can be specified as:
PIDevaluate(r) =

if r.act 6= evaluate < NA, /0 >
else if r |= (targetPolicy = id1∨ . . .∨ targetPolicy = idn)∧ (deny conditions..) < N, /0 >
else if r |= (targetPolicy = id1∨ . . .∨ targetPolicy = idn)∧ (allow conditions..) < Y, /0 >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
where, differently from the policies described in Chapter 4, each policy is associated with a unique ID used
to refer to it as the target of another authority policy. For the sake of simplicity, we will not include obliga-
tions for authority policies. The authority policy specifying who can evaluate a set of usage control policies
corresponding to a specific (tag,level) pair in a policy lattice can be specified as:
PIDevaluate(r) =

if r.act 6= evaluate < NA, /0 >
else if r |= tag = t ∧ level = l∧ (deny conditions..) < N, /0 >
else if r |= tag = t ∧ level = l∧ (allow conditions..) < Y, /0 >
otherwise < NA, /0 >
where “tag” and “level” are keywords for the tags and levels in a policy lattice. For the sake of clarity, we
remind that a (tag, level) pair is associated with a set of policies with at most one policy for each action. In the
example of Figure 4.3, the (privacy,1) pair is associated with the policies Pp,1write and P
p,1
read . In other words, the
(tag, level) pair is used as an ID for policy sets contained in a policy lattice. A disjunction of such conditions
can be used to specify more than one policy set in the same authority policy. In other words, the devolution of
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authority described by a policy graph is applied per (tag, level) pair. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume
all (tag, level) pairs to be contained into only one node in the graph, so that evaluation of the corresponding
policies is controlled by only one authority policy. Directly trusted evaluation authorities can be specified with
equality conditions on their identity in the authority policy specification. In the following, given a leaf node ni
in a policy graph, we will refer to Pi as the set of (tag, level) pairs associated it and from which policies can be
reconstructed.
The specification of several authority policies like the two shown above actually corresponds to the specifi-
cation of a PAES policy graph. Generally, the creation of a DSA is no easy task, especially when organisations
with different requirements decide to share data and when people’s lives may depend on the agreed policies.
Creating both a policy graph and a policy lattice is complex as it may prove difficult to foresee all the situa-
tions where the data access may be required and the manner policies combine and propagate once several data
objects have been merged and transformed. This is why a policy analysis tool that could determine whether
the specified policies satisfy specific criteria would be an important tool for the organisations writing the DSA.
Significant work has been done on policy analysis including within our own group [CLM+09]. However, the
integration of such techniques with a data dissemination framework remains for future work.
5.3.2 Connected Environments
Data Publication in Connected Environments
Whenever connectivity is available, the data publication phase follows the same steps described in Section
4.7.2. However, the licence is generated differently, as described in the following.
Consider a scenario where a fictional Medical Research Centre (MRC) receives data about patients from the
Sacred Heart Hospital (SHH) to run studies on some medical products its employees are currently working on.
Figure 5.2 shows a possible SHH corporate policy graph governing access to patient records. SHH lets each
patient verify the policy lattice (whose details are not shown) and choose a set of entities she trusts to evaluate
all the corresponding policies. The patient considered in the example chooses Bob, one of her closest friends,
to determine whether recipients satisfy the policies in the lattice. If Bob is a journalist or competitor most
researchers would not want him to know what they are working on and will not send their credentials to him.
However, the policy graph also allows researchers to be evaluated by any research facility working on stem
cells research ranked by USNews as one of the best hospitals. Evaluation of whether a research facility satisfies
this policy is left to SHH. SHH and the research facility may however be competitors, and the facility may not
trust SHH to know what kind of research projects it is carrying out. Therefore the policy also allows research
facilities to be evaluated by any publicly recognised organisation giving grants for medical research. Whether
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P0, {Bob}
P0: all (tag, level) pairs in the policy lattice 
P1, {SHH}
GP1
P2, {SHH}
GP2
P1: Any research facility working on stem cells ranked by 
USNews is allowed to evaluate P0
P2: Any organisation granting funds for medical research 
is allowed to evaluate P0
GP0
Figure 5.2: Example policy graph for a connected scenario
Algorithm 3: Symmetric key generation for encryption of XML data
Input: A set of data labels DL = {L1 . . .Ln} associated with an XML document’s elements
forall distinct (tag,level) pairs (t, l) in labels in DL do
generate random symmetric key kt,l;
end
forall label Li ∈ DL do
ki = 0;
forall (tag,level) pair (t, l) ∈ Li do
ki = ki⊕ kt,l;
end
end
a company or organisation satisfies this requirement is left again to be verified by SHH.
The protected patient’s data package must therefore contain information related to the specified policy graph.
To do so, we modify the mechanism to generate the symmetric keys used to encrypt the XML document
described in Section 4.7.2. Instead of generating a symmetric key for each distinct data classification label
associated with the document’s elements, we generate a symmetric key kt,l for each (tag, level) pair (t, l) in the
policy lattice. The symmetric key used to encrypt an element associated with a specific data label is generated
as the xor of all keys kt,l for which the (tag, level) pair (t, l) appears in the label. The process is described by
Algorithm 3.
All elements associated with the same data label L j can now be encrypted with the same key k j. Once the
PAP has received all policy updates (including PAES graphs), the derived data manager has labelled the data
and the PEP has encrypted it with the generated keys, the PEP also generates n symmetric keys kPi (one for each
authority policy Pi, or non-leaf node ni in the graph). The keys are used to generate a publishing licence that is
a concatenation of message parts m0 . . .mn generated according to Algorithm 4. The algorithm takes in input a
policy graph, the set of keys kt,l associated with (tag, level) pairs and a symmetric key km used to encrypt the
metadata. Intuitively, each message mi is associated with a node ni in the graph and contains (possibly part
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Algorithm 4: Publishing licence generation
Input: A policy graph, the list of (tag,level) pairs and corresponding keys (t, l) : kt,l and a key km
forall nodes ni = (Pi,DEAi) do
if out(ni) 6= /0 then
generate random symmetric key kPi ;
end
end
forall nodes ni = (Pi,DEAi) do
generate message mi = Pi;
if out(ni) = /0 then
in f oi = km|list o f (tag, level) pairs ∈ Pi and corresponding keys kt,l;
end
else if out(ni) 6= /0 then
in f oi = H(Pi),kPi ;
end
forall ea ∈ DEAi do
mi = mi|{in f oi}PKea |IDea;
end
end
forall node ni do
if Node Type(ni) 6= ”strict” then
forall node n j ∈ in(ni) do
mi = mi|{in f oi}kPj ;
end
end
else if Node Type(ni) = ”strict” then
generate random symmetric key k′Pi ;
mi = mi|{in f oi}k′Pi ;
num = #in(ni);
/* break the key in num fragments */
{fragi,1 . . . fragi,num}= break(k′Pi ,num);
l=1;
forall node n j ∈ in(ni) do
mi = mi|{ f ragi,l}kPj ;
l++;
end
end
end
of) the information to unlock the information associated with subsequent nodes in the policy graph. Therefore,
each message contains the policy of node ni (or set of (tag, level) pairs for leaf nodes), the set of directly trusted
evaluation authorities that can be contacted (with their identity certificates IDea) and the decryption key (or
fragment of decryption key) to decrypt the subsequent node’s information (or the data for leaf nodes). Keys
associated with strict nodes are fragmented using a simple xor function so that a key fragment is generated
for each parent node. For leaf nodes, the policy to be satisfied is the list of (tag, level) pairs associated with
the node. Messages for leaf nodes also contain the key km used to encrypt the metadata that must be used by
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evaluation authorities to evaluate the usage control policies and the list of keys kt,l associated with the (tag,
level) pairs. The message parts for a labelled document published with the example policy graph of Figure 5.2
would thus look like:
m0 P0 (list of all (t,l) in the leaf node) | {km, list o f all (t, l) : kt,l}kP1 |
{km, list o f all (t, l) : kt,l}PKBob | IDBob
m1 P1(Stem cells facility with USnews rank ≤ 10) | {H(P1),kP1}kP2 |
{H(P1),kP1}PKSHH | IDSHH
m2 P2(Recognised org. granting funds) | {H(P2),kP2}PKSHH | IDSHH
Figure 5.3 depicts the new protected data package containing the message parts as a publishing licence. Each
key kPi is used to protect the keys corresponding to subsequent nodes in the graph. A copy of each symmetric
key kPi is also protected with the public keys of the directly trusted evaluation authorities for Pi. Therefore, to
obtain key kPi an entity belonging to group GPi must be authorised by an authority ea ∈ GPj where ni ∈ out(n j)
or by a directly trusted authority for Pi, i.e. by entities that can decrypt key kPi . If a node is a strict evaluation
node, a new key k′Pi is generated to protect kPi . The new key is then fragmented and each fragment is protected
with the key kPj corresponding to a node n j ∈ in(ni) . Therefore, to obtain key kPi an entity belonging to group
GPi must be authorised by an entity that is in all authority groups GPj for each node n j in the set in(ni) (i.e.
an entity that can obtain all fragments of k′Pi and reconstruct it). As for the data package described in Section
4.7.2, the packages integrity is also protected. An attacker trying to modify one of the messages mi could either
modify the unprotected policy, the encrypted parts of the message or the directly trusted authorities’ identity
certificates. In the first and second case, the attack would be detected by an authority when accessing the hashes
(or list of (tag, level) pairs and corresponding keys in message m0) in the message’s encrypted part. In the third
case, the package would become useless as only the originally intended authorities can decrypt the rest of the
package. In other words, modification of any part of the package would result in the impossibility of accessing
the data, but not in an incorrect policy evaluation.
Policy Evaluation and Enforcement in Connected Environments
The policy evaluation process for a PAES policy graph can be described as a recursion of the process described
in Chapter 3. It comprises an initial forward process (policy evaluation) and a final backward process (key
disclosure). The policy evaluation process finds a chain of entities satisfying the policies in the policy graph.
The initiator is the data recipient e that receives the data with the messages m0,m1 . . .mn and tries to access
it. Let P0 be a leaf node containing the set of (tag,level) pairs contained in the data label associated with the
data e is trying to access. The data recipient first looks for an entity ea ∈ DEAP0 she trusts. If the search
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PAES Publishing license Encrypted XML document
<VICTIMS>
      <VICTIM status="alive" label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 1)">
<NAME>Jane</NAME>
         <SURNAME>Austen</SURNAME>
         <GENDER>F</GENDER>
         <AGE>23</AGE>
         <NATIONALITY>British</NATIONALITY>
         <DOB>1980-04-07</DOB>
 <PHONENUMBER>07877578834</PHONENUMBER>
         <ADDRESS>
     <ADDRESSLINE>390 High Road</ADDRESSLINE>
     <ADDRESSLINE>South Kensington, London</ADDRESSLINE>
     <POSTCODE>SW7 2AZ</POSTCODE>
 </ADDRESS>
         <CONDITIONS label="(confidentiality 0),(privacy 2)">
     <SYMPTOMS>
 <SYMPTOM active="yes">
     <DESCRIPTION>head bleeding</DESCRIPTION>
     <FIRST-AID date="2000-01-12T12:33:00Z">bandaging</FIRST-AID>
     <SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>apply stitches</SUGGESTEDTHERAPY>
 </SYMPTOM>
     </SYMPTOMS>
 </CONDITIONS>
      </VICTIM>
</VICTIMS>
Protected data package
m0
m1
m2
....
mn
metadata
Figure 5.3: Protected data package
succeeds, e sends m0 to ea (in practice she only needs to send {in f o0}PKea , as described in Algorithm 4). The
evaluation authority ea can then perform the same evaluation process described in Chapter 4 and return the
keys kt,l with which e can reconstruct the keys used to protect the XML elements. In this case, the protocol
would be identical to that described in previous chapters. Otherwise, e can choose any entity e0 she trusts and
that grants him access under P0. Then e sends the messages to e0. To return the keys to access the data, e0 must
first access the encryption key used to encrypt in f o0. Let this key be k1, associated with policy P1. Therefore,
e0 iterates the process by looking for an entity that positively evaluates it under P1 and to which it can send
messages m1 . . .mn. The sequence of evaluations terminates whenever an entity ea ∈ DEAPi returns a positive
evaluation. Whenever there is a strict node in the policy graph, the entity that wants to access the in f o field
must contact more than one higher-level authority to receive all the fragments of the key encrypting it.
In the key disclosure process each entity ei ∈ GPi satisfying policy Pi is allowed to get the symmetric key
necessary to disclose the information at the subsequent nodes in the policy graph. This process is initiated by
the last entity in the chain eh. Entity eh is a directly trusted evaluation authority and can thus directly access
the information H(Ph),kPh (or km and the set of keys kt,l if Ph is contained into a leaf node) encrypted with its
public key. It can then check the integrity of policy Ph and send kPh to entity eh−1. This will then disclose kPh−1 ,
thus iterating the process. If an entity must be evaluated by more then one authority because of a strict node in
the policy graph, then it must combine all the policy fragments obtained by the various higher-level authorities
to re-construct the original key. If the set of (tag, level) pairs contained in a node is not sufficient to reconstruct
a whole label associated with the data (excluding tags associated with 0 and * levels), then the data recipient
must try to access the information contained in more than one leaf node, thus performing several times the
above protocol.
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Figure 5.4: High level architecture integrated with PAES for use in connected environments
Figure 5.4 depicts the updated version of the proposed architecture. The authority selector component is
used by the PEP to select trusted entities. This is realised with a simple predefined list to compare with the
entities contained in the DEA sets. If no entity in the set is trusted, we let the user select an entity from the
predefined list. Other more complex approaches are indeed possible. Note that evaluation authorities must
also be provided with an authority selector as they also must be evaluated. Figure 5.5 shows the interaction of
components for policy evaluation. The figure does not show the whole evaluation process since after a suitable
evaluation authority has been selected, the process continues as depicted in Figure 3.7.
Figure 5.6 shows the policy evaluation process in the example described at the beginning of the previous
section. The recipient of a patient’s record sends the message parts, along with her credentials (certifying that
she is a biochemist working for MRC and specialised in stem cells) to a research facility. Since authority
policies are public, she should look for a facility running a project on stem cells and ranked by USNews,
as specified in the requirements. We call this entity e0. e0 verifies that the recipient is a MRC biochemist
specialised in stem cells, removes message m0 and sends the data, along with its credentials, to an organisation
that funds research projects. We call this entity e1. e1 verifies that e0 is a facility working on stem cells and
ranked by USNews, removes message m1 and sends the data, along with its credentials, to SHH (e2). SHH
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Figure 5.5: Interaction of components for policy evaluation using PAES in connected environments
can directly access h(P2) and k2 and verify that e1 is a company whose research grants are publicly recognised.
This concludes the forward process.
During the backward process, i.e. when keys are disclosed, e2 sends k2 to e1, who can now access and verify
the integrity of P1. If the policy was not tampered with, it can send k1 back to e0, who can now access the
(tag, level) pairs list with the corresponding keys and the metadata. It can evaluate the policies corresponding
to the (tag,level) pairs and send the keys back to the data recipient who may now access the document. Note
that the integrity of the metadata and the (tag, level) list is guaranteed by the fact that both are encrypted like
the keys encrypting the document. Maliciously altering any part of the publishing license would result in the
impossibility for the authorities to decrypt the metadata, encryption keys or document.
Each entity trusts the one at the next level to see its credentials and to verify correctly whether it satisfies the
requirements specified in the policy. However, trust is not transitive since it is strictly related to the evaluation
of a policy which involves only two nodes. Credentials sent from an entity to an authority to be evaluated
are in fact not further disseminated and confidential information is accessed only by authorities trusted to do
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Figure 5.6: Policy evaluation recursion
so. Finally, since at each step a part of the data package is removed, entities at each level can only access the
information they have been authorised for. With respect to trust management systems, recipients no longer
need to gather credentials from every entity involved in the chain. At each step two different entities (evaluator
and evaluated entity) perform a part of the protocol and evaluate part of the policy chain. At the end, the data
recipient only has to present her own credentials to the chosen authority and does not worry about the other
entities being part of the chain.
5.3.3 Partially Disconnected Environments
Let us now consider the crisis management scenario described in Section 1.3. When network connectivity is
absent, the movements of first responders at the scene of the accident can be exploited to carry the information
to whoever needs it. The multi-hop ad hoc network paradigm [CG07, RHB+07] was introduced to address sit-
uations where no network connectivity is available. Intuitively, peers exploit the temporary ad hoc connections
they establish with each other when moving to deliver messages. Vahdat et al. [VB00] introduced the concept
of epidemic routing, i.e. the broadcast of messages to all nearby peers to guarantee their final delivery to an
intended recipient. Lilien et al. [LGY07] proposed the opportunistic networks (oppnets) paradigm, where a
small set of initial peers (seeds) iteratively ask others to participate in the network and become helper nodes.
By including new peers the oppnet grows, thus increasing the likelihood that messages are delivered. Li et
al. [LR00] proposed an algorithm to modify peers’ movement trajectories to increase message delivery. The
Haggle project [SHCD06, SSH+07] integrates the various approaches by introducing an architectural layer that
automatically selects the best connection mode available when applications require network access.
Oppnets are ideal for first responders that need to exchange information in the area of an incident and several
proposals have applied ad hoc networking to crisis management. Aschenbruck et al. [AGPG+07, AFMT04]
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present a mobility model for rescuers based on the established procedures that public agencies follow when
facing a crisis. The simulation results show that ad hoc networks benefit from an higher density of the peers
and their constrained mobility. Lilien et al. [LKB+06] highlight the general security requirements for ad hoc
networks in terms of message privacy and integrity and of common attacks that can hinder the network oper-
ation (e.g. denial of service). However, the authors suggest that because of the impossibility of authenticating
peers when they enter the network, it is necessary to rely on intrusion detection or trust management systems
to discover malicious nodes only after they have already misbehaved. Seth et al. [SK05] propose the use of
hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) to encrypt messages disseminated in an ad hoc network. How-
ever, this solution is suitable only when the identity of the intended recipient is known in advance and when
all the participants on the network know the central private key generator (PKG). Moreover, as the scale of the
incident grows larger, several agencies are called to intervene and share information. Although DSAs between
the agencies would have been typically set up, it is not possible for them to agree about which responders will
be authorised to access which data (and pre-emptively give them access keys created from access hierarchies
or using attribute-based encryption), as crisis situations often evolve in sudden and unpredictable ways that do
not conform to the rehearsed scenarios. The context in which the events unfold must thus be considered at each
access request. Agencies with no pre-existing DSA and whose rescuers have not been given any pre-defined
key may also be called upon to intervene. In general, data protection schemes for ad hoc networks are mostly
intended for protecting communications between a specific sender-recipient pair, i.e. to protect data packets
while they are stored and forwarded by intermediate nodes. This conflicts with the need to disseminate in-
formation widely and in a timely manner. Information must be shared among several responders and sending
separate copies of the same data to each intended recipient is not a viable solution in such a low bandwidth net-
work. Similarly, the centralised architecture of traditional rights management solutions makes ERM approaches
unusable in opportunistic and ad hoc networks.
Opportunistic Network Overview
Let us assume that responders are equipped with mobile devices such as PDAs, smartphones and netbooks
capable of running an instance of our data protection architecture and capable of short-range wireless com-
munication so that they can establish temporary ad hoc connections when they are close to each other. The
devices can also store small amounts of information and can deal with encryption keys and algorithms. Modern
smartphones with a Java virtual machine and equipped with an SD card or other memory are typical examples
of the devices we consider. Let us also assume that responders manually activate a disconnected operations
mode on their devices, so that they can actively search for nearby peers to communicate with. This is mainly
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Figure 5.7: Data exchange in a crisis scenario
done to save battery when connectivity is available. Alternatively, the disconnected operations mode could be
automatically turned on when no network is detected. However, this solution would again result in a waste of
battery in the case no connectivity was available but there were no need for data exchange. The emergency
opportunistic network established in our scenario (Figure 5.7) comprises three types of peers: rescuers (the
same depicted in Figure 4.15), bronze command centres (BCC) and roots of authority.
Rescuers move in the disaster area, gather information and store and forward messages while moving. Note
that they may carry messages that they cannot themselves access, which are protected as described in the
following sections. BCCs are usually located on emergency vehicles on the perimeter of the disaster area.
Although it is not a strict requirement, we consider BCCs to have special connection capabilities that allow them
to send/receive information to/from silver command centres (SCC) located in the organisations’ headquarters.
They thus receive information both from rescuers and SCCs. As described in Chapter 4, both BCCs and
SCCs aggregate information received from both outside and inside the disaster area and re-disseminate derived
information possibly of limited size. Roots of authorities are the peers entrusted by the respective organisations
to start a sequence of policy evaluations, i.e. the entities placed as directly trusted evaluation authorities in
the PAES policy graph. They keep the access and usage control policies and deploy them in the crisis area.
Each individual rescuer is assumed to store in her device a copy of the identity (public key) certificate of the
roots of authority and of the BCCs belonging to her agency and of others well-known trusted third parties
(e.g. certification authorities). In our scenario, we consider BCCs to work as both roots of authorities and data
aggregators.
Using PAES in Opportunistic Networks
The difficulty in applying traditional ERM protection schemes to oppnets is the lack of reachable trusted eval-
uation authorities (EA) that can be used for data publication and policy evaluation. When publishing data that
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Figure 5.8: An example PAES hierarchy for crisis management
will be disseminated in an environment with no connectivity, the only entities that data recipients will be able
to contact are those that will move in the disconnected area. In other words, the only entities that will be able to
evaluate whether a rescuer can access some data or not are other rescuers moving in the area and that the data
recipient can meet and interact with.
Rescue organisations typically have pre-defined intervention strategies that their personnel follow during
crisis management. Similarly, pre-defined strategies for policy evaluation can be specified as PAES graphs.
Figure 5.8 shows an example PAES graph for crisis management. Consider the scenario where a police BCC
receives from the company owning one of the tankers involved in the accident a short document with details
about a liquid leaking into a sewer. The information is immediately disseminated in the area via opportunistic
forwarding and with an attached label whose confidentiality level states that all rescuers can access it while the
emergency operations are still ongoing. The DSA stipulated by the police, fire brigade and ambulance services
specifies that any data recipient requesting to access the data must be authorised at least by a fire fighter (sat-
isfying the fire fig policy) or a paramedic (satisfying the param policy), provided the current emergency-code
level described by a security token disseminated by the police is “red”. In other words, if the situation is severe
enough that data must be released more quickly, fire fighters and paramedics can act as evaluation authorities
trusted by data originators (or, more specifically, by their organisations). They are located close to potential
recipients and are thus in the best position to evaluate their access to data. However, before they can do so, their
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role and the value of the current emergency code must be verified. Fire brigade team leaders (satisfying the
team ld policy) and expert medics (satisfying both the doc pc and doc amb policies) are considered authorities
to evaluate these conditions, as they are the most suitable individuals for evaluating their subordinates. How-
ever, even team leaders and medics must be evaluated to verify that they can be trusted for policy evaluation, i.e.
that they satisfy the specified criteria. Since the organisation originating the data is the police, it is necessary
that police identifies an authority to act as a “bridge” with the fire brigade and ambulance services. In other
words, an entity that can pass authority to members of the two partner organisations during the emergency. It
is thus decided that team leaders must be evaluated by police sergeants (satisfying the pol srg policy). Since
medics must take care of much more delicate tasks, it is also decided that doctors should receive an explicit
authorisation by both an ambulance services’ rescue team leader (satisfying the amb ld policy) and a police
sergeant. These new authorities can be directly evaluated by the respective BCCs that act as roots of authority.
To maximise the probability of meeting a trusted evaluation authority, recipients can also contact authorities at
higher levels than their direct parents in the policy graph. For example, when the current emergency code is not
equal to “red” and paramedics and fire fighters cannot act as authorities, recipients (including fire fighters and
paramedics) can still contact fire brigade team leaders and medics to access the data.
The solution we propose to allow policy evaluation in ad hoc networks is to evaluate policies preemptively
and authorise (even unknown) peers when they are met in the crisis area, possibly before they receive any data.
In our example, rescuers may have no contact with the police BCC. However, the police BCC gives to police
sergeants the right to evaluate fire brigade team leaders. Both sergeants and team leaders are likely to move in
the area and meet more peers. They can then evaluate them and give them either access rights or evaluation
rights, according to the defined policy graph. Police sergeants may meet team leaders and give them evaluation
rights over fire fighters. Team leaders are then likely to move and meet fire fighters, to whom they can assign
the corresponding evaluation rights. Finally, fire fighters may meet other rescuers and give them access rights.
Evaluation or access rights are therefore passed from an authority to a peer whenever they meet for the first
time, opportunistically.
One of the most important aspects of crisis management is the timeliness of the information. Delays in
accessing data caused by the absence of connectivity with an evaluation authority may cause severe problems
during the operations. The preemptive policy evaluation we propose is therefore a suitable solution.
Authority Specification and Deployment
As root of authorities, BCCs initiate the dissemination of authority rights in the area of the accident in the
form of disseminated group keys. First, they generate an authority table on the base of the PAES policy graph
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ID Policy (Y conditions) EAGs DEAs Node
Type
Keydata
fire fig role=“fire fighter” ∧ emergency code=“red” team ld APKfire fig
param role=“paramedic” ∧ emergency code=“red” doc pc
doc amb
strict APKparam
team ld role=“team leader” pol srg APKteam ld
doc pc role=“doctor” ∧ expertise=“emergency” ∧ explicitAu-
thorisation=“true”
pol srg APKdoc pc
doc amb role=“doctor” ∧ expertise=“emergency” ∧ explicitAu-
thorisation=“true”
amb ld APKdoc amb
pol srg role=“sergeant” BPC APKpol srg
amb ld role=“rescue team leader” BAC APKamb ld
policy
lattice
fire fig
param
Table 5.1: Example authority table
described in the DSA. Table 5.1 shows an authority table for our example. Each row associates the identifier of a
group of authorities (in the ID column, corresponding to the ID of an authority policy) with the authority policy
entities must satisfy to be assigned to it (in the Policy column), and with the authority group(s) authorised to
evaluate whether the policy is satisfied (in the evaluation authority groups, EAGs column). For simplicity, the
policy specification in the example table contains only the positive conditions (contrary to the policies described
in Chapter 4 which also contain a negative and a not applicable set of conditions), but a full specification is also
possible. The DEAs column is instead used to specify directly trusted authorities. Their ID in this case must
correspond to the ID contained in their identity certificates that must be stored in the devices. The Node Type
column specifies whether the policies are contained either in a loose-evaluation node or in a strict-evaluation
node. Intuitively, each row represents a node of the policy graph. As for traditional policy evaluations, once
a peer becomes a member of an authority group, it is trusted to verify the satisfaction of the policy conditions
(that must be monitored) periodically. Thus, while a condition for a group G is temporarily not satisfied, the
peer is trusted not to use the corresponding authority, i.e. it does not evaluate peers for groups Gi for which G is
an evaluation authority group. The last line in the table indicates which authorities can evaluate usage control
policies associated with (tag, level) pairs.
Each authority group G is also associated with a pair of public and private keys (APKG and APK−1G ) contained
in the Keydata column. Possession of a group private key is synonymous with membership in that group. Keys
are periodically refreshed by roots of authority before any new crisis event, to avoid reuse of keys distributed
during previous events that may have been compromised. Initially, rescuers do not possess any private keys as
their membership in a specific authority group must be assigned by a trusted evaluation authority. No one is
part of any group a priori, as keys are distributed during the crisis. This is done for two main reasons: first,
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Figure 5.9: Policy graph with multiple strict evaluation nodes
context conditions must be considered when evaluating policies; second, rescuers belonging to organisations
who are not part of a DSA might also need to access data and may thus receive the keys during the crisis if they
satisfy the corresponding policies.
Group private and public keys are initially generated and kept only by roots of authority in special data
structures described in the next section. While public keys are freely distributed when peers meet, distribution
of private keys is subject to policy evaluation.
Key Generation
The process generating the authority private key pairs is a function of the policy graph defined in a DSA. It
can be run either by roots of authority or higher-level entities managing them (e.g. SCCs). For each row in
the authority table a new key pair is generated and the corresponding public key is stored in the Keydata field.
Consider an authority ea and a peer e being evaluated by ea to be assigned to group GP. If the evaluation is
positive, ea must be able to give APK−1GP to e. Therefore, every evaluation authority must be given the group
private keys of all the authority groups it can evaluate. However, if policy P is part of a strict evaluation
node, then ea must be a member of different authority groups to evaluate P, e.g. GPi and GPj . Therefore ea
should be able to obtain APK−1GP and give it to e only if authorised by two possibly different authorities. This
is why for strict evaluation nodes private keys are split in several shares with an xor function and given to
different evaluation authorities specified in the table. The use of the xor function for secure key fragmentation
is well-known in cryptography [key03] and assures that no knowledge about the original key can be gained
from knowing only a subset of its fragments. However, not only APK−1GP must be fragmented, but also all the
keys or fragments of keys of groups for which GP is an evaluation authority group.
Consider the example depicted in figure 5.9. To be authorised to evaluate P0 (i.e. to have APK−1GP0 ), a peer
must satisfy P1 and P2. Satisfying each policy should provide a key fragment of APK−1GP0 (frag1 and frag2
respectively) to the peer. To be authorised to evaluate P2 and provide frag2, a peer must satisfy P3 and P4.
Also frag2 should then be fragmented, so that each evaluation provides a fragment of frag2, i.e. frag3 and
162
frag4 respectively. Key APK−1GP0 should thus be actually split in three fragments frag1, frag3 and frag4. We
assume peers do not collude to obtain fragments they do not possess to reconstruct whole keys and impersonate
authorities they are not authorised for. We also assume they do not evaluate strict-evaluation policies before
being members of all the groups they need (e.g. a member of GP1 does not give frag1 if not also possessing
frag2). These assumption are reasonable since each fragment is issued only to peers that satisfy specific trust
requirements (i.e. policies). Private keys and their fragments are stored in special key data structures of the form
(keyFragment,evalChain), where keyFragment is a key or fragment of key and evalChain is the sequence of
authorities that can have the key and pass it to others after a positive policy evaluation. Keeping information on
such sequences is necessary as authorities store keys for their direct children, but also for all their descendants.
Algorithm 5 describes the recursive procedure to generate the key pairs and key data structures initially stored
by roots of authority. keysetID is a set of key data structures belonging to the authority ID . Note that despite
the similarities with Algorithm 4, the two algorithms produce very different results. Algorithm 5 generates in
fact a set of keyset data structures and requires a recursive procedure to fragment keys according to the policy
graph. Algorithm 4 instead generates a set of messages that constitute a license ready to be disseminated with
the data and does not require any recursion since fragments of keys must not be further fragmented. The result
obtained by Algorithm 5 for the policy graph of our crisis example (Figure 5.8) would then be:
keysetpol srg ={(KP−1pol srg, pol srg),
(KP−1fire fig,fire fig/team ld/pol srg),
(KP−1team ld , team ld/pol srg),
(KP−1doc pc,doc pc/pol srg),
(fragparam,1, param/doc pc/pol srg)}
keysetamb ld ={(KP−1amb ld ,amb ld),
(KP−1doc amb,doc amb/amb ld),
(fragparam,2, param/doc amb/amb ld)}
Note that only the key sets for root nodes are generated, since any other information would be redundant.
Keys and key fragments belonging to each group can be easily recognised as the group’s ID is included at the
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first position in the evaluation chain.
Algorithm 5: Authority key generation procedure
Input: An authority table
forall TAG elements ea do
generate random key pair (APKea,APK−1ea );
AddKey(ea, (APK−1ea , ea));
end
Procedure AddKey:
Input: An authority ea, a data structure KD = (frag,chain)
if EAGs(ea) = /0 then
keysetea = keysetea∪{KD};
end
else if Node Type(ea) 6= ”strict” then
forall a ∈ EAGs(ea) do
AddKey(a,(frag,chain/a));
end
end
else if Node Type(ea) = ”strict” then
num = #EAGs(ea);
/* break the fragment in num new fragments */
{frag1 . . . fragnum}= break(frag,num);
i = 1;
forall a ∈ EAGs(ea)) do
AddKey(a, (fragi, chain/a));
i++;
end
end
Authority Evaluation and Key Distribution
When a crisis situation occurs, the agencies involved must first of all ensure that responders (including those
from other agencies) are aware of their data protection policies, especially if a common DSA is not available.
We must consider this case when dealing with crisis management scenarios where different agencies intervene
on the scene and must cooperate even with nor previous agreement. As we will describe later, this implies that
rescuers must exchange all information on the DSA they operate under, so that the corresponding policies can
be enforced also by users of other organisations that did not agree on it. When operative in the area, roots of
authority (in our example BCCs) first try to locate nearby directly trusted authorities (in our example BCCs
from different agencies) and contact them. If communication is possible (as we generally assume for BCCs),
they exchange the respective authority tables and policy lattices. Even if direct communication is not possible,
officials of the different agencies would typically have a face to face meeting (e.g. a briefing) to organise the
operations. Data could then be exchanged. Thus, initially all BCCs are considered to know the policy graphs
and policy lattices of all the initially involved agencies. If organisations share the same DSA, the DSA specifies
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who must generate the authority table and key sets to be distributed. Otherwise, different policy lattices from
different DSAs can be easily merged into one lattice including all tags, CVPs and transformations. However,
policy graphs cannot be merged so easily. Consider two policy lattices lata and latb whose evaluation authorities
are specified by two different policy graphs pga and pgb and let them be merged into a policy lattice latc. If a
new data object satisfies CVPs from both lata and latb it will be labelled with non-default sensitivity levels for
both lattices. Access to the data will thus be subject to the evaluation of several policies coming from different
lattices, where each policy requires a different evaluation authority. In other words, users would be forced
to require access from an authority defined by pga and an authority defined by pgb at the same time, which
would slow down the data access process. This is why having a common DSA for all participating agencies, or
different DSAs whose policy lattices do not overlap (i.e. the set of data objects they protect do not overlap), is
the best situation possible. Once all BCCs are aware of all available policies, the corresponding authority tables
(with no private keys) can be disseminated to all responders.
At this point the roots of authority begin sending to each nearby directly trusted authority the key sets for
the groups they are authorised to evaluate. In our case, police, ambulance services and fire brigade share a
DSA and are thus aware of the common policy graph and policy lattice. Let us assume that they agree on the
bronze police command centre (BPC) generating the corresponding key sets. The BPC inserts keysetpol srg in
the keydata column of its authority table at row pol srg. Since the BAC is a directly trusted authority for the
group amb ld, the BPC sends to it keysetamb ld (via the same channel used to exchange the table).
Figure 5.10: Opportunistic dissemination of authority keys
Starting from directly trusted authorities, group membership is opportunistically evaluated as follows (figure
5.10). Whenever two peers ei and e j come into communication range, unless they have previously met during
the current crisis and have not received new keys in the meantime, they exchange the list of authorities (and of
(tag, level) pairs) they are authorised to evaluate (according to the authority groups they are currently members
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of). Amongst these, each peer chooses the authority groups of which they want to become members. The choice
can be made either by the human user or automatically, according to a pre-defined strategy. The two peers
exchange the list of chosen authorities along with the certificates needed for the evaluation of the corresponding
policies. Each peer evaluates the policies with the received certificates and available context parameters. For
each satisfied policy, i.e. for each new group the evaluated peer must become member of, a new key set is
created containing all the key data structures available whose evaluation chain contains that group. The key
sets are then exchanged and used to update the authority table. Key fragments are also merged whenever
possible to obtain a new fragment or a whole key. Consider a police sergeant member of group pol srg meeting
a fire brigade team leader. After evaluating the policy for group team ld, the police sergeant’s device will
generate keysetteam ld = {(KP−1fire fig, fire fig /team ld /pol srg), (KP−1team ld , team ld /pol srg)} collecting the
key data structures containing team ld in their chains. The fire brigade team leader will then receive the key
set and use it to fill the row team ld in its authority table. With this mechanism, authority keys are distributed
in the crisis area only according to the requirements specified in the policy graph.
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Figure 5.11: Interaction of components for policy evaluation in disconnected environments
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Figure 5.11 shows the interaction of components for policy evaluation. The figure does not show the details
of the policy evaluation that is performed as already described in Sections 3.4.3 and 4.7.3. The main difference
with the protocols described in previous chapters is that peers do not contact neither the DSA Architecture for
policy updates nor the secure token and certification architecture to get credentials. Such services are in fact
unreachable when connectivity is not available. Also, before evaluating each other, peers exchange all available
data (including all known public keys and policies), according to the opportunistic dissemination paradigm.
This is all the more important since disseminated data can contains context tokens and revocation lists to be used
in policy evaluation such as the emergency code token generated by a silver command centre. Organisations
may even assign to well-known rescuers deployed in the crisis area the right/duty to make decisions upon
specific context values (e.g. again, the emergency level). Other rescuers could then update their local knowledge
with the most recent received information. Also, revocation can be partially realised by BCCs performing re-
keying operations at fixed time intervals or whenever important context information changes. This results in the
dissemination of a new authority table and of new key sets together with the updated context information. Note
that re-keying does not correspond to a revocation of the already obtained access rights, but would only prevent
recipients from obtaining new data without a new evaluation. However, re-keying is the first recovery procedure
to enact when something goes wrong, i.e. when unauthorised users get access to confidential data. The fact that
peers act as evaluation authorities that cannot contact external services explains why we did not use specialised
attestation authorities when evaluating trusted platform modules as described in Chapter 3. Clients must store
locally the needed integrity measurements to use when evaluating peers. Similarly, peers are expected to store
public keys of certification authorities to verify the validity of credentials. The mutual evaluation between peers
is possible because the client architecture is already provided with all components (PAP, PDP, PIP) it needs to
evaluate policies, exactly as traditional remote evaluation authorities. Figure 5.12 depicts the updated and final
version of the proposed architecture, where remote evaluation authorities are substituted by clients. Note that
this is true also for connected environments, where evaluation authorities can have the exact same component
structure as clients.
Data Publication in Partially Disconnected Environments
Data publication follows the same process described in Section 4.7.2. However, since connectivity is not
available, peers do not contact the DSA architecture for policy updates, and the publishing licence is built
differently. Once keys for each (tag,level) pair have been generated as described by Algorithm 3 and the data
has been labelled and encrypted as described in Section 5.3.2, the data package is built appending the encrypted
data to the information generated by algorithm 6. The metadata is encrypted with a symmetric key km. Then,
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Figure 5.12: High level architecture for derived data protection in partially disconnected environments
for each leaf node ni in the policy graph a copy of km, of the (tag, level) pairs associated with the node and the
corresponding encryption keys is encrypted with a symmetric key kPi . A copy of the (tag, level) pairs is also
appended in clear to ease the decryption process. If ni is a loose evaluation node, a copy of kPi is encrypted for
each group listed in the node’s EAGs field with that group’s public key. If ni is a strict evaluation node, then
kPi is fragmented and one fragment is encrypted for the public key of each one of the groups listed in the EAGs
field. A copy of kPi is also encrypted for each directly trusted authority and its identity certificate is appended to
the package. All the encrypted kPi or their multiple copies are then included in a publishing licence and attached
to the data, together with the encrypted metadata and km. Therefore, the disseminated package for the example
policy of Figure 5.8 contains, besides the encrypted XML data, the following information:
{metatada}km | list o f all (t, l) : kt,l
{list o f all (t, l) : kt,l ∈ P0}kP0 |
{kP0}APKparam | {kP0}APK f ire f ig
where kP0 is the encryption key generated for the only leaf node P0. In this way only members of the au-
thority groups authorised to evaluate the usage control policies (i.e. paramedics and fire fighters) can decrypt
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the encryption keys to send to authorised rescuers. Also, any alteration of the package would result in the
impossibility for any rescuer to decrypt the metadata, the labels and decryption keys or the whole document.
Algorithm 6: Publishing licence generation for disconnected publication
Input: A policy graph, the list of (tag,level) pairs and corresponding keys (t, l) : kt,l used for the data and a
key km
package = {metadata}km ;
forall nodes ni = (Pi,DEAi) do
if out(ni) = /0 then
generate symmetric key kPi ;
package = package | {list o f all (t, l) : kt,l ∈ Pi}kPi ;
forall ea ∈ DEAi do
package = package|{kPi}PKea |IDea;
end
if Node Type(ni) 6= ”strict” then
forall node n j ∈ in(ni) do
package = package|{kPi}APKPj ;
end
end
else if Node Type(ni) = ”strict” then
num = #in(ni);
/* break the key in num fragments */
{fragi,1 . . . fragi,num}= break(kPi ,num);
l=1;
forall node n j ∈ in(ni) do
package = package|{ f ragi,l}APKPj ;
l++;
end
end
end
end
Data Access in Partially Disconnected Environments
Once evaluation authorities have been distributed in the disconnected area, evaluation of usage control policies
can be performed as for connected environments, provided that the recipient meets an evaluation authority after
she receives the data. Evaluation of usage control policies (i.e. policies associated with (tag, level) pairs) can
be performed only with respect to a specific data object, since the corresponding encryption keys kt,l are only
stored in the data object’s licence and are unique for every published data object. When meeting (i.e. when
getting into communication range with each other), if an authority claims it can evaluate the sets of policies
corresponding to a certain set of (tag, level) pairs contained in a license, then the user can ask it to decrypt
the corresponding keys. The authority can in fact use the private key of its authority group to access the key
encrypting the keys kt,l associated with the (tag,level) pairs. Obtained keys are then stored so that they can
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be combined with keys kt,l from other authorities, in case they were not sufficient to build the whole key
corresponding to a whole classification label. Indeed, if wireless remote connectivity becomes available, the
recipient can also contact a remote authority. Note that the absence of a nearby authority to contact may still
prevent authorised rescuers from accessing the data. However, in our example rescuers such as paramedics and
fire fighters will always be able to access it (provided the context conditions are verified) since they themselves
are considered trusted authorities for the evaluation of the usage control policies. As such, it is preferable to
specify policy graphs such that all the possible intended recipients are included in at least an authority group. In
this way recipients/authorities can directly access the (tag,level) pairs and kt,l keys to decrypt (possibly part of)
the data and to evaluate locally the corresponding usage control policies. Also, if the (tag,level) pairs contained
in a leaf node were not sufficient to generate any label, data recipients may need to acquire more than one
authority, i.e. to acquire access to the encrypted information of more than one leaf node. For example, consider
a policy graph specifying that only firefighters were authorised to evaluate policies corresponding to any level
of the confidentiality tag and that only paramedics were authorised to evaluate policies corresponding to any
level of the privacy tag. This policy graph would have two leaf nodes, one containing all the (c,i) pairs and
one containing all (p,j) pairs, whose parent nodes would be the firefighter and paramedic authority groups,
respectively. A recipient should be (or contact an authority that is) both a firefighter and a paramedic at the
same time to access information labelled as {(c, 1) (p, 1)}. This situation is clearly unlikely. This is why it is
important to balance the tradeoff between granularity of control and performance and why in our example all
(tag,level) pairs are contained in the same leaf node in the policy graph.
An important aspect to consider is what happens when users regain connectivity. The disconnected opera-
tions manager would detect the newly available network and data would no longer be published according to
the opportunistic PAES protocol. However, the system must guarantee that already disseminated data is still
accessible and at the same time leverage the new dissemination context. This is why it is advisable that in the
PAES policy graph each node (or at least the leaf nodes containing the usage control policies) is associated with
at least one directly trusted evaluation authority that is also a traditional, remote evaluation authority that users
can contact when connectivity is available. In this way the passage from disconnected to connected networks
can occur seamlessly. In the opposite case (i.e. the passage from connected to disconnected networks) data
would instead need to be republished under the new conditions.
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5.4 Evaluation
When used in connected environments to determine trusted evaluation authorities, the main limitation of PAES
is scalability. When one of the policies is evaluated negatively, the entity under evaluation must choose a
different evaluator or return back to the previous entity a negative response. This also happens if no trusted
evaluators can be found. Therefore, a policy chain evaluation may return a negative result even if the entity
under evaluation actually satisfies the specified requirements. The flexibility that PAES offers to receive a
negative response and try a different evaluation authority raises a scalability issue. If n entities are required to
evaluate a policy at each level of a chain spanning l levels, in the worst case the number of messages exchanged
would be O(nl). However, we must consider that: i) an evaluation chain can be shorter than the corresponding
policy chain (e.g. if the chosen evaluation authority is directly trusted by the policy writer), ii) policy recipients
can filter out the entities they do not trust or that do not probably satisfy the chain requirements, iii) policy
chains for most application scenarios are very short.
In any case, the major application PAES was intended for is its use in disconnected environments. In this
context, the PAES-driven key distribution creates an overhead on data distribution and data access. Responders
acting in the crisis area may receive useful data that they cannot access because no valid authority has evaluated
them yet. It is therefore important to verify that such an overhead does not create undue burden and does
not significantly hinder rescue operations. We have simulated the movements and communications of rescuers
in the crisis scenario described in section 1.3 using the GUS (Geographic Urban Simulator) [BD09]. We
performed tests that considered the dissemination of data originally sent from the BPC, using the example
policy in Figure 5.8 and considering paramedics and firefighters as the intended recipients. The aim of the
simulation was to evaluate the rates at which keys and data are distributed, i.e. to verify that delay between
the delivery of the data and the delivery of the key is negligible. The simulation has been performed over only
one (although randomised) mobility model, but a pertinent, realistic and pessimistic one, thus guaranteeing the
results are general.
5.4.1 Mobility Model
The simulation area is divided into five different sub-areas:
• The accident area, i.e. the 100m radius perimeter centred on the car crash location;
• The evacuation area, i.e. the area external to the incident perimeter and limited by a 400m radius perime-
ter with the same centre. This is the area used by rescuers to evacuate victims and to move towards the
respective BCCs;
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• The bronze police command centre area, the bronze fire brigade command centre area and the bronze
ambulance command centre area, placed respectively north-west, north-east and south on the evacuation
area perimeter.
Again, we based our simulation and thus the simulated behaviour of rescuers on the study of the actual
procedures followed by public safety organisations in the United Kingdom [GBLD]. Rescuers move according
to the following patterns, partially depicted in Figure 5.13. Fire fighters move in teams of three, including a
team leader. They first move from the BFC area towards the accident area. We simulate the search for victims,
fires or collapsing structures inside the area by having groups of rescuers move to several destinations in the
centre of the emergency area. For each destination reached they wait 120 seconds and then keep moving to
a new one. Constables follow the same pattern as fire fighters. Police sergeants move back and forth from
the BPC area to a random point in the accident area, to simulate a control-and-report activity. Paramedics and
doctors follow the same pattern to simulate rescue and evacuation of victims. All the rescuers move at 1.1 m/s,
which corresponds to the speed of a fast walking person, and broadcast messages every second. This mobility
model is actually the most conservative choice for peer mobility as it represents a worst-case scenario for the
performance of our protocol. Obstacles, forced routes (e.g. roads) and attraction points in the area constrain in
fact the rescuers to move on the same paths, increasing the number of times they meet and thus the performance
of the protocol. Our simulation is thus based on a situation that is more demanding with respect to the protocol
than a real world setting.
The simulation was executed multiple times, each time varying parameters, including the number of rescuers
involved and the communication range of their devices. In particular, we considered 30, 75 and 150 rescuers
(evenly divided between the three participating organisations) with 10m, 20m and 30m communication ranges.
Rescuers were divided as follows in their respective organisations: police sergeants represent 20% of the police
force; doctors and rescue team leaders represent 9% and 20% of the ambulance services force respectively; fire
fighters team leaders represent 33% of the fire brigade force.
5.4.2 Results and Evaluation
To measure the effectiveness of the PAES-driven key distribution, we compare data delivery with the key
delivery time for all rescuers in the system. In the opportunistic networking context, message delivery time
refers to the elapsed time taken for a message to be received by all intended peers within the system. The
delivery ratio represents the total fraction of rescuers who have successfully received a message at a specific
instance in time. In contrast, key delivery time measures how quickly peers receive authority group keys they
are entitled for based on the policy graph available.
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Figure 5.13: Mobility model of rescuers in the emergency area
Rescuers 10m 20m 30m
30 1386 979 887
75 1040 943 883
150 869 804 756
Table 5.2: Average key delivery times (seconds)
Rescuers 10m 20m 30m
30 1333 891 759
75 1197 1117 900
150 1031 864 760
Table 5.3: Average data delivery times (seconds)
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the average key delivery times and average data delivery times (in seconds) obtained
varying the devices’ communication range and number of rescuers. Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 depict the
results when varying the communication range of 30 rescuers. Figures 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 depict the results
when varying the communication range of 75 rescuers. Figures 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 depict the results when
varying the communication range of 150 rescuers. All results show a sigmoid function representing key and data
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Figure 5.14: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (30 rescuers, 10m communication range)
delivery times similar to that found in closed systems. If we refer to the elapsed experiment time as t, then we
see a sigmoid shaped delivery function where the function tends towards 1.0 for increasing t (limt→∞ f (t)= 1.0).
Increasing the communication range was seen to improve the derivatives of both data delivery and key delivery,
as it does increasing the peer population, as expected. We emphasise that both sigmoid functions plotting data
delivery times and key delivery times are close to each other in all experiments. As expected, data delivery starts
prior to key delivery (that is subject to positive policy evaluation). However, while for simulations involving 30
rescuers the data delivery function overlaps or overcomes the key delivery function for most of the simulated
time, for simulations involving a larger amount of rescuers key delivery quickly overcomes data delivery.
Only in scenarios with 30 rescuers is data delivery faster than key delivery for most of the simulations,
as confirmed by the average results plotted in Figure 5.23. The results indicate that keys can be received
before the data, so the overhead posed by the protocol is negligible. We can explain such results as follows.
As the rate of increase in performance fundamentally depends on the multiplicity of broadcast messages to
neighbouring rescuers (i.e. the number of peers and the communication range), the rate of data delivery and
the rate of key delivery are affected by mobility and by the complexity of the policy graph (see later). Policies
are evaluated starting from all BCC areas (i.e. wherever directly trusted authorities are) and thus keys are
distributed from three different locations (and by three different organisations) towards the centre of the crisis
area. Also, having rescuers from the same organisation moving in teams eases the evaluation process, as keys
are directly passed from team leaders to their subordinates. Therefore, performance only depends on a single
step in the dissemination process, namely the passage of keys from a rescuer belonging to an organisation to a
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Figure 5.15: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (30 rescuers, 20m communication range)
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Figure 5.16: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (30 rescuers, 30m communication range)
175
!"
!#$"
!#%"
!#&"
!#'"
!#("
!#)"
!#*"
!#+"
!#,"
$"
-'!!" $!!" )!!" $$!!" $)!!" %$!!" %)!!" &$!!" &)!!"
.//0123425"
6470849:";34"
key delivery
data delivery
Figure 5.17: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (75 rescuers, 10m communication range)
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Figure 5.18: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (75 rescuers, 20m communication range)
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Figure 5.19: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (75 rescuers, 30m communication range)
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Figure 5.20: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (150 rescuers, 10m communication range)
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Figure 5.21: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (150 rescuers, 20m communication range)
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Figure 5.22: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (150 rescuers, 30m communication range)
user belonging to another one. After a key has crossed organisational boundaries, it is quickly disseminated in
the other organisation leveraging the close movements of its rescuers. We emphasise that these consideration
are valid in the general case and not just for our simulation model. First, as we described in Section 5.3.3,
policies are always distributed starting from more than one point. Second, our model represents the actual
mobility pattern rescuers follow during an emergency. Rescuers do not move alone following random routes,
but move in groups in a single direction for a given length that depends on the movement area considered.
Contrary to keys, the data considered for distribution is initially disseminated only from the police BCC area
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Figure 5.23: Average key delivery times and data delivery times with different parameters
and only by police units. To be received by all peers, the data must not only reach the centre of the area, but
also the more distant cooperating BCCs.
We define the complexity of a policy graph as the inverse of the average probability for peers satisfying
certain requirements to meet authorities that can evaluate them, i.e. the probability of obtaining membership of
the corresponding authority groups. Several factors contribute to the complexity of a policy graph:
• the depth of the policy graph, i.e. the minimum number of evaluations that must be performed before a
peer can become an authority;
• the width of the policy graph, i.e. the number of different disjoint groups peers can be members of;
• the number of strict-evaluation nodes, i.e. the number of peers that must meet more than one authority to
acquire whole authority private keys.
The complexity of the policy graph also depends on the deployment scenario. A high probability that context-
dependent conditions are verified during the crisis and a high number of peers satisfying policies at high level-
nodes speeds up the evaluation process. This is why an important aspect of the mobility model is the percentage
of rescuers divided amongst the several groups. Intuitively, weakening the requirements to be an evaluation
authority increases the number of policy evaluations and thus speeds up the key distribution process. Similarly,
stricter requirements mean fewer authorities are present in the area, thus resulting in a higher key delivery delay.
Building a more complex policy graphs for a specific scenario impacts negatively on the performance of the
system (shifting the resulting sigmoid functions) and thereby influences the capacity of the system to deliver
keys. Simulations run with the simpler policy graph depicted in Figure 5.24 confirm this hypothesis. The results
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Figure 5.24: A simpler policy graph
in Figure 5.25 clearly show a shift to the left of the sigmoid function for the key delivery rate. The policy graph
we used for our experiments and depicted in Figure 5.8 is more complex than required in most emergency
scenarios. Moreover, we emphasise that the simulation we performed is based on the dissemination of a data
package starting immediately as the rescue operations begin. This is not a realistic scenario, as rescuers would
arrive at the scene with a set of pre-loaded information and only afterwards, while the operations unravel,
new data would be created and disseminated. In other words, the sigmoid function for data delivery should
be shifted right in all plotted graphs by an amount of time corresponding to the delay between the operations
starting point and the creation and dissemination of the first data package. Moreover, since crisis management
is a delicate activity that must often rely on human judgement rather than automated procedures, users entrusted
with specific authorities may also be allowed to give to users memberships of certain authority groups manually,
effectively providing a break-the-glass override. Consider for example the case where a seriously wounded
victim is being assisted by a fire fighter, but no paramedic is available nearby. Assume that the fire fighter
has access to the victim’s information and that an uninjured victim of the accident is willing to lend assistance,
attesting she is a medic. In this situation, despite the fact that the medic does not satisfy any authority policy, the
fire fighter might decide to give him access to the victim’s data. Break-the-glass policies would also increase
the performance of the key dissemination process, as meetings between peers may result in a key exchange
by means of a manual overriding of the normal authority policies that would not permit it. Finally, break-the-
glass policies represent the main recovery mechanism when data dissemination goes wrong and data becomes
inaccessible.
Nevertheless, the results of the simulations showed that keys for data access are mostly received before the
data itself, thus granting data availability and timely accesses. This means that while responding to a crisis,
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Figure 5.25: Key delivery and data delivery ratio (150 rescuers, 10m communication range) with a simpler
policy graph
rescuers may use the data received immediately (or with negligible delays )as they already possess the necessary
decryption keys.
5.5 Implementation Aspects
Simulations have been performed using the GUS (Geographic Urban Simulator) [BD09], which is capable of
simulating large systems of interacting peers within urban settings. The GUS is built on top of the Java in
Simulation Time (JiST) framework [BHvR03], which provides a discrete event simulation base. Applications
can be written in Java and subsequently simulated in the environment, merging mobility traces with application
logic.
The implementation of the architecture is a simple extension of the one described in Chapter 4 and most
of the components have been reused. Given the simulated environment where our implementation works,
communications between clients have been realised with standard TCP/IP connections. The new components
performing the PAES key generation and distribution have also been implemented in Java and integrated with
the existing architecture. The standard Java crypto and security libraries have been used for encryption, key
generation and fragmentation.
Once the main components had already been implemented for our derived data protection architecture, im-
plementation and integration of the PAES protocol was straightforward. Most of the components were in fact
left unchanged (PAP, PIP, PDP) while others only required minor changes (PEP). The derived data controller
and communication manager components were completely unrelated and separated by the PEP, which helped
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in the integration. Also the basic cryptographic components were reused. In fact, while PAES and our de-
rived data solution address completely different problems, they actually reuse the same primitives, combined
according to different protocols.
5.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we presented the second and third major contributions of this thesis, i.e. the Policy-based Author-
ity Evaluation Scheme (PAES) and its application to connected and partially disconnected environments. We
first introduced policy graphs as the means to specify PAES constraints on policy evaluation, i.e. to specify what
entities are trusted as evaluation authorities for specific policies. We then showed how PAES can be integrated
with the general architecture described in Chapter 3 and the derived data control system described in Chapter
4. In particular, we distinguished between two different cases: data protection in fully connected environments
and data protection in partially disconnected networks. In the first case, PAES allows data recipients to choose
their own trusted policy evaluation authority among those satisfying the criteria defined by the data originator.
Also, it enhances existing solutions by distributing the policy evaluation process, so that the set of evaluation
authorities can dynamically change. This is useful whenever some authorities are unknown or unreachable. In
the second case, PAES allows policies to be evaluated when only ad hoc connections can be formed amongst
moving peers. To prove the solution does not hinder data availability, we performed simulations showing that
the overhead imposed by PAES varies with the defined policy graph but is acceptable for most policies. Stricter
policies come at the cost of a performance decrease. However, we consider most policies to be much simpler
then the example policy we used throughout our simulation and with which the scheme’s overhead was already
negligible.
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Summary of Thesis
Data sharing agreements between cooperating companies require that access to and usage of exchanged data
are controlled whatever the environment in which data recipients are located and whatever the modifications
to which data has been subjected. Enterprise rights management systems and several data encryption systems
have been proposed to protect shared data. The former solutions allow data originators to publish their data
on remote publishing servers that can be contacted by data recipients who want to access the data. The latter
solutions allow instead data originators to directly encrypt their data for a subset of data recipients possessing
specific asymmetric keys.
In this thesis we investigated two of the main problems that affect current data protection solutions and
proposed solutions that enable future progress to be made. First, policies governing data access and usage are
associated with the data at publication time and do not change for the whole duration of the data’s lifespan.
In the real world, data is not just accessed and read by recipients, but used to derive new information possibly
by aggregating or merging it with data published by different originators. Not only modified data may require
stricter or looser protection policies, but policies associated with aggregated data must consider the protection
requirements of all information that contributed to its creation. Second, existing protection systems suffer
from major limitations when data recipients or originators operate in disconnected environments. On one
hand, ERM systems require that data recipients connect to remote publishing and evaluation authorities, which
is impossible when connectivity is not available. On the other hand, encryption schemes such as attribute-
based encryption cannot take into consideration the context into which access is requested, while keys must be
distributed amongst all potential recipients a priori, thus assuming a perfect universal agreement between all
organisations whose employees might receive the data.
We started from reviewing existing solutions, distinguishing between solutions for policy specification and
solutions for policy enforcement. In particular, information flow systems and trust management systems were
at the basis of the solution we propose. We described several trust management languages underlying their
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problems related with credential finding and privacy issues. Finally, we introduced trusted computing tech-
nologies as the hardware/software basic layer assuring enforcement mechanisms correctly enforce the specified
policies.
Given the two different problems we tried to address, we introduced a general data protection architecture
that we integrated with the solutions we devised. In particular, the architecture makes use of trusted computing
technologies to allow data originators to specify policy conditions on the hardware/software configuration of
recipients’ machines who try to access the data. The use we propose for TC technologies differs from other
existing ones as we separate TC from the enforcement architecture, so that adoption of TC verification can be
dictated by high-level policies.
The first major contribution of this thesis is a data labelling and information flow model for derived data
control. The model is designed to allow the partial ordering of sets of policies according to the protection they
provide and the specification of transformation labels that specify how pre-defined transformation functions
modify the security requirements of the input/output data. The idea at the basis of the solution is to adapt
discretionary policies so that they behave as floating labels in a label lattice. Policies are associated with labels
that are in turn attached to data, so that the flow of labels from data to its derivation corresponds to a transition
in the set of applicable policies. The proposed solution allows the control of the sensitivity levels and thus the
policies associated with derived data, at the cost of restricting the usages that data can be subject to.
The second major contribution of this thesis is the policy-based authority evaluation scheme (PAES). Inspired
by trust management systems, PAES tries to apply their concept to ERM systems by allowing data originators to
specify a strictly controlled graph of delegated evaluation authorities and by implementing a policy evaluation
protocol that does not require the collection of all the needed credentials into a central point.
The third major contribution of this thesis is the application of PAES in partially-disconnected environments.
We showed that a policy evaluation across ad hoc links allows policy evaluation and data access and usage
rights to be devolved in disconnected environments, guaranteeing timely access to data with negligible delays.
6.2 Contributions
Crisis management is one of the most demanding application scenarios for applying usage control to dissemi-
nated data, because not only is connectivity not available, but timely access to data is a fundamental requirement
when human lives are at stake. The overall solution this thesis puts forward addresses all requirements by en-
abling data dissemination, usage control and derived data control as dictated by a data sharing agreement in
disconnected environments. Moreover, it provides protection against the attacks we presented as our target in
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Section 3.2.3 and depicted in Figure 3.1. For the sake of completeness, we repeat them here:
• Curious originators trying to learn recipients’ private credentials. The PAES implementation we
described in Section 5.3.2 addresses this problem. Data recipients are in fact allowed to choose their
most trusted policy evaluation authority amongst a policy-defined set of acceptable ones. If a curious
originator published data for an evaluation authority that recipients do not trust or know and she did not
specify an additional authority policy, recipients would be aware of the risk they incur when sending their
credentials for policy evaluation.
• Attacks on the integrity of policies and metadata. All cryptographic schemes we presented for data
publication also protect the integrity of policies and metadata. When data is published using PAES in both
connected and disconnected environments, the disseminated protected package (Sections 4.7.2, 5.3.2 and
5.3.3) contains an encrypted version of the data labels (from which policies can be reconstructed) and
metadata. Alteration of this encrypted information would result in the impossibility of accessing the data,
but not in an incorrect policy evaluation.
• Malicious software reading unprotected data and keys. We addressed this threat by integrating our
architecture with trusted platform technologies capable of verifying the presence of untrusted software
in remote machines (Section 3.5).
• No connectivity. The PAES implementation we described in Section 5.3.3 addresses this problem. Usage
control policies can be evaluated even in disconnected environments, provided that users’ devices are
capable of creating ad hoc connections. None of the existing ERM systems would be able to provide
access to data gathered or created during the rescue operations described in the application scenario of
Section 1.3. On the contrary, our solution allows rescuers to protect data, exchange it and access it in a
timely manner, with only negligible delays. The simulations we used to prove our approach considered
a realistic mobility model with worst-case characteristics (such as the absence of pre-defined paths and
the dissemination of data starting at the beginning of the rescue operations) in which we did not include
break-the-glass policy overrides that would further improve performance.
• Unprotected derived data. The derived data solution we designed and presented in Chapter 4 allows
newly created and derived data to be automatically protected with no intervention needed by human users
and no delays. Solutions that cater for changing data [Ado04] are limited as they expect data authors to
modify the protection policies manually and push them through a centralised publishing server. These
solutions are rather superficial as not only may users specify incorrect policies, but they could neglect
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the issue altogether. Once a policy lattice is specified, it can be used to control data automatically for its
entire lifecycle, from creation through modifications to destruction.
The framework presented here does not aim to address more common attacks and threats such as denial-
of-service attack, main-in-the-middle attack, substitution attack, credential forging, IP spoofing etc. for which
traditional solutions can be deployed. Similarly, we have not addressed threats to the physical and human
environment where data is shared, such as bribery, industrial espionage etc.
Our solution can also express traditional usage and access control policies. PAES can use directly trusted
authorities to replicate the evaluation scheme of traditional ERM systems, while policy lattices can be specified
with only one classification label (i.e. with one level only for all tags). The use of more complex policies
depends on the specific scenario and on the requirements of the organisations sharing the data. In other words,
we designed a system whose different components can be used independently and that, in its simpler form
stripped of all its innovative solutions, expresses the behaviour of existing systems.
While industry and academic research focuses on developing new policy languages and models to express
ever more complex data protection requirements, this thesis puts forward a solution that is orthogonal to existing
solutions. Policies specified in different languages can in fact be organised in lattices and PAES graphs with
minimum effort and enforcement architectures can be updated to enforce the corresponding additional controls.
This is why we based our design on the architecture presented in Section 3.4 that, in its high-level aspects,
is similar to traditional enforcement architectures. The significance of the ideas we put forward and their
contribution to the broader picture of data protection systems lies not only in the requirements they satisfy, but
also in that they do not require existing products and solutions to be fully re-designed. The novel components
we integrated with the architecture presented in Section 3.4 could in fact be similarly and seamlessly integrated
with other architectures.
More in general, what can be learnt from this thesis is that while current solutions can be improved and made
more flexible, this always comes at the cost of either making policy specification more complex or of further
constraining users in their usage of data. Balancing the tradeoff between protection and usability is no easy feat
and greatly depends on the application at hand.
6.3 Operational Assumptions
The correct and efficient functioning of the solutions we proposed is based on a set of assumptions that we
summarise again. First, we assumed a “homogeneous environment” where every user is equipped with a
mobile device capable of wireless communication and of running the data protection architecture described
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in the previous chapters. In particular, the policy decision point of such architecture makes use of a policy
language and set of credentials that are assumed to be used by all the participating organisations. As such,
role hierarchies and the semantics of user attributes, context attributes and obligations are considered to be
well-known by all organisations. Similarly, all users are assumed to store in their device a copy of the public
key of all certification authorities and root of authorities specified in a DSA. Moreover, the mobile devices are
assumed to be equipped with a trusted platform module storing an endorsement key.
When DSAs are in place, we assumed that many domains are present to deal with different types of data, so
that the amount of CVPs to be performed for every new data object is not overwhelming. For example, in a
corporate environment new data created by researchers or product engineers in a development department may
be protected by different CVPs with respect to data created by managers. Moreover, we have assumed that
the set of transformations through which users can modify data is limited to those listed in a DSA. Similarly,
the CVPs we proposed as example assume that users only edit documents that can be easily analysed by XPath
expressions. This is however a restriction of the proposed data model and is not meant to be a general limitation
of the approach.
When a Req CVP is specified to require users to decide the sensitivity level for a given data item, we assumed
that users authorised to access and transform the data are also automatically trusted to take decisions over its
protection.
Given that data is filtered before users can access it, we have assumed XML schemas and DTDs can be
ignored. In other words, the parts of a filtered document that can be accessed by users may not constitute a
valid document on their own.
In scenarios where connectivity is not available and credentials cannot be verified, we have considered a
validity time frame during which revocation lists are assumed not to change. We have also assumed that BCCs
can interact (not necessarily via wireless communication) to exchange policy graphs and keys before the start
of the rescue operations.
For the sake of performance and efficiency, we have also assumed all (tag,level) pairs to be contained in the
same node of a policy graph and that the lowest level authorities in the graph are the intended recipients of the
data. We emphasise that this assumption is actually a best-practice that aims to increase data availability, but
that the functioning of the protection system does not depend on it.
Finally, we have assumed that when users receive private keys, they can be trusted not to collude to exchange
key fragments and do not evaluate policies unless all keys related to a strict-evaluation node have been already
received.
Note that that any system that should integrate out solutions cannot still be considered acceptably safe without
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providing an adequately safe operational envelope, based on the analysis of the hazards that threaten not only the
correct usage and dissemination of data but also the data originators, recipients and users and their environment
in general. Therefore, data usage must be monitored so as to discourage potentially malicious recipients and
to intervene in case of policy breaches. Also, user training and physical security and handling practices for
devices must be provided so that users can make the most of the available tools and so that the risk of human
errors is minimised.
6.4 Caveat
One may argue that writing complex policy lattices and graphs is an additional burden for organisations at policy
specification time, or at the moment when DSAs are being agreed upon. However, we think this is inevitable if
organisations want to control derived data and data usage in disconnected environments with greater flexibility.
Also, a greater control at corporate level implies more restrictions on final users who are forced to use data only
through a pre-defined set of transformations and who cannot specify their own policies unless their organisation
explicitly allows them.
A possible issue of our automatic data labelling mechanism via CVPs is that it may be a very resource-
intensive operation. In fact, the time it can take depends not only on the number of CVPs available, but also on
their semantics and on the size of the data to be labelled. This is why the scope of the available DSAs must be
narrow enough so that only a very relevant set of CVPs is performed for every data object.
When dealing with disconnected environments, the existence of several unrelated DSAs that specify different
policies for the same data objects may deteriorate the performance of our protection scheme. Users would be
forced to require access to data to several different authorities (possibly coming from different organisations)
which may not be present at the same time, or which may not agree on the access decision. In this case access
could be delayed or denied altogether.
Finally, evaluation of policies in disconnected environments relies on the assumption that the validity of
certificates can be verified with revocation lists that may have been received via opportunistic forwarding before
the actual verification takes place. Similarly, evaluation relies on disseminated context tokens that may not
represent the current situation. When a new version of a context token is created and disseminated, it is received
by evaluation authorities with a delay during which incorrect policy evaluations may have been performed. This
is inevitable as no remote services can be contacted to obtain up-to-date revocation lists and context tokens.
In the same way, if policies are updated during an emergency, they must be pushed to all the rescuers in the
emergency area. Dissemination of the new policies suffer from the inevitable delay caused by the opportunistic
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distribution and thus users may be evaluated under different policies, depending on their location.
6.5 Future Work
The ERM and DRM industry has been frequently challenged in recent years by software products that could
circumvent its data protection solutions. This situation led companies active in the DRM area to adopt a new
strategy where software updates are continually pushed on clients to counteract the latest anti-DRM software,
which in turn is usually developed by reverse-engineering DRM products. This caused the DRM market to
reach a stalemate where few real innovations are proposed. One of these, trusted computing, has received
several criticisms [Sch03, Fel03] that, together with the lack of a common standard implementation amongst
software and hardware producers, has led to a slow adoption. In fact, while nowadays several hardware products
carry built-in trusted computing chips, few software products are really integrated with them. On the other hand,
ERM solutions proposed by both industry and academia have kept evolving by introducing new type of controls
such as those defined in the UCONABC model [PS04]. In the future, ERM solutions will be even more integrated
within corporate IT infrastructures, controlling every data exchange not only between employees of the same
organisation but also of partner organisations. However, because of the similarities between the architectures
of all ERM solutions, it seems not enough effort is being put to study new enforcement mechanisms that could
surpass traditional centralised approaches.
The work described in this thesis is a first step to address the problems we considered in existing data
protection systems. However, it is by no means a complete work, as further studies can be conducted. One
of the interesting directions for future work on our derived data solution is the study of possible solutions
to track provenance, i.e. to keep track of the original data and sequence of transformations that ended up
creating a specific data object. A provenance record for data could be very useful when deciding what policies
should be applicable for a given access request, since all policies applicable to all data objects in the lineage
of the requested data could be taken into consideration and merged. This could be performed by taking into
consideration the length of the data lineage (e.g. the number of transformation steps it took to create the current
data) and the depth at which each data object appears. Versioning systems are an example application where
data modifications and transformations are tracked and can be rolled back if necessary, actually building a
provenance record of data. Consider a document being modified so that its classification increases. Some
recipients who could access the document prior to its transformation may now be denied access. However,
they may be allowed to access the older versions of the modified elements in the XML tree, provided the
document contains them too. In other words, recipients may have different views of the same document, being
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able to access different versions of its elements. This possibility also raises other questions. What happens
when a user transforms a document for which she can access only older versions? Which version does the
transformation consider? Would the output document contain also the unmodified versions? Would users be
able to see completely deleted elements of the document?
The possibility to hide parts of a document selectively also raises another problem. Consider the case where
a paramedic is reading the medical details of a patient, but cannot access the section on allergies. Completely
removing the section is extremely dangerous, since the paramedic may give the patient drugs she is not supposed
to take. In other words, besides read and transformation rights it should be possible to specify a special visibility
or existence right allowing recipients to see the existence of a document’s element, but not its content. This
possibility should then be integrated with version control. For example, let us consider the case of a recipient
being granted read rights on an older version of an element and visibility rights on a more recent one. What
would the recipient be allowed to see? Also, it is important to consider that documents may have rules guiding
their creation and validation and filtering them may cause them to become invalid or to be shown in an invalid
form. Future work should thus investigate the possibility of having filtered documents that work with such
schemata.
Many directions for future work are also possible for PAES. Even if the approach offers great flexibility, data
recipients are still limited in their choice of evaluation authorities to those acceptable to the originator as defined
in the policies. A negotiation process between data recipients and originators could offer more flexibility. How-
ever, this possibility raises several problems. First, it would not be feasible in a data dissemination environment
where users may not know each other and may be online at different times. Moreover, this may require the data
to be repackaged for each negotiating recipient and would result in a set of disseminated packages containing
the same information but being controlled by different rules.
Future work may try to integrate PAES with frameworks for hybrid networks such as Haggle [SHCD06,
SSH+07]. In fact, although we implemented the PAES components to be integrated into our proposed archi-
tecture, its testing has been limited to simulated environments and communications via traditional TCP/IP on
ethernet and wifi channels. Future work should thus investigate the use of different wireless ad hoc networks
such as Bluetooth. It would also be interesting to study the applicability of PAES to new communication pro-
tocols such as near-field communication (NFC) and RFID. The processing power of active NFC and RFID tags
could in fact be used to determine who should be entitled to access the tag’s information.
Given the large availability of policy languages and models, the focus of research is now shifting towards
finding new and more effective techniques for policy analysis and validation [CLM+09]. Writing long and
complex policies can in fact become a waste of time if a minimum error in the specification not spotted by
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the policy writer can compromise data protection. In this sense, automatic analysis tools for usage control
policies would greatly help in the specification of both policy lattices and PAES policy graphs. For example,
it could be possible to determine whether data can be transformed so that no one can access it or so that
conflicting obligations must be performed to use it. Or it could be possible to determine whether a PAES policy
graph contains hidden cycles where the constraints of policies at higher levels are a subset of the constraints
of policies at lower levels. In other words, to determine whether entities could be evaluation authorities for
themselves (which is not always an undesirable property, e.g. when policies must be evaluated locally).
Also, while in the solution we proposed policies can be directly written for specific data or for large sets of
objects via CVP, resulting in a possibly complex specification, it would be possible to use machine learning
techniques [CRL10, CRR+09] to learn policies from human behaviour and decisions.
Finally, while we have described how PAES can be integrated with data protection architectures, it may be
possible to use it for different applications such as certification and trust management systems. It could for
example be integrated with X509 certificates so that chains of trust can be specified that depends on PAES
graphs.
A last problem that can be investigated and that regards both connected and disconnected scenarios, is the
problem of recovering from errors in the data protection and thus from data leaks. This includes the problem
of detecting the leaks and identifying who first caused them, and then to take measures to prevent future ones.
To do so it may be possible to rely on quantitative trust management techniques so that the trustworthiness of
users is decreased as soon as they misbehave. Data distribution can then be made conditional on the level of
trust that ca be put in the data recipient.
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